Tomahawks from “Depression Central”

As the North Coast is coated in another couple of inches (feet) of snow – although we’re actually suited for this stuff and a couple of inches (feet) doesn't generally cause “Lockdown Mode” – and with the Cavaliers coming off of their worst loss in franchise history, the tenor in Northeast Ohio regarding sports (and the city/county/region) is at the lowest point in recent memory. With that being the case, now would be a perfect time for the national sports media to join the local sports media in telling us how terrible things are...at least as they perceive them to be.

That being said (and I won't let that glass go anywhere below half-full), let's get some Tomahawks in the air, if only so I can straighten up to see them instead of being bent over a snow shovel...
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By now, you’ve likely seen the piece on ESPN by Jerry Crasnick that is called “Indians follow the Cleveland Way”, with it appearing on the sidebar later among “Most Sent Stories on ESPN.com” in the day as “Crasnick: Indians keeping Cleveland Down”...no, seriously.

The Indians are keeping Cleveland down? The “Cleveland Way”?
Oof...well, you know where this is going…

Obviously, the opening paragraph contain the unbelievably pervasive “Woe is Cleveland” stuff that we can’t escape from the national (and local) media and continues with the trite drivel that’s going to come in one of these pieces as he actually writes “the Indians have also done their share to stoke the city’s reputation as Depression Central” and that “Antonetti must feel like the teenager who got his driver’s license, snagged the keys to the family car and then found out that dad (in this case, the Dolan family) wasn’t willing to spring for the cost of gas and insurance.”

At that point, the body bags are filled with toe tags attached…and he’s not even started any kind of analysis on the Indians.

Ultimately, it’s a cursory look at the lack of off-season activity on the North Coast and an attempt to encapsulate everything going on with the organization in one neat, little package. That may speak to the average fan or the “DOLANZ R CHEEP” crowd, but when Crasnick says that the Royals had a more interesting off-season because they “hastened their long-term rebuild” by trading Greinke, that’s just getting lazy, given that the Indians attempted to do the same in 2008 and 2009 when they moved THEIR Cy Young Award winners and that they’re actually attempting to avoid the “long-term rebuild” that’s been underway in KC for 20 years, with the Tribe now three seasons removed from an ALCS appearance.

As boring and dull as the off-season has been, the past two Julys have been more active than I would ever want to see in my life again, as the Indians almost completely turned over their roster in 30 months, to the point that they fielded the youngest team in MLB and figure to answer more questions about those young players in 2011. In that vein, perhaps the most interesting paragraph in the Crasnick comes when he actually seems to agree with the do-nothing off-season:
While those minor league deals for Adam Everett, Jack Hannahan, Paul Phillips,Travis Buck and Doug Mathis haven’t moved the enthusiasm meter in Cleveland, the Indians are probably wise not to overspend on veterans who would simply replicate what they already have. The team’s two big positional question marks are second base and third base. If the alternative is overpaying for a “bridge” guy like Pedro Feliz or Jorge Cantu, the Indians would rather open the season with Jayson Nix or Jason Donald until Chisenhall is ready to make the jump from Triple-A Columbus.

That sentence is admittedly bolded by me, but let me get this straight...the whole piece is predicated on the Indians doing nothing this off-season in FA while the rest of MLB presumably passes them by, furthering the gnashing of teeth and pulling of hair crowd, when “the Indians are probably wise not to overspend on veterans who would simply replicate what they already have”?
Am I following this?

Crasnick attempts to put a bit of a positive spin in the piece saying that “if you look carefully, there are glimmers of hope” and a look at some of the individual players, but he goes back to the well to close it out, using the “beleaguered” and “financially hamstrung” and “frigid winter” lines that we’ve all come to know and love from the WWL, among other sources.

That all being said, the piece is without insight as Crasnick has a couple of quotes that provide insight on particular players and what people around the league are saying about them. To wit, there’s this on Hafner:
“He’s come back a little more than I thought he might, to be honest,” said an American League personnel man. “A lot of people view him as a lesser player because he’s making more than he’s worth. But he’s still a threat. It makes the opposing manager think when the guy comes to the plate.”

Hafner is still a topic that needs more examination, but Crasnick has some interesting tidbits relating to another supposed slugger, reporting that LaPorta is working with a nutritionist (which Ozzie Guillen will be sad to hear about as he may not be able to call him “Fat Matt MaTola” for too much longer) and MaTola having a “slider speed bat” according to an AL scout, which is more than a little terrifying, given the fact that it is possible that he is what he is at this point in his development.

Perhaps most interestingly is the tone taken by the Indians’ execs quoted in the piece as it departs from the small-market doldrums and actually sounds confident...a change in the public stance from the team, or at least the one that makes it to print. This is from a few months ago, but do you remember the whole “Flipping the Script” idea presented in this space in terms of how the Indians’ Public Relations are a complete disaster, made worse every time the team (poorly) attempts to explain themselves?

Here’s what I wrote as to what they should be saying...at least as a start:
They should be pointing out that they pulled this off once before and while the end result didn’t flesh out the way they thought it would, they’ll be damned if they’re not going to do it again. They should say that the economics of baseball aren’t going to dictate terms to them because they’ve learned from their mistakes and are creating that model franchise with a full pipeline of young players that was promised back in 2002.
--snip--
Use the bully pulpit from the corner of Carnegie and Ontario again to move away from the talk that “this is a rebuilding year again” and say that young in-house talent are unequivocally the players that are going to lead the Indians to their next appearance in the playoffs. If the Front Office TRULY believes it, come out and declare that the assembled young talent at all levels will prevent the team from going into this valley again.

Of course, my prescription called for them to be much bolder than that, but interestingly, here’s what Chris Antonetti said to Crasnick:
“We’ve been in a similar situation before, and we’ve demonstrated the ability to overcome those challenges and put together a championship-caliber team,” Antonetti said. “We feel equally strong about our talent base now and throughout our farm system. The challenge is to have patience and let those guys play.”

That’s the first quote attributed to Antonetti that takes that slant and, while he could certainly play that angle up a little more so it sounds a little more compelling and urgent than that quote, I suppose it represents a start. There are more from Antonetti in this even-handed MLB.com piece by Jordan Bastian which, while operating under the same premise as the Crasnick piece (once you get past the “Antonetti resourcefulness” story that we’ve heard before) that project more of the “we’ve done this before” and “patience is the best path” rhetoric that the Indians should have been spouting since October.

As for final thoughts on the Crasnick piece, if you were expecting something that went more in-depth or attempted to take more than just a snapshot of the Indians as they stand now…well, then you haven’t learned your lesson about getting your sports information from the 4-letter word, the one that ceased being a valuable resource for intelligent sports fan long ago, and is content to appeal to the masses and generate page views and revenue by any means necessary. This is no different and, frankly, probably the reason that you come here…
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One of the other interesting nuggets from the piece (remember, I didn’t say it was useless) was that Antonetti still didn’t rule out adding a starting pitcher, with the obligatory caveats thrown in. Since I’ve never been all that inclined to even take a flyer on Bart Colon (and this may completely rule him out if…you know, performance matters), let me throw another name out there that may be available and could represent a decent value-option for the rotation – Manny Parra.

Yes, I know that he’s been unable to stick in the Brewers’ rotation and his struggles led very clearly to the additions of Greinke and Marcum as Milwaukee has decided that Parra is not destined to be part of a potential playoff team’s rotation, meaning that Parra’s going to get relegated to the role of long man or to the bullpen, but what would it take to pry him out of the Cream City – maybe Crowe (as a 4th OF or to “complement” Carlos Gomez in CF...though neither can hit LHP) and some other ancillary pieces to Milwaukee?

Certainly some of Manny Parra’s numbers are downright frightening – a 5.02 ERA, 1.62 WHIP line in 2010 and a 6.36 ERA, 1.83 WHIP line in 2009 – so why would the Indians even be interested in a guy like Parra?

Well, he’s LHP and while that may not mean much, let’s look past ERA and WHIP to some advanced metrics and how Parra stacks up with pitchers that threw more than 120 innings last year:
xFIP – 3.95 (45th in MLB)
If you’re not sure what FIP is, it is Fielding Independent Pitching and since it now exists, here’s a great explanation of FIP that is actually easy to understand and actually fairly amusing. Taking it a step further than FIP, a variation of it is xFIP, which “attempts to adjust FIP and ‘normalize’ the home run component as research has shown that home runs allowed are pretty much a function of flyballs allowed and home park, so xFIP is based on the average number of home runs allowed per outfield fly”. As it says here in the link to The Hardball Times, xFIP, “theoretically...should be a better predictor of a pitcher’s future ERA.”

Back to Parra, you know where his xFIP of 3.95 ranks?
Better than any Indians’ pitcher, better than...are you ready for this...David Price, Carl Pavano, Josh Beckett, and I could go on for a while. Just check it out for yourself.

Parra is high on this list because if xFIP attempts to “normalize the HR component” and he does give up a bunch of HR (19th highest HR/9 in 2010, 26th highest HR/9 in 2009 among starters with more than 120 IP), it brings that HR/9 back to the normal numbers and adjusts his FIP (4.50 in 2010, better than Tomlin, Gomez, and certainly Huff) to that lower xFIP.

If that doesn’t strike you, how about SIERA:
SIERA – 3.82 (32nd in MLB)
If you’re wondering what in the world “SIERA” is, it is a stat from Baseball Prospectus that stands for “Skill-Interactive Earned Run Average” and it “estimates ERA through walk rate, strikeout rate and ground ball rate, eliminating the effects of park, defense and luck.” Essentially, it attempts to take things that pitchers cannot control out of the equation and tries to account “for how run prevention improves as ground ball rate increases and declines as more whiffs are accrued, while grounders are of more materiality for those who allow a surplus of runners”. It is not all that different than FIP or xFIP, but it takes into account the fact that ground balls are generally preferable to line drives or fly balls and adjusts the number accordingly.

Back to Parra again, if you’re wondering where he sits in the SIERA rankings for 2010, that number bests David Price, Gavin Floyd, Matt Cain, among many others.

In case you’re wondering, the best numbers put forth by a Tribe pitcher last year was, for both metrics, Justin Masterson with his 3.98 xFIP and his 3.83 SIERA...both of which Parra bested in 2010.

So, if both of these metrics attempts to measure what a pitcher can control, why is Parra going to be relegated to the bullpen in Milwaukee and why have his ERA and WHIP simply not translated through if his pitching – taking out luck and fielding, among other things – put him in some rarified air among MLB pitchers?

One answer comes when you see that his BABIP (Batting Average on Balls In Play) is absurdly high, meaning that when a fair ball comes off of a hitter’s bat against Parra, the likelihood that it’s going to end up as a hit is somehow exponentially higher than nearly every other MLB pitcher. In case you think that’s hyperbole, here is where Parra has ranked in BABIP among starters for the past three years:
2010
BABIP - .352 (2nd highest in MLB)

2009
BABIP - .365 (highest in MLB)

2008
BABIP - .337 (8th highest in MLB)

Either Manny Parra is the unluckiest SOB out there who gives up a disproportionate amount of HR and who is the victim or more “unlucky” placement when hitters make contact against him or there’s a definitive reason that more balls that get put into play against him become hits and why more fly balls hit against end up in the stands...and that reason is that he gets hit hard, meaning the Indians should steer clear.

However, there is another interesting aspect about Parra and why he might appeal to the Indians as they search for “value” around the league to augment their pitching staff. Remember the whole piece about how the Indians may be targeting pitchers with groundball tendencies in an effort to find arms that are undervalued because of lower K rates?

Check Parra’s groundball rates for the last few years and how it compares to pitchers with more than 120 IP around MLB:
2010
47.2 GB % - 48th in MLB

2009
48.1 GB% - 28th in MLB

2008
51.6 GB% - 13th in MLB

This is well-worn territory, particularly with all of the GB pitchers on the staff and with more coming, but the improvement of infield defense is tantamount here in 2010 (and count me as irrationally optimistic with Donald more comfortable at 2B and with Cabrera hopefully re-committed to his conditioning), but if the Indians are looking for undervalued options that could upgrade their pitching staff and allow Huff, Tomlin, and Gomez to start the year in AAA, wouldn’t a player like Parra make sense?

Yes, he’s arbitration-eligible for the first time this year, which means that his price tag is going to go up, but after his 2010 in which he actually struck out 129 in 122 last year, posting the highest K/9 rate of his career (9.52…nearly double that of Mitch Talbot and 6th among pitchers with more than 120 IP last year), Bill James’ projection for him in 2011 is a 4.82 ERA and a 4.07 FIP.

If you’ve not seen the Bill James projections for the Tribe starters, here they are for comparison’s sake with Parra:
Masterson – 4.11 ERA, 3.90 FIP
Carmona – 4.26 ERA, 4.33 FIP
Carrasco – 4.45 ERA, 4.34 FIP
Talbot – 4.73 ERA, 4.07 FIP
Tomlin – 4.08 ERA, 4.46 FIP
Huff – 4.67 ERA, 4.45 FIP
Gomez – 4.89 ERA, 4.48 FIP

Maybe Parra is just another arm that would be unnecessary to acquire and more money than he’d be worth (though he wouldn’t cost much in terms of salary and the team would retain control over him for three years), but if you’re looking for the type of move that I’d like to see the Indians exploring to augment the starting rotation, it doesn’t involve lottery tickets on Bartolo Colon or Bruce Chen (yes, I know I’ve championed him before) or the dregs of the remaining FA.

Rather, I’d like to see them adding a pitcher that they feel is undervalued by his current organization and could be acquired for a package of middling prospects (and we have a bunch) that amount to organizational filler. If a guy like Parra fits that description, let’s see that type of creative move that would bear more fruit than a bargain-bin FA signing and could have more of an impact on 2011 and, more importantly, beyond.
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Back to that idea about infield defense going forward and groundball-inducing pitchers, has anyone else noticed that there seems to be a bit of a logjam at the upper levels of the Minors as it pertains to the two biggest areas of need around the infield?

By that I mean, last year in Akron, the 3B was Lonnie Chisenhall and the 2B was Jason Kipnis…no big mystery there as each is a top prospect and the assumed eventual starter in Cleveland at those postions, perhaps even this year. Since both will now be moving up to Columbus, one would have to assume that (given the infield defense…um, issues with the parent club) the Indians would want to maximize the exposure of those two players at those two positions as much as possible in 2011.

What’s the problem, right?
Well, the 2B last year at the end of the season was Cord Phelps, who then went out to the Arizona Fall League to “learn” how to become a 3B, to presumably put himself into the 3B mix at some point while Chisenhall ripens in Columbus. Well, if The Chiz is playing 3B everyday in Columbus and Kipnis is playing 2B, what about Robert Cord Phelps?

If “Robert” is making a defensive transition to 3B, where is he going to play 3B with The Chiz presumably ensconced at the Hot Corner at Huntington Park?

Yes, this is a largely insignificant “logjam” that probably has an easy solution (maybe Kipnis starts 2011 in Akron, though that wouldn’t get Phelps more time at 3B) and where Phelps plays should perhaps be secondary to the development of Chisenhall and Kipnis, but consider what Dan Szymborski’s ZiPS projections for 2011 look like for Phelps and the presumed 3B for the parent club (at the moment), Jayson Nix:
Phelps - .262 BA / .331 OBP / .369 SLG / .700 OPS (92 OPS+)
Nix - .225 BA / .293 OBP / .384 SLG / .677 OPS (84 OPS+)

These are all projected numbers obviously, but if the Indians have major concerns about Nix’s GLOVE at 3B (and they should), what keeps Phelps from legitimately starting the season as the Indians’ 3B, relegating Nix to a Utility role or to the waiver wire?

Going a little further on this, Phelps posted an .892 OPS in AAA last year over 273 PA in his first year at the highest Minor League levelas a 23-year old. For comparison, as a 23-year-old in his first year (2006) in AAA, Nix posted a .630 OPS while a member of the Rockies’ organization in 397 PA and followed that up with a .793 OPS in AAA in 2007 as a 24-year-old.

Is that to say that Cord Phelps is the “answer” at 3B out of Spring Training?
Of course not, as he struggled in the Arizona Fall League as a 3B and given that his 2010 represented a sharp uptick from his previous MiLB numbers, but realizing that Phelps is making a defensive transition (just like Nix is), would anyone else be surprised or disappointed if Phelps comes out of ST as the starting 3B with Nix as the de facto utility man?

Perhaps I’m down on Nix because I think that his power in Cleveland was largely a fluke and because he posted a .281 OBP in 2010 (6th worst among AL players with more than 350 PA) while he looked like he was completely lost at 3B. Additionally, maybe Phelps is the “Devil I Don’t Know”, preferable to the one I do know in Nix, but all things being equal, I wouldn’t be all that broken up if Cord Phelps pushes his way onto the team in Goodyear (assuming defensive efficiency, of course) with Nix moving to a Utility role, setting the stage for Phelps to become the Utility IF if or when The Chiz arrives from Columbus.

Regardless, I have a lot easier time seeing Cord Phelps as a part of this team going forward as a Utility player than I do Nix and if each is transitioning from 2B to 3B as the Indians look for that stop-gap until The Chiz is ready, it would be foolish to think that Phelps couldn’t break camp with the Indians this Spring as the starting 3B...assuming he can play 3B
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In that 3B discussion, you’ll notice that one name is missing that is often bandied about as an “internal option” in that I can’t say that I consider Jared Goedert as a feasible option for 3B to start the season, considering what we’ve heard about Goedert’s defense and the hopes for improved infield defense at the Big League level for 2011.

Maybe it’s folly to dismiss "Go Dirt" (and yes, I know that pronunciation is incorrect) as a stop-gap 3B option while extolling Cord Phelps (who didn’t play 3B until the Arizona Fall League) as a legitimate option coming out of Goodyear, but Goedert’s value to me would be to provide depth as a RH bat at 1B beneath Matt LaPorta or to perhaps eventually take the role now filled by Shelley Duncan on the team, as a RH 1B/DH that can spell Hafner or be a RH bat off of the bench with some pop. It’s been discussed before about how the Indians are devoid of 1B depth beneath MaTola and, with Chisenhall figuring in as the long-term answer at 3B, a move across the diamond for Goedert may be in order...just as it was for Wes Hodges a few years back.

Hopefully, Goedert's “star” doesn’t dim the way that Hodges quickly did and realizing that Goedert has never played 1B in the Minors, if Jordan Brown and Beau Mills represent the “depth” in AAA and AA (assuming Brown clears waivers) for the Indians...well, that “depth” is pretty shallow. LaPorta is going to get an awfully long leash in Cleveland this year (and rightfully so), but Goedert, whose ticket to the Bigs is likely his bat after his 2010 season in which he hit 27 HR and 37 2B, could find himself awfully useful to the Tribe if he dons a 1B glove and starts the year in Columbus as the Clippers’ 1B.

Reason being that if LaPorta were to find himself on the DL or if Travis Hafner is in need of some RH protection from someone not named David S. Duncan, Goedert would represent a solid internal option. While I can’t seem to find Goedert’s splits from last year (as minorleaguesplits.com has unfortunately closed up shop), I seem to remember that Goedert thrived in particular against LHP in 2010, meaning that he would be a nice bench option/quasi-platoon player with Hafner going forward, even for a limited time.

If you’ll remember that Austin Kearns’ splits show that he has no greater success against LHP than RHP (.749 OPS vs. RHP in 2010, .740 OPS vs. LHP in 2010), meaning that the Indians are likely to still be looking for some RH protection for Hafner in the lineup. Certainly, it could come from playing Marson at C against particular LHP, moving Santana to DH to remove Hafner from the lineup and to give Santana’s body a break from the “tools of ignorance” every so often.

However, another option going forward could be Goedert and while some are still inclined to list Goedert as a 3B, after hearing about his defensive...um, adventures, I’m more inclined to let Goedert slide over across the diamond to 1B and attempt to push his way into the Indians’ plans with success against LHP, while providing some necessary insurance against that guy with “slider bat speed”.

Maybe Goedert (who is 4 months younger than LaPorta and will be 26 this May...with all of 362 PA above AA) doesn’t amount to much more than a piece or a fungible part. But, as is the case with Phelps, wouldn’t it be nice if these types of guys start to surprise us in terms of being legitimate, if imperfect, contributors. After seeing all of these homegrown “prospects” (ahem...Sowers, Crowe, Brown, Huff, etc.) have the curtain pulled back on them to reveal them to be inadequate even to simply serve as placeholders, seeing a nice, cheap RH bat off of the bench that can man 1B or DH or a stop-gap 3B who fills the Utility role for 6 years have to be considered player development victories at this point.

That may not quicken the pulse and it certainly gets to a factor determining where the Indians find themselves, but it would also represent a step forward for an organization that has not been able to develop “a nice, cheap RH bat off of the bench that can man 1B or DH or a stop-gap 3B who fills the Utility role for 6 years” for far too long.
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Finally, in light of the events in LaLa Land on Tuesday night and where the Cavaliers currently stand as a franchise (and...um, I would read this if you care about the Cavs), wouldn’t a best-case scenario for the Indians come with some sort of fast start for their 2011 season?

Certainly, I’m not suggesting that the Indians are going to necessarily burst out of the gate and, even if they did, that they would suddenly and miraculously recapture the rapt attention of the North Coast. However, if the Indians were to even stick around .500 for the first couple of months of the season with some of the young guys (like Carrasco and Santana, just to name two) generating some new sources of excitement to go with solid contributions from Carmona, C. Perez, and Choo, there may be some seeds of interest sewn around a building team that (quite suddenly) doesn’t look as far away or seems to be on par with the other major sports franchises of the town.

While that bar may not be all that high right now – and remember “The Cleveland Way” that started this whole run or words – it would certainly seem that the city's attention would be there for the taking...

Stockpiling Arms on A Lazy Sunday

The holidays have passed and the New Year is upon us as the North Coast’s wintry grip starts to squeeze a collective populace that has no football to watch, presides over a basketball team with the NBA’s worst record, and is in the midst of a “Rebuild/Reload/Whatever” at the corner of Carnegie and Ontario. While it already seems like months since we’ve seen the sun and long for the warmer, brighter days of Spring and the promise that it brings with it, it does become difficult to have that optimism translate to Cleveland sports. Making it worse is the tone taken by those who are largely responsible for the coverage of those sports as, just for today’s example, the city’s last major paper uses 238 words to announce that Jordan Brown has been removed from the 40-man roster, but uses a ¼ of them to drop this snide bit of “commentary” just to editorialize the Tribe’s off-season in a largely unjustified setting:
The Indians designated him for assignment to make room for outfielder Austin Kearns, the only big-league free agent the Indians have signed this winter. If that’s discouraging, look at it this way. The Indians are paying Kearns $1.3 million. At this time last year, the only big-league free agent they’d signed was Mike Redmond for $850,000. The Tribe is on a spending spree.

Anyone got a towel to dry that last line off…it’s dripping with unmerited sarcasm.
And the flames of discontent are unnecessarily fanned higher (while the position that the Indians are approaching the off-season exactly as they should is ignored) as that little aside was in the body of a piece announcing the removal of a 27-year-old player from the 40-man roster, a player that is likely to stay in the organization because (this being the first time he’s been designated for assignment) Brown remains in the Tribe organization if he clears waivers, which is likely. Brown being removed is really a non-story (so apparently the PD beat writer took the opportunity to take a swipe at the organization) as he has fallen far enough on the depth chart at enough positions that he’s likely never going to see his way back to Cleveland, unless something goes horribly wrong in the next couple of years…even worse than 2010.

Between the troika a Sizemore, Brantley, and Choo with Kearns in the outfield and Zeke Carrera on the 40-man giving the Indians 5-man depth (and…um, Trevor Crowe…you’re next on this DFA thing as Zeke’s presence makes you more than expendable), Hafner, LaPorta, Duncan, Weglarz, and Goedert all on the 40-man roster, the LH Brown – who is a man without a position and has yet to display much more than a high BA in the upper levels of the Minors – was simply the odd man out. An argument could be made that Brown should have stuck around ahead of Duncan or Goedert, but I’d take both of those players as RH compliments to Hafner or as insurance against MaTola starting slowly again over keeping Brown on the 40-man.

As I said, the Brown DFA is largely a non-story (despite the fact that I just spent all of that time on it) and with that finally out of the way and me off of my little MSM soapbox, let’s get going on a Lazy Sunday that features some of the best Indians’ writers out there (and I would encourage you to click on the links provided as I may be utilizing particular assertions or paragraphs from some of these pieces, but all merit a look of their own volition) all somehow hitting on the same topic…well, kind of.

That topic is one that hasn’t gone unnoticed here as the amount of pieces written in this space that play off of an “Arms Race” or “Arms Debate” or “Bearing Arms” are nearly too many to count (and please note the new “Stockpiling Arms” in today’s title as I may have finally exhausted every pun involving “Arms” in military terms), but that doesn’t mean that there isn’t new ground to tread upon and lots of tremendous articles to get us there.

Besides, it is Sunday and what else are you going to do this today look up Pat Shurmur’s underwhelming resume online again?

Unless you really plan to, let’s get it going…
Back in the saddle after the holidays, Anthony Castrovince starts it off by reviewing the returns for CC and Cliff, taking into consideration the timeframe of when the players should be contributing at the MLB level saying that “it’s not all that unreasonable to suggest that 2011, three years removed from the trade, is a time when LaPorta and Brantley ought to prove their long-term value” and taking it further that “we’ll know a lot more about the Lee trade after 2011, when we get a full-season look at Carrasco in the rotation and we have more definitive answers on whether Jason Donald is a full-time second baseman and Lou Marson, playing in a backup role behind the dish, can hit in the bigs.”

The timeframe that AC points out is more than valid, particularly considering where the players acquired were in their advanced stages development as (most notably) LaPorta, Brantley, Carrasco, Donald, and Marson all arrived to the Indians playing at AA or above. That being said, AC is absolutely correct in asserting that 2011 is a huge year for the evaluation of these trades and while final judgment on either trade at the end of 2011 will still be too early (remember how long it took a certain Arkansan to turn into Clifton Phifer), the performance of the players acquired in the CC and Lee deals (as well as the Victor deal, as all 3 pitchers acquired from the Red Sox arrived at a level of AA or higher) in the coming year will begin to determine not only whether those deals will be viewed as boons or busts, but more importantly, the performance of the players acquired will determine how close/far away the Indians are from legitimately competing.

While the trades of CC, Lee, and Victor find themselves under scrutiny entering the season, WFNY’s Jon Steiner takes a fascinating look back at what the Indians targeted – specifically in the Lee and Martinez deals – in that they added a number of potential impact arms, something that is not always easy to do on the trade market, as Steiner points out with the help of some fascinating charts and lists.

Steiner defends the arms acquired, calling the manner in which they added players resembling “a buckshot approach” and finishes the piece with a challenge to find that one trade whose return looks better that has happened in recent years that looks better than the arms netted for Cliff and Vic because high-impact, young pitching generally isn’t traded:
The deck is stacked, especially when it comes to pitching, and you get what you can, not what you deserve. Or, to put it another way: where are all these impact pitchers that have been acquired via trade? If the market doesn’t deliver them up, it’s hard to fault the organization for not acquiring them.
So if you think we could have gotten more, you’ll have to show me a team that did get more.

Interestingly, you know who the best pitcher in recent memory acquired via trade when he was still in the Minors has been?
Um…Cliff Lee, acquired back when he was a soon-to-be-24-year-old Harrisburg Senator that was moved from the Expos’ AA team to the Indians’ AA team back in 2002.

Not since Randy Johnson with Seattle has there been a Cy Young Award winner (and I know that’s a fairly arbitrary criteria) that had been traded as a prospect and won with the team that acquired him as a prospect. But isn’t that exactly what happened with Lee, the one that had only 62 1/3 MLB IP before his age 25 season…the one that didn’t emerge as a legitimate ace until he had spent 4 full seasons in MLB and parts of 2 more, with 129 games started under his belt before his 2008 season, when he was 29 years old?

The one who was acquired by THIS FRONT OFFICE (or some amalgamation of it) nine years ago?

Lest anyone think that Lee was this hotshot prospect who was viewed as much more than an auxiliary piece to the Colon deal, here’s ESPN’s write-up of Lee at the time of the trade...and please click on that link to see how the Colon deal in its entirety was viewed real-time by the WWL:
Cliff Lee, LHP, 23 - Lee, ranked only as Montreal’s 11th-best prospect at the start of the year, blossomed into one of the top pitchers in the Eastern League, going 7-2 with a 3.23 ERA (7th) and 105 strikeouts (1st) in 86.1 innings. He relies on control, with just 23 walks, but has allowed 12 home runs.

That’s the whole description and, if you’re curious, that “11th best prospect” ranking prior to 2001 comes from Baseball America prior to 2002 and the 10 players ranked ahead of Lee were Brandon Phillips, Brad Wilkerson, Grady Sizemore, Donnie Bridges, Josh Karp, Justin Wayne, Rich Rundles, Zach Day, Luke Lockwood and Eric Good.

If you’re still not convinced, realize that Baseball Prospectus said at the time that Lee would be joining Akron along with “fellow left-handed pitching prospects Billy Traber, Brian Tallet and Alex Herrera” continuing that “Lee figures to be ready for the majors at the end of the 2003 season. His upside is that of a #3 starter.”

Is that supposed to lead us to believe that Corey Kluber is your 2016 AL Cy Young Award Winner?
Certainly not, but it speaks to the idea that these prospects (and particularly pitchers) are difficult to quantify in terms of floors and ceilings, even by the most astute publication or scout as even the very top prospects often flame out. To that end, the Indians trusted their internal scouting and asked for Lee as part of the deal, for which they would be vindicated, even if the ultimate vindication didn’t come until 2008. Whether the volume of pitchers that they now count as their own in the system (ranked as 3rd best and probably the deepest by an interesting new measure) pan out to that degree is certainly up for debate…but time is the only argument that will settle that debate.

Back to the Colon deal briefly, the aforementioned B-Pro piece, written on July 2nd of 2002, is absolutely fascinating to read in terms of how history repeated itself at the corner of Carnegie and Ontario and two most interesting parts of it, particularly pertaining to today’s topic, come at the end...and remember, this is about the Colon deal in 2002:
Some fans wondered why the Indians didn’t receive more pitching in return, or try to get a player that could contribute right now. Shapiro made inquiries along those fronts, but teams simply weren’t willing to part with players that they felt were instrumental in their continued run for the division.
--snip--
The Colon and Alomar trades have not gone over well with Tribe fans. Winning breeds expectations, and right now, those expectations are not being met. The radio talk shows have been bombarded with negativism and attendance has already taken a hit. Most teams in all four major sports have periods in which they have to re-tool; now, it’s the Indians’ turn. Shapiro knows that the remainder of the 2002 season will be a tough time. Cleveland fans should at least feel comfort in that the men in charge have a plan and intend to stick to it. If everyone involved just shows a little patience, there should be a reward at the end.

Check out that first line in particular and how it relates to the Steiner piece, in that young pitchers generally don’t get traded and read that second part again and realize that if the Indians were currently handling themselves in the press with that sentiment, while the critics who are quick to blame Shapiro for everything (and have since 2006) aren’t going to be convinced, that their perception among the fanbase would be held in much higher regard.

Regardless, back to this idea of evaluating the deals of the past two-and-a-half years and the focus on adding pitchers at multiple levels, let’s take a look at the deals that the Indians consummated from 2009 to now. I’m not including the CC or Blake deals as I think that it is important to remember that the Indians still thought contention was possible in 2009 when they added DeRosa and Wood, so the returns on the CC and Blake deals were more designed to augment the pieces in place than they were to usher in a full blown reconstruction project.

Conversely, when DeRosa was moved, followed by the Lee deal that signaled (pretty definitively) that the “Rebuild/Reload/Whatever” was truly underway, take a look at the players acquired in order of trade:
DeRosa Trade
RHP Chris Perez
RHP Jess Todd

Betancourt Trade
RHP Connor Graham

Garko Trade
LHP Scott Barnes

Lee Trade
RHP Carlos Carrasco
RHP Jason Knapp
C Lou Marson
2B Jason Donald

Victor Trade
RHP Justin Masterson
LHP Nick Hagadone
RHP Bryan Price

Picking up a trend yet with 11 players acquired and 9 of them being pitchers?
On we go...
Pavano Trade
RHP Yohan Pino

Shoppach Trade
RHP Mitch Talbot

Branyan Trade
OF Ezequiel Carrera
SS Juan Diaz

Peralta Trade
LHP Geovanni Soto

Kearns Trade
RHP Zach McAllister

Westbrook Trade
RHP Corey Kluber

Since I’m not including the Wood trade because it was a straight salary dump, with the exception of the Branyan trade when they added Zeke Carrera (whose presence makes Trevor Crowe extremely expendable), THEY’RE NEARLY ALL PITCHERS…that’s 18 players added since the DeRosa deal and 14 of them are pitchers of various pedigree and at various levels.

Some of these guys contributed immediately to the parent club with various degrees of success ranging from high-impact (C. Perez) to steady contributors (Masterson and Talbot) while some were not far off from contributing and were either highly-thought of like Carlos Carrasco (and here’s another of the pieces from Adam Van Arsdale at LGT about the most important players going forward on Car Car and if you’ve not been reading all of these, which also now includes Santana...well, shame on you) or represented decent, near-term options like Jess Todd.

Others were mid-level prospects around AA or AAA who were either thought to be starters (Barnes, Pino, McAllister, Kluber) or potential relievers (Hagadone, Price, Graham) with the final grouping coming in the form of the arms that were furthest away, as players that still can’t legally drink with either a great amount of upside (Knapp) or who represented a possible diamond in the rough, posting a 2.93 cumulative ERA in low-A (Soto).

That cumulative return doesn’t yield the immediate returns that most Indians’ fans seem to be looking for (and this guy puts the Indians’ 2011 rotation as the 10th worst in MLB…and also interestingly the 3rd best in the AL Central), but you start to see how these arms acquired via trade start to line up from Cleveland to Lake County.

Throw those on top of the players added via the draft in the past two years (Pomeranz, White, and Gardner most notably in the near-term) - who were added for some serious cash as Pomeranz’s $2.65M bonus ranks as the 3rd highest signing bonus in club history after Danys Baez and Jeremy Guthrie while White’s $2.25M bonus slots him with the 5th highest signing bonus after Baez, Guthrie, Pomeranz, and Jerry Sowers - and you start to see this idea of trying to pull together a depth in arms that puts those famous “Waves of Arms” (that never arrived) to shame by sheer volume.

Actually, the inclusion of Baez, Guthrie, and Sowers on that Top 5 Amateur Signing Bonus list is instructive to not get too excited about any of these guys, whether it be a lack of time or talent that catches up to them, seeing those names and remembering the hopes…no, assumptions that once existed for them gets back to the idea that the Indians are attempting to take the attrition rate for pitchers and bludgeon it away with arm after arm.

A good friend e-mailed this to me earlier in the week on this very topic, saying that “it’s possible the Indians are ahead of the game again. They’re not doing a sabermetric end run around the small market catch-22. They’re lining up in the power-I with fifteen guys on the field. I mean does anybody even approach this organization in depth?”

To his point, the Indians learned what happens when attrition, injury, and regression take out the players (and, most notably, the pitchers) that the organization is counting on to simply continue to fill holes. Hell, most of us thought that the pipeline was full back in 2007 with Carmona excelling in MLB and Miller waiting in the wings with a whole gaggle of LHP to fill the back-end of the rotation around Lee and Westbrook after CC was going to leave. Much to our chagrin, but we found out that when Fausto sprouts a spare tire, when Atom Miller’s finger protests, and the gaggle of LHP turn out to be “Sowersian”, we were left with scraps, opting for Hot Carl Pavano and dipping too deeply into depth that wasn’t there.

Perhaps if TINSTAAPP (There Is No Such Thing As A Pitching Prospect) rules the day, maybe the only way to counteract that (particularly for small-market teams that can’t buy depth on the open market) is to just load up on players at an unprecedented rate…and isn’t that kind of what we’ve seen since the DeRosa deal?

As my aforementioned good friend continued in his e-mail earlier this week, he thinks that “you’d have to spend a fortune on the draft in this model - like, enough that you’d forsake even some modest free agent signings. And make a lot of Zach McAllister / Scott Barnes type mid level pitching acquisitions to provide some insurance for your more valuable arms. And you need a roster with a lot of flexibility in terms of veteran flotsam and guys with options”…and again, doesn’t this sound exactly like what they seem to be doing?

In no place is it as obvious as in the bullpen going up and down the system, with TCF’s Al Ciammiachella illustrating the net effect of this very clearly in a great piece on bullpen options that exist below the surface and how the Indians have not only targeted potentially high-impact arms for the bullpen, but that they’ve done it en masse. Certainly not all of these guys are going to pan out, be it relievers or starters, as everyone should carry a card in their wallet that says “Remember Atom Miller” whenever it is assumed that a certain player or players will simply assume the mantle of starting pitcher or 2B or closer or 3B.

However (and just to keep this with the pitchers), if the Indians attempt to add (via trade or via the draft) arm after arm that can be neatly slotted one after another, to the point that there looks to be almost too much depth (and legitimate depth, not depth created by homerism), then the Indians will be able to perhaps achieve what they were ultimately unable to do in the first “Rebuild/Reload/Whatever” and sustain that pipeline of arms.

Let’s be honest in that they started out with a TON of arms back around 2002 or 2003 that sorted themselves out (Traber, Tallet, Lee, Davis, Cruceta, Rodriguez, Westbrook, among others) in the rotation, but the bullpen always remained the Achilles’ Heel as for every Dave Riske (relievers who contribute to the parent club), there seemed to be 5 Fernando Cabreras, promising arms that flame out. Maybe that is still the case, in terms of attrition, and maybe the Indians are planning for 10 to 20 Fernando Cabreras, knowing that they just have to get 2 or 3 Dave Riskes out of the equation to accomplish what they were never able to in 2006 and 2008 as a lack of internal depth (particularly in the bullpen) put the best-laid plans under the blade of the guillotine.

As a quick aside here, did everyone see that Chris Archer (a Tribe 5th Round Pick in 2006 and one of the 3 Minor League arms involved in the DeRosa deal) was just sent by the Cubs to the Rays and was called the “most significant chip” the player that most compelled the Rays to make the deal with the Cubs, according to TR Sullivan of MLB.com.

You know, Garza...the starting pitcher with 3 straight seasons of sub-4.00 ERA who isn’t a Free Agent until after the 2013 season, same time Choo becomes a Free Agent? Yeah, that whole “the Rays are a small-market success story” may have been a bit premature as they have now lost or will lose Crawford, Pena, Garza, Soriano, Benoit, Navarro, and Choate this off-season as they attempt to fill holes internally and on the fly, acknowledging that the 2011 season “will be very difficult”.


With the Indians having recently occupied where the Rays sit at this point in their development (with 2 good seasons and more supposedly on the way, do you notice what the Rays’ Front Office – you know that “brilliant” Andrew Friedman and his counterparts in the Front Office – is doing?

Yep, they’re loading up on prospects to go on top of their own prospects in an attempt to outpace attrition and to build a team that doesn’t just has the possibility to maybe contend for a division title, but rather to load up for a run of a couple of years when they can legitimately compete in the playoffs, as they recently have…it’s just that the “load up” isn’t going to come in 2011.

Keeping it with the Garza trade and today’s topic, Kevin Kaduk of Yahoo’s Big League Stew has an interesting take on this from a Cubs’ perspective saying that the trade doesn’t make much sense on the North Side, unless they’re trying to create some fan interest with the move, perhaps at the expense of the best long-term plans:
I would have rather the Cubs kept on the path of the first long-term plan that's been spotted on the North Side since Mark Grace was chain smoking in the minors. The continuation of that plan should have looked like this: Write off 2011, stock the prospect pool further by trying to move Carlos Zambrano and Aramis Ramirez near the trade deadline and sell, sell, sell the idea that these sacrifices will all pay off big dividends in the years ahead.

This is for the large-market Cubs, whose likely best path back to relevance (and I’ll remind you that they were in the playoffs in 2007 AND 2008) is to punt on 2011 and maybe 2012 and live to fight another day. If that represents the most prudent strategy for the Cubs at this point in their organization, how does it relate to what the Indians are doing, having punted on 2010 and probably 2011 when they traded Lee and Martinez (among others), attempting to live to fight another day?

Whether they’ll ultimately have the muscle to bring to that fight remains to be seen, but what happens in 2011 (particularly on the mound) is going to go a long way in setting a fight date…

Tomahawks and The Weight of “Brass”

Finally almost firmly back in the saddle here after a week in Milwaukee over the holidays that was highlighted by standing next to Craig Counsell at the cheese counter in a Pick ‘n Save on Christmas Eve morning (no, I did not mention how he has a hand in my sports misery as The DiaBride held my tongue) and lowlighted by a stomach bug that swept through the fam on Christmas night, let’s get back to doing what we do around here and get some Tomahawks in the air while being flabbergasted that Manny Acta is now the longest-tenured coach/manager in Cleveland sports.
No, seriously...

Since the Hall-of-Fame debates hold only marginal interest to me even if former Indians are involved (and this grand-standing on both sides of the argument leading up to the voting for a lot of these players is getting increasingly exhausting and off-putting), let’s attempt to keep the focus on the North Coast and let’s get them up in the air...
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One of the truly enjoyable moments of my trips to Milwaukee always come when I get a chance to talk some baseball with my brother-in-law (a Cubs’ fan), who commiserates with me on the state of our teams while sipping some Fat Tire or Spotted Cow and marvelling at the money still owed to Hafner, Zambrano, and Al Soriano by our unrequited loves.

This Christmas however, provided some new baseball talk fodder as my in-laws welcomed a relatively new guest to the festivities as The DiaBride’s cousin arrived and it was quickly revealed that he, being a Brewers’ season ticket holder on the heels of the Greinke trade and knowing that the two of us are big baseball fans, wanted to talk some Brewer baseball.

Realizing that this is a forum that focuses nearly exclusively on the Indians (sometimes to an unhealthy degree), follow me on this as it’s coming around to the Tribe...

Obviously, the Brewers’ fan was thrilled about the additions of Greinke and Marcum and what it meant to the Brewers’ chances in 2011. At one point, the pedigree of the prospects and players leaving the Brewers was introduced and it was quickly shot down by the Brewers’ fan, who laid out the lines of the night (well...at least in the non-Christmas division) as he said that prospects shouldn’t matter to the Brewers because Fielder will be leaving after this season and that the Brewers have a chance to really go for it in 2011...which, he said, is exactly what they’re doing.

He went on to say that he didn’t care about the long-term ramifications of trading prospects because the Greinke and Marcum trades showed that the Brewers’ Front Office is serious about winning and that (here comes the money line) this off-season has shown that the Milwaukee Brewers have some...wait for it...“brass”

This is the money line and not just because I love when people use the term “brass” to describe the...um, “undercarriage” of a particular person or entity. Rather that “brass” of the Brewers’ Front Office is what has endeared the team to the city’s fanbase as Milwaukee showed some “brass” when they were in contention in 2008 by acquiring Sabathia and now are showing some serious “brass” in cashing in their prospect chips (and a lot of them) to make a serious run at the 2011 playoffs by using their young players to address the glaring deficiencies on their team that weren’t going to be filled by any internal options.

This particular Brewers’ season ticket holder said that he’s more than happy to send his check into the Brew Crew for his season tickets this off-season because of the “commitment to winning” that they’re showing through their actions and not through empty words. Keep in mind that this Brewers’ team has finished the last two seasons with 80 and 77 wins, “good” for 3rd place in their division for each of the last two years, with a good portion of the same stable of young talent in place from their 2008 playoff appearance

His zeal and his optimism got me to thinking about the situation and wondering, what is the weight of “brass” for an MLB team and how it relates to the public’s perception of them?

There’s no question that the Brewers are going for it and that their fanbase is reacting to the actions favorably, per Biz of Baseball, as the club added 1,500 season ticket holders after the Greinke deal (compared to 400 new season ticket holders added in the first two months of the season last year) and also, “secured renewals on two of their Founders Suites, which are located on the Field Level...renewed five Club Suites (Club Level) and have also had a number of inquiries from potential new customers regarding Club Suite availability.”

By now, you see where all of this is going in relation to what we’ve seen since the CC trade to Milwaukee and the shrinking attendance numbers at the corner of Carnegie and Ontario. After the 2007 ALCS appearance, with one year left on Sabathia’s contract, the Indians stood pat for the most part in the ensuing off-season, content to allow their young players (who had fueled the stretch run in 2007) continue to develop and to lead the team back into contention in 2008.

Obviously, that never happened and while the team did make additions in the following off-season (namely Wood and DeRosa), the die seemed to have been cast with the Indians as “sellers” and with the Dolans as “cheap” and with the perception of an organization more likely to sit on their hands than be pro-active when the time for activity arose became pervasive through 2009 and turned toxic in July of that year and into the new decade. Further, in light of Max Ramirez (the prospect moved for Kenny Lofton in the summer of 2007) being DFA’d by the Rangers with his .699 career OPS in all of 140 MLB PA since being moved by the Tribe, the “value” of holding onto prospects is certainly a valid topic.

In hindsight, what move could have been out there that may have galvanized the Tribe fanbase, to give the sense that the Front Office had the “brass” be it during that 2007 season or after the ALCS appearance?

Looking at the FA signings after the 2007 season, nothing really jumps out in terms of filling huge holes via FA that existed because the major hole that was revealed came from a incendiary bullpen that “boasted” first half ERA’s for what was assumed to be ¾ of their back-end in Borowski - 7.56 ERA, Betancourt - 6.00 ERA, Jensen Lewis - 4.73 ERA, among others. Should they have done more than simply add Masa Kobayashi? iOf course, but If you’re looking at that FA list, I suppose that a case could be made that the Indians should have made their bullpen addition THAT off-season, with the likes of Francisco Cordero (134 ERA+ in 2008) and Scott Linebrink (125 ERA+ in 2008) being the most attractive names available on the FA market.

But would that kind of addition (Cordero or Linebrink) generated the type of excitement that we’re seeing in Milwaukee?

They could have added a “big” bat (Jason Bay was always the name bandied around), although it is worth mentioning that the 2008 team scored the 7th most runs in MLB. Sure, most of those runs came in the second half as they made their improbably push to .500 and it would have to be argued that the team would have had to have foreseen the nauseating team-wide slump in the first half (seriously, look at these numbers), the injuries to Martinez and the stunning drop-off from Hafner or the startling regressions from Gutierrez and Cabrera.

Perhaps you could make an argument that another starter would have helped given what we know about Carmona’s disappearing act in 2008 (although he did start out much better than a certain Hefty Lefty) and with Westbrook hitting the shelf in May, but that would have taken more than just a little crystal-ball gazing and would have meant that Cliff Lee (the 5th starter to start 2008) would have likely been traded to accommodate such an addition.

This is all an exercise in futility, I know - attempting to re-write the past and wondering what the future would look like with that altered past (forgive me, “Back to the Future” was on AMC the whole time I was laid up sick at my in-law’s house), but the actions of the Brewers this off-season - trying to burst through that open window - and the inaction of the Tribe prior to the 2008 season - attempting to let “The Plan” follow through as the course of “action” - is fascinating as both small-market teams have taken a much different approach to their “window” of contention with their fanbases responding accordingly at the Box Office.
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Of course, it bears mentioning that the additions of Greinke and Marcum could result in nothing more than another 3rd place finish for the Brew Crew with injuries, regressions, and a lack of depth submarining any hopes of them taking the NL Central title away from Cincinnati or the Cardinals as it takes a while for these things to shake out and...well, that’s why they play the games.

However, it is more than a little interesting to note that the Indians reportedly kicked the tires on the former Cy Young Winner Greinke (and for a fascinating trade breakdown on a Cy Young Award winner being traded, here’s one...the Luis Tiant deal from the Tribe to Twins that occurred over 40 years ago), in that the reports regarding the Indians’ “pursuit” of a legitimate starting pitcher are rare this off-season.

To that end, here’s a little blurb on whether the Indians were in on Brandon Webb (since signed by the Rangers for an incentive-laden deal that likely took the Tribe out of the running) from Jordan Bastian, who also touches on Huff and Laffey in an “Inbox”. As for other arms that have found new homes, Chris Capuano has gone to NYM in a deal that I wouldn’t have minded the Indians ($1.5M base), given his performance down the stretch for the Brewers last year and his left-handedness.

Not allowing themselves to be totally shut out of the “Arms Race”, the Indians acquired RHP Joe Martinez from the Pirates, a soon-to-be-28-year-old who doesn’t miss many bats and while he has some groundball tendencies, likely figures to play some role as a swing man/spot starter for 2011 as he has two options remaining that the Indians are likely to burn as the back-end-of-the-rotation and front-end-of-the-bullpen figure to have some major turnover as 2011 progresses. You may recognize the name as Martinez came up in the Giants’ organization and was involved in a gruesome batted-ball-off-of-the-head incident in 2009. Last year, he was dealt to Pittsburgh, where he briefly came out of the bullpen as a long man, logging multiple innings in 3 of his 5 appearances…so, meh.

Further, the Indians inked RHP Doug Mathis to a minor-league deal (OH, THE HUMANITY!) with Mathis spending most of his 2010 in Oklahoma City playing for the Rangers’ AAA club. Last year, he posted a 5.56 ERA in AAA over 18 games (15 starts) and had a brief stint with the Texas parent club, posting a 6.04 in 13 relief appearances. Like Martinez, Mathis played the role of multiple inning reliever from time to time with Texas, throwing more than 1 IP in 5 of his 13 appearances. While his ERA is frightening, 8 of the 15 ER he let up in MLB in 2010 came in one appearance against the Blue Jays, when he gave up 3 HR in 1 ⅓ IP.

In 2009, Mathis was a serviceable reliever for the Rangers, posting a 3.16 ERA (148 ERA+) and a 1.15 WHIP over 42 ⅔ IP in 24 games, 13 of which he finished as a member of the bullpen. He’ll be 28 in June and doesn’t strike anybody out (44 K in 87 ⅓ MLB IP), so figuring on him to be much more than rotation/bullpen fodder isn’t realistic, but effective relievers can come from unusual places and Mathis’ 2009 showed that he can be a “part” in a bullpen, albeit a relatively minor one.

All told, maybe Martinez is an upgrade over Justin Germano, who he ostensibly replaces on the 40-man, maybe he is not. Maybe Mathis can re-capture some of the success he enjoyed in 2009 coming out of the Rangers’ bullpen, maybe he can not. Ultimately, the warm body filling the 40th roster spot or a reliever on a Minor League deal with some modicum of MLB success is not a major concern of mine.
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Much more concerning to me is the fact that the Indians suddenly look like the 2nd best team in Cleveland and, depending upon the direction the team that plays at the Lakefront takes may be the furthest along in terms of a “rebuild” as it would seem that Square 1 is what the Indians look to be stepping up from in 2011.

Whether they do or not remains to be seen, but pitchers and catchers report in 39 days, so answers (and probably more questions) are not far off…

Spending A Lazy Sunday On…Spending

During the season in which spending comes under the microscope for all holiday shoppers, the lack of spending at the corner of Carnegie and Ontario has remained in the crosshairs for the faction of Clevelanders more inclined to make a joke about “the cobwebs in the Dolans’ wallet” than to take a logical overview of where the team stands after the tear-down that took place from July of 2008 to the dawn of a new decade. Nevertheless, with every signing by another team drawing snickers and every Minor League signing from the Tribe drawing howls from those that are still paying attention, the Indians continue to let the FA market and trade market evolve without them. None of this was unexpected nor does it represent a foolhardy stance for the off-season, but the scope of their inactivity was in plain view last week as the off-season spending by all MLB teams was compiled and tabulated by MLBTR.

You’re only going to get one guess – and you’re probably not going to be wrong without even looking – as to which team ranks dead last on the list, with only the Kearns’ $1.3M deal on their “added” ledger for the off-season.

Cue the pulling of hair and the resounding harrumphs...right?
To a degree I suppose, as an off-season in which a team almost does literally nothing certainly doesn’t generate a lot of intrigue or excitement among even the most rabid fans, as much as the strategy may make sense. However, taking a deeper look at this, peruse that list again and realize that there is a very clear distinction between “Dollars Spent” and “Dollars Spent Wisely” for any given team in any given off-season, regardless of expectations or market size.

This goes without saying as recent memory has shown us that when the Indians have “Spent” on the FA market, they have had their share of hits (Millwood and Pavano most notably) and more misses (Wood, Dellichaels, Kobayashi, etc.) and there’s no telling from one off-season to the next which players will fall into which column. Spending in a given off-season (or even being preternaturally pro-active) does not guarantee any level of success the following year (see the Mariners’ off-season last Winter and their 2010 record) as Championships are not won on paper in January, but after a long and tenuous path has been followed into the Fall.

That being said, as much as the inactivity of the Indians has infuriated some of the fanbase (enflamed by a local media in need of something to deride…not difficult, given the local sports scene), I would offer the idea that the Tribe sitting on their hands is a preferable course of action if you compare the activity of some of the other teams that ended the 2010 season at the bottom of the league.

To wit, the woebegone Pittsburgh Pirates gave a 2-year deal worth $8M to Kevin Correia, who posted a 5.40 ERA last year including an almost incomprehensible 5.36 ERA IN PETCO PARK, gave $4.25M guaranteed over 2 years to platoon OF Matt Diaz (.633 OPS vs. RHP, .830 OPS vs. LHP in 2010), meted out a 1-year deal to 1B Lyle Overbay (who posted a .762 OPS last year) worth $5M, and handed $500K over to Scott Olsen (who has allowed more runs than tallied strikeouts over the past two years) on the FA market.

In a way, you almost feel bad for a team like the Pirates (I did say “almost”) in as much as their mess is of their own doing, they’re under the watchful gaze of their local fanbase (and the Revenue Sharing Watchdogs) to spend money…any money, this off-season. Some of those signings might work out as Correia suffered a major tragedy last year when his brother was killed in a car accident and a change of scenery could benefit him, just as a properly-utilized Diaz is a nice complementary piece. If you’ll remember, I was on the “add Diaz as a RH 4th OF/complement to Hafner” train and still think that he would have been a better addition than Kearns

However, all of those additions feel like a team spinning their wheels as it either speaks to a developing team that has NO option at a spot like 1B (which simply isn’t true in Pittsburgh) where Overbay will play, or a team trying to keep the barking watchdogs at bay and pacify a fanbase by spending money when it may be a mind-numbingly bad idea to do so on the FA market, given how far away the team is from legitimately contending and how none of the players they added this off-season will play a role in whatever incarnation of the Pirates is the next to contend…whenever that may be.

Just for another example from a team that occupied the lower echelon of MLB with the Pirates (and the Tribe), the Royals added Melky Cabrera and Jeff Francoeur, and while it was “only” a $3.75M outlay of cash to “add” those two pieces, realize that Francoeur ranked 128th of the 149 qualified players in OPS last year with a .683 OPS and that actually bested the .671 OPS put forth by Melky Cabrera, who came in at #134 on that 149 player list. News that both are likely to be in the everyday lineup in 2011 (perhaps at the expense of playing time to Lorenzo Cain) only crystallizes this idea that adding pieces for addition’s sake may pacify some of the frothing mouths in the fanbase, but it actually does more damage to the development of a team that should be building toward the future.

As a quick aside here, both Francoeur and Cabrera posted a higher OPS in 2010 than Franklin Gutierrez (.666 OPS), who is guaranteed to make $4M in 2011, $5.5M in 2012, and $7M in 2013…but I digress.

What I’m getting at is that the vast majority of teams in MLB do not have the luxury (or the margin for error) to become players on the FA market for difference-making players. That’s not to say that there aren’t effective ways to augment a small-market club via FA as the Brewers’ addition of Takishi Saito on a 1-year deal is exactly the type of deal that will likely go under the radar (and the Brewers have only “spent” $3.18M in FA, despite their noisy off-season), but is likely to produce dividends for the club.

For a team like the Indians, as much as every piece written about them relates to “payroll restrictions” and a “shrinking payroll”, they are still a team that just tore down a talented (and vastly underachieving) team over the past two years and – by simple virtue of the MLB pay scale – are going to have players that are young, inexperienced, and cheap. Just as we saw from 2004 to 2009, as those young players develop, they’re going to be paid commensurately with their production and their service time. As we’re about to see SS Choo get more money because of the structure of MLB salaries, that day is coming down the line for players like Santana, Masterson, Carrasco, etc…it just isn’t any time soon.

Lest anyone forget, all of those talented players now in their 30s that have left the Indians over the past two-and-a-half years – CC, Lee, Victor, and others – were all signed to long term deals at one time early in their careers BY THIS OWNERSHIP GROUP and the years in which they proved themselves to be worthy of contract extensions and long-term deals were seasons (namely 2003 and 2004) in which the Indians were not in contention. Remember who’s still on the team working off of long-term extensions (again, meted out by the Dolans) in Hafner, Sizemore and Carmona – a trio that you could argue were three of the five most promising players on that 2007 team outside of a certain Hefty Lefty and Martinez, who WAS under contract through last season.

Just to further that thought, realize that after the 2007 season, the Indians had every player under contract until the end of 2010 except for Sabathia and Blake, both of whom were FA after the 2008 season. CC’s imminent departure left a sizable void in the future of the team, but it was one that was inexplicably filled by the still-unexplained transformation of Cliff Lee into Clifton Phifer Lee, who replaced CC at the top of the rotation out of nowhere. Given that after the 2008 season, the team added two external pieces in DeRosa (essentially a replacement for Blake) and Wood (to remedy the bullpen ails), the Indians figured that they had 3 seasons AFTER 2007 in which to compete with the same group or a similar group of players that had just come up one game short of the World Series.

While we all know what happened from Opening Day 2008 to where we sit today, the events of the last two-and-a-half years (and most notably the trades of Vic and Cliff) have outrageously overshadowed the fact that the Indians did, in fact, have a group of players under contract that should have been able to stay together until the end of 2010. The underachievement of that group and the lack of winning (for a variety of reasons) in 2008 and 2009 from a talented group of players being the torpedo that would sink the chances that the former “core” would stay together through the end of last season.

Lost in all of the tear-down is the fact that these were deals inked by Indians in the mid-2000s that bought out arbitration and FA years of young players, with their level of advancement and their age listed thusly:
April 2005
CC Sabathia (Age 24) – 4.12 career ERA (107 ERA+) – 2 years, $17.5M
Victor Martinez (Age 26) - .807 career OPS (115 OPS+) – 5 years, $15.5M with club option

March 2006
Grady Sizemore (Age 23) - .816 career OPS (118 OPS+) – 6 years, $23.45M with club option
Jhonny Peralta (Age 24) - .794 career OPS (113 OPS+) – 5 years, $13M with club option

August 2006
Cliff Lee (Age 27) – 4.39 career ERA (99 ERA+) – 4 years, $15M with club option

April 2007
Jake Westbrook (Age 29) – 4.35 career ERA (101 ERA+) – 3 years, $33M

July 2007
Travis Hafner (Age 30) - .984 career OPS (158 OPS+) – 4 years, $57M with club option

April 2008
Fausto Carmona (Age 24) – 3.67 career ERA (123 ERA+) – 4 years, $15M with 3 club options

Nearly all of those deals look downright cheap (and I did say “nearly”) in hindsight as the Indians meted out multiple years and multiple millions to keep their homegrown “core” together essentially through the 2010 season. While the “best laid plans” certainly went awry, looking at those names and the contracts given out to them, it goes back to the idea that the Indians HAVE developed and signed their young talent in the not-too-distant past…it’s just that said young talent didn’t win enough (particularly as the years wore on) to justify keeping the “core” together.

Just to bring that around to the current situation and the current crop of youngsters, whether the day is going to come for any of young Tribesman when they are approached about a long-term deal (similar to all of the ones handed out in the early-to-mid-2000s) remains to be seen as Choo likely would have already signed such a deal if he had a different agent and Cabrera’s health issues are likely the main detriment in him not getting a long-term contract that locks down his arbitration years. Going past those two, the only way to determine if LaPorta, Brantley, Masterson, etc. (and each name in that sentence links to a must-read analysis of each of those players that Adam Van Arsdale has been putting together in a series over at LGT…and I hope Carrasco is next) is by allowing them to play and while each is going to earn $450K this year.

The concern this off-season shouldn’t be whether the Indians are going to be spending money on the FA market, but rather whether all of those players that have been added to the organization in the last three years are going to merit the type of deals that were handed out to those names above, when Sabathia, Martinez, Lee, Sizemore, and others were given long-term, pre-arbitration deals.

Back to the current off-season, given what we saw happen from 2003 to 2009 (the build-up with essentially all of the pieces in place to contend for FOUR years, not the tear-down) and how the Indians did sign a number of their players to contracts once their performance justified them, how does it strike you for the Indians’ off-season approach and should they go out and spend money on higher-priced, perhaps lower-talent players because it would show some “willingness to spend” that would translate to the box office?

If you mean doing what the Orioles (who ALWAYS spend about $70M in payroll from year to year) have been doing for the past few years or what the Tigers have done in the past few years, “winning” World Series titles in January (remember when they added Cabrera and Renteria, how it was a “guaranteed” division title) and what the Pirates seem to be doing (likely against their better judgment), I’ll take the Indians’ current strategy this off-season of looking to add ancillary pieces and parts around the core of players that is going to be most instrumental in their likelihood to contend.

That being said, even those ancillary pieces though don’t come cheap in FA and even moderately upgrading the roster at a number of different positions for the Indians would have come with a relatively high price tag and low impact players, similar to what you see from the Pirates. For an illustration of this, going back to the ol’ “Roadmap for the Off-Season”, just take a look at what some of the players that I had suggested the Indians add have signed for with their new clubs:
Brandon Webb – 1 year, $3M with incentives to make contract potentially worth $8M to $10M
Zach Duke – 1 year, $4.25M
Matt Diaz – 2 years, $4.25M
Jesse Crain – 3 years, $13M
Don't take this to mean that I don't think that any or all of those guys could have helped the Indians - just not at those numbers. Additionally, realize that the suggestion that any of those guys could have been added represented suggestions for ancillary pieces, which would have totaled $13.5M ($3M for Webb not taking incentives into account, $4M for Crain, $4.25M for Duke, $2.25M for Diaz) for 2011 with future commitments still out there for Crain ($9M after this year) and Diaz ($2M after 2011) past the coming season.

Realizing that those names were thrown out there by me, does the addition of those 4 players make the Indians a contender in 2011 or make a difference past that, or does it simply make 2011 a little more palatable while making the Indians look “active” in the off-season, even if that activity was akin to spinning wheels?

Maybe if everything breaks right and all of those guys pan out, but wouldn’t the time to add even a moderately significant piece come after the young players have had a chance to assert themselves into what look like gaping organizational holes?

Certainly everyone would like to see the Indians more competitive from Opening Day and there were interesting pieces out there (Xavier Nady, who went to the D-Backs for $1.75M, DJ Carrasco, who the Mets inked for a total of $2.5M) who would have helped the team for nominal amounts and there are still options out there that could make sense for the Indians that elicit more confidence than adding Bartolo Colon (and that picture there is of him last week, so let’s hold off on the “he’s in great shape” talk) to the Goodyear mix, but to what end?

There are LHP that could be added to the rotation like Jeff Francis, whose 5.00 ERA may scare some folks, until you see that his 3.92 FIP (Fielding Independent Pitching) as a starter last year put him 35th among all NL starters with more than 100 IP. He would certainly upgrade the rotation as, for some comparison on that, the only Indians’ starter with more than 100 IP to have a FIP lower was Justin Masterson, whose 3.93 FIP far outpaced his “competition” in the Tribe rotation. Past Francis, they could take a look at a LH arms like Chris Capuano, who missed the 2008 and 2009 seasons due to injuries, but returned in 2010 to post a 3.95 ERA and a 1.30 WHIP in 66 IP for the Brewers last year, or Bruce Chen, who posted his lowest ERA since 2005 and put up the lowest FIP of his career last year with the Royals.

An starter still makes sense to me in that it allows the young pitchers (namely Huff, Gomez, and Tomlin) start the season in Columbus and earn their way onto the parent club instead of falling backwards into the 5th starter spot…it’s just that I’m not interested in giving a pitcher like Kevin Correia a 2-year deal worth $8M to accommodate that competition in AAA.

By the same token, an argument could be made that players like Jon Rauch or Chad Durbin make sense for the Tribe to add a RH veteran arm to their bullpen given their youth and what we’ve seen from bullpens in the past few years, but the designation of Justin Germano (ahead of Trevor Crowe and Jordan Brown…just to name two) put forth the idea that the Tribe is comfortable going with a lot of promising unknowns in the bullpen for 2011.

However, depending upon what kinds of contracts those players (Capuano or Chen or Rauch) are going to command, it could be argued that throwing guaranteed money at any of these guys is akin to that missing the “Dollars Spent Wisely” column that we started off with.

That being said, I have a suspicion that the Indians will attempt to find some value at the lower end of the FA market as they’ve done successfully in the past, with Pavano two years ago and with Kearns last year. A trade would certainly still be possible as Mark DeRosa was added for three promising young relievers (one of whom, Chris Archer, has developed into a bona-fide prospect) and the Indians are flush with promising young relievers. Maybe they add a guy on a Minor League deal that bears no fruit or maybe they pull another pleasant surprise out of the bargain bin…frankly, I’m not losing sleep over it.

However, it bears repeating again (even though I feel like a broken record in this respect) in that the Indians have been down this path of rebuilding just 6 or 7 years ago. Given that essentially the same Front Office is in place, the off-season between the 2003 and 2004 seasons is instructive as the Indians made no major additions, instead choosing to play their young talent for the 2004 season and for the seasons that followed.

When that in-house young talent blossomed, they locked them up in long-term deals and had the “core” of players signed through the 2010 season, with only one notable exception. Maybe they should have added more than they did after 2005 and after 2007 to take one big run at a World Series trophy, but the seeds of the success of the 2005 and 2007 seasons were sewn in 2003 and 2004.

Whether similar seeds have taken root this past year or in the next few years will eventually produce a garden as it did in the mid-to-late-2000s remains to be seen and time will be a major determining factor. As painful as it was to see the “garden” cultivated from 2002 to 2008 ripped up and sold at market, the Indians have to hope that the newly planted seeds will bear the same fruit and if, this time, they can sustain in a way that they were unable to in the past few years.

Holiday Tomahawks

With Christmas rapidly approaching and the Family Truckster getting packed up soon enough for some Holiday goodness in Wisconsin, since a Lazy Sunday will not be forthcoming this weekend – you know, day after Christmas and all – I thought I’d put some Tomahawks in the air up amongst the snowflakes.
And with that, let ‘em loose...
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Starting off with the newest Minor League signing on the Reservation, the Indians inked former A’s prospect Travis Buck to a Minor League deal earlier in the week and, while this signing seems to have been received more “huzzahs” than the deals meted out to Jack Hannahan and Adam Everett, I’d put Buck on the same par as Hannahan and Everett as “depth signing”, in the hopes that it improves the overall talent level at the upper levels, however unlikely Buck is to make an impact.

Some optimism exists that a healthy Buck can re-capture some of the career momentum that he established as a 23-year-old rookie in 2007, when he posted a .805 OPS (127 OPS+) and hit 22 2B in 82 games. However, since Buck’s rookie season, he has posted a cumulative .662 OPS (77 OPS+) at the Big League level in 335 PA over 3 years and while that rookie season seemed to portend a bright future for Buck, he has been undone by injuries and inconsistency since bursting onto the scene. What Buck represents is a reclamation project for the Indians – one who probably isn’t going to see time in Cleveland in 2011 with Choo, Brantley, Sizemore, and Kearns in the fold – who doesn’t cost the Indians anything more than AAA PA at this point.

While some would ask what the point is of even adding Buck, I suppose that it goes along with the idea that having Austin Kearns on the roster over Trevor Crowe on the roster makes the team better. To that end, I would say that having Travis Buck around as an option as an OF probably makes the 40-man better, as opposed to keeping some of the other 40-man options, like Jordan Brown, around into 2011 or beyond.

Since the name of Jordan Brown has been invoked, while Brown has long been the object of much affection (some of it misguided), take a look at how the two players compare, particularly last year:
LH Travis Buck turned 27 in November
LH Jordan Brown turned 27 last Saturday

2010 in MLB
Buck - .167 BA / .255 OBP / .286 SLG / .541 OPS with 1 HR in 48 PA
Brown - .230 BA / .272 OBP / .310 SLG / .582 OPS with 0 HR in 92 PA

2010 in AAA
Buck - .298 BA / .364 OBP / .463 SLG / .827 OPS with 3 HR in 141 PA
Brown - .298 BA / .341 OBP / .463 SLG / .804 OPS with 8 HR in 355 PA

2009 in AAA
Buck - .285 BA / .366 OBP / .438 SLG / .804 OPS with 5 HR in 266 PA
Brown - .336 BA / .381 OBP / .532 SLG / .913 OPS with 15 HR in 455 PA

Sure, Brown had better numbers in 2009 in AAA, but can we establish that we’re not looking at players that are all that dissimilar, as neither of them have displayed the power that you would like to see from a corner OF or from a 1B/DH and both are now entering the “prime” years of their career?

The biggest difference would be that Buck has proven that he can play the OF capably, something Brown (who has always been a 1B) has not. And to that end, assuming that he shows some aptitude with the bat, Buck is likely a better depth option than Brown going forward because of that versatility and because of the promise of that age-23 season, when he was healthy and thriving.

If “a better option than Jordan Brown” is all Buck amounts to, there’s still not a lot lost in terms of taking a chance on Buck getting healthy and justifying his former status as a top prospect. Interestingly, in going through Buck’s page at B-Ref, one of his closest comps through his age 26 season is the newly-minted $126M man, Jayson Werth. Werth struggled through his early-to-mid-20s with injuries, changing organizations and missing the entire 2006 season before the Phillies took a 1-year, $850K gamble on him...one that obviously paid off for the better part of three seasons.

Am I saying that Travis Buck is going to do what Jayson Werth did?
Certainly not as the number of former top prospects who succumb to injury and ineffectiveness is too long to even begin to compile, but Buck had the prospect pedigree and limited success at the start of his career as Werth did, only to see his career deep-sixed by his own fragility.

If the Indians can hit on resurrecting Travis Buck’s career to the point that he becomes a useful MLB player, bully for them. Even if he upgrades roster depth and represents a more versatile and valuable option than a guy like Jordan Brown, it still represents a decent find. At the very worst, he flames out, spends the year in AAA and makes his way out of the organization.

Regardless of the ultimate outcome, signing him doesn’t cost them much in terms of a Minor League deal with a non-roster invitation to Goodyear.
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Outside of the corner of Carnegie and Ontario, since much of the baseball world has been consumed with the Grienke-to-Milwaukee move last weekend, here’s an interesting diversion that you can think of while you’re wrapping Christmas gifts. It comes from the terrific John Perrotto of Baseball Prospectus and how Zach Grienke actually did Royals’ GM Dayton Moore a favor by requesting a trade, at least in terms of public perception:
Dayton Moore faced the decision that all small-market general managers seem to eventually be forced to make: do you hold on to your most marketable player, or do you trade him for young and affordable players in bulk?
--snip--
This time, though, Moore was a GM who had help in the decision. That help, ironically, came from the player.
Greinke told the Kansas City Star in August that he was tired of losing and felt the Royals’ much-anticipated crop of top prospects would fail to make an impact at the major-league level until after his contract expired following the 2012 season. Greinke continued to push for a trade behind the scenes, and his demand grew stronger last week when he changed agents with the objective of forcing a deal.
That worked out well for Moore in many regards. Unlike most GMs in his position, he does not have to bear the brunt of negativity from the media, public, and even his own players for trading a star player.

Whether Moore got enough for two years of Grienke is up for debate (and Joe Posnanski initially hated it, then warmed to it...somewhat, until he read that Melky Cabrera could keep Lorenzo Cain on the bench) and certainly comparisons are going to be drawn to the players received for Cliff Lee from Philly, as each deal contained “ready-for-MLB” position players that had struggled to date in MLB, an “almost-ready-for-MLB” pitcher with issues, and a low-Minors arm to dream on.

Since I’m not going to spend my days analyzing the Grienke return, what I’m initially interested in is the fact that Perrotto acknowledges that the Royals’ GM “faced the decision that all small-market general managers seem to eventually be forced to make: do you hold on to your most marketable player, or do you trade him for young and affordable players in bulk”, which perpetually makes me wonder – in what universe does this acceptance of an obviously flawed system continue?

This off-season, we’ve seen both Adrian Gonzalez and Zach Grienke moved for packages and Matt Garza and/or James Shields may not be that far behind as the Padres and the Royals made the same decisions that the Indians did in 2009, essentially punting on a season (or two) well in advance of the start of a season in the best interests of the health of the organization in the long-term view.

That frustration is not new nor is it going to be easily solved by MLB, but the crux of Perrotto’s piece intrigues me as he asserts that Grienke basically took the onus of being the “bad guy” off of Dayton Moore in terms of making a decision. Moore’s tenure in KC has not earned him the “benefit of the doubt” as future success still looks a few years off with a stacked Farm System, but Grienke demanding a trade publicly freed Moore to a degree, in that he didn’t have to come off as the “guy who decided to trade Grienke” (which was in the best interest of Kansas City), and rather is simply the GM who accommodated the trade wishes of Grienke and attempted to maximize value in a return for him.

It’s logistics...I know, but it’s also tied to public perception and since we’ve gone around and around about this Indians’ PR “problem” (self-created as it may be), it got me wondering as to how things would have played out if the Indians hadn’t traded Lee (most notably) when they did and whether the situation that took place in Kansas City over the past few weeks would have transpired last off-season for the Tribe with Lee.

Truthfully, I have no advance knowledge that Lee was going to demand a trade as he certainly has been traded enough in the last 2 years without ever demanding a trade, and the whole discussion is really akin to attempting to jump into the Silver DeLorean.

However, how would the Indians be perceived today if CC had left via FA for the biggest contract ever signed by a starting pitcher instead of being traded? What if it was Lee who forced the Indians’ hand in trading him and his departure was not compelled by the sudden change in stance from the Front Office and ownership that saw him make his way to Philly...the first time? Would the Indians have been saved from the “brunt of negativity from the media, public, and even his own players for trading a star player”, as Perrotto puts it?

Ultimately, we’ll never know as the moves that were made on the North Coast were made when they were and were all initiated by the Front Office. Whether they turn out to represent the right moves for the organization remains to be seen, but with Grienke “forcing” his way out of Kansas City this week, it is interesting to think about the situation in comparison to the Indians in the summer of 2008 and 2009.
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Keeping the topic with the Grienke trade and attempting to find some relevance to that trading post at the corner of Carnegie and Ontario that was open from July of 2008 until this past August, Dave Cameron of Fangraphs takes a look at the “buyers-and-sellers” aspect of the trades consummated this off-season and concludes that it is “almost universally agreed that the buyers did better on the rest of the deals, as established major league players have simply not been generating the types of returns in trade that we’ve seen in prior years” chalking up that trend to the fact that “teams are reacting to the rise in prices in free agency by increasing their valuations of cost-controlled players”.

Now think about this in the context of how the Lee and Martinez deals, in particular, are viewed today and how the Indians’ last “tear-down”, mainly the Colon deal in 2002, seems to almost be the exception to the rule, and an antiquated exception at that. If what Cameron writes is true, the Indians’ decision to tear it down in July of 2009 and since has coincided with those increased “valuations of cost-controlled players”, which may speak to how their returns on Lee and Martinez underwhelm many.

While I think it is still extremely early to judge the majority of these deals (as Sizemore and Lee weren’t contributors for a solid 2 ½ seasons after the Colon deal), the importance of 2011 to guys like LaPorta, Carrasco, and Masterson (all of whom were, let’s be honest, the big “prizes” in those deals based on age, advancement, and prospect standing) cannot be understated as the excuse that “it’s still too early to judge these deals” has an expiration date and (particularly for LaPorta) it is not a terribly long way off.
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As for the other Midwestern team involved in the Grienke deal, there has been some scuttlebutt about how the Brewers getting Grienke debunks the notion that only large-market teams are at the card table for these players, which is patently absurd as Grienke was acquired VIA TRADE and not on the FA market. While a good deal of attention has been paid to how the Red Sox have figured out a way to work the system to their advantage by stockpiling that valuable commodity – young, cheap talent – what the Brewers have done is actually more impressive.

By that I mean that the Brewers’ player development system has allowed them to pull the deal for Grienke (and for Marcum...which is a deal I LOVE for Milwaukee) in that they had a pipeline full of mainly position players, with established position players ahead of them at the MLB level, and some intriguing low-level arms, ultimately turning those “prospects” into trading chips.

Don’t take this to mean that the Brewers are this model franchise (as they’ve finished with 80 and 77 wins in a weak NL Central the last two years with some serious talent in place), but they had an organizational deficiency in pitching and an abundance of corner players in 2008 and snatched CC from Cleveland. Going into this off-season, they still had that organizational deficiency in starting pitching, but were more or less set up the middle of the diamond with pitchers in their organization that were promising, but unlikely to contribute in the near future, which allowed them to move those fungible assets to add Grienke and Marcum.

At this point, the Brewers should be lauded for their aggressiveness at this time in their franchise’s history...and, as a quick aside, I do hope this works out for them with Prince about to leave in FA after this year and them really putting everything out there for this year. However, more admirable than their aggressiveness in the here and now is the slow and steady player development that put them in this position, where they had highly-sought-after young players outside of their “core” group of players already in MLB and they have now flipped those younger players to help the parent club for the 2011 season.

To bring that idea to the events of the last few years in Cleveland, if there is one main segment of the “The Plan” that failed miserably it was unquestionably that of player development. The idea that the prospects would come to fill holes and other prospects who represented redundancies in the system could be flipped to fill other holes never took shape because...well, because those prospects turned out to be sub-par players, unable to crack the Indians’ starting lineup, much less generate much interest on the trade market.

This is not breaking new ground, I know, but to see the manner in which the Brewers utilized their young, expendable players brings it back to the continued failure of the Indians’ player development, which led the organization to make the Vic and CP Lee deals as they acknowledged that the team’s internal prospects would cause a drop-off of biblical proportions, not difficult to see if you take away the players acquired for the likes of CC, Blake, Victor, Lee, DeRosa, and others from the current roster and see what remains.

It’s a scary prospect (thinking of what 2011 would look like without Santana, Perez, Masterson, Carrasco, LaPorta, and Brantley) and it speaks to the undoing of the organization from 2008 to today, on display as Minor League FA represents upgrades over former 1st Round Picks (like last year with Kearns and Crowe) or players who were once highly thought of in some circles (like this year with Buck and Brown...potentially).

As the player development in place in Milwaukee has allowed them to extend their look at realistically making the playoffs (and the Brewers have won ONE playoff game since 1982), the failure of the Indians to continually augment their system with players that could either help the parent club OR be used as trade bait to improve the parent club (Max Ramirez being the lone exception) is what the Grienke-to-Milwaukee deal brings into sharper focus.
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With that final thought to keep you warm on these cold winter nights…you know, because your blood pressure is rising, let me take the time to wish everyone out there a very Merry Christmas, wherever you and yours may be this weekend.

Merry Christmas everyone…