Results Based on Merit, Not Market

As the calendar turns and all eyes are either cast in the past or into the future, the events of 2009 continue to fester for me in terms of how the lessons of 2009 don’t necessarily point to a clearer future in 2010 and beyond in MLB. When Game 1 of the World Series pitted two former teammates, both former Cy Young Award winners, neither of them wearing the uniform that they donned in their Cy Young Award winning season (and neither of them having reached their 31st birthday), the ugliness that has been lurking under the surface in terms of MLB and the disparity created in the current structure reared not just an ugly head, it revealed itself for all to see on a cold October night in the Bronx.

While fans in Cleveland were left to take the body blows from the national media (prodded on by FOX’s graphic titled “At Least You Have LeBron while showing both CC and CP Lee in their Cleveland uniforms), it was hard not to wonder if this seemingly chance occurrence was simply the appetizer for what is to come as MLB improbably gets less balanced and more weighted towards teams with bigger markets, with larger margins for error, and ultimately larger payrolls. The CC-Lee matchup brutally exposed the problems within MLB, where certain teams not only have to continue to be adept at developing young, cost-controlled players, but now have to hope that those players develop within the same timeframe allowing contention, if albeit brief contention. What prevents Josh Johnson taking on Ricky Nolasco in the Fall Classic (not involving the Marlins) or even a Tim Lincecum v. Matt Cain match-up in October (with those still playing for the Giants sitting at home) at some point in the future?

Gone are the days when prudent decisions made in baseball allowed teams to compete based upon their own decisions, and growing more obvious is the notion that teams have to compete with a laundry list of factors coming before anything even related to baseball. Much of the blame has been placed at the feet of the large market teams and on the shoulders of the Bud Selig, who has presided over the sordid state of affairs as the disparity among MLB teams to be growing instead of shrinking.

With that in mind, let’s go to the interview posted at MLB.com with Selig regarding how the league has weathered the economic storm of the past year and what kind of state he sees baseball in today compared to how he took it over:

“On the field, it was fabulous. A great year, beginning to end. We had more competitive balance. It was just a terrific year, under the worst circumstances since the Great Depression. That’s the point you have to keep in mind.”
--snip--
Selig’s tenure has been characterized by economic reforms such as revenue sharing and the luxury tax that are intended to improve competitive balance. With the wide variations among franchises’ ability to generate revenue, and without a salary cap, baseball’s economic playing field cannot be completely level. But the movement toward greater competitive balance has changed the competitive character of the game.
--snip--
“But the economic reforms have been remarkable. When you think of what baseball’s economic system was in 1992 and what it is today, nobody could have ever believed that we would have this kind of revenue sharing and the luxury tax. People talk about the system, it needs this and that, and I don’t deny that it needs some work. But I think of the pain that we went through in the 1990s and the evolution since then, it’s sort of stunning. I’m proud of the change.”

Truthfully, the most relevant sentences have been bolded by me, but Selig speaks extensively of the changes that have been made to the economic structure of the game from the time he took over in 1992 to where it sits today in the article and, since he brought up the comparison, let’s take a look at MLB Payrolls by team in 1992 and in the just-completed 2009 season:
MLB Payrolls – 1992
1) Mets - $44,352,002
2) Dodgers - $43,788,166
3) Blue Jays - $43,663,666
4) Red Sox - $42,203,584
5) Athletics - $39,957,834
6) Yankees - $35,966,834
7) Reds - $35,203,999
8) Royals - $33,643,834
9) Angels - $33,529,854
10) Giants - $33,126,168
11) Braves - $32,975,333
12) Pirates - $32,589,167
13) Brewers - $30,253,668
14) Rangers - $29,740,667
15) Cubs - $29,060,833
16) Tigers - $28,413,500
17) White Sox - $28,413,500
18) Padres - $27,584,167
19) Twins - $27,432,834
20) Cardinals - $26,889,836
21) Phillies - $23,804,834
22) Mariners - $22,483,834
23) Orioles - $20,997,667
24) Expos - $15,869,667
25) Astros - $13,352,000
26) Indians - $8,236,166
For comparison's sake going forward, realize that the median salary in 1992 was $29,997,188 with 15 of the 26 teams (those below the A's and above the Phillies) spending a number that was either less than 20% above that figure or 20% below that figure. The highest payroll represented a 48% higher payroll than the median and the lowest payroll (the Dick Jacobs-owned Indians, I might add) spent 72% less than the median.

MLB Payrolls – 2009
1) Yankees - $220,024,917
2) Mets - $142,229,759
3) Cubs - $141,632,703
4) Red Sox - $140,454,683
5) Tigers - $139,429,408
6) Phillies - $138,286,499
7) Dodgers - $131,507,197
8) Angels - $121,947,524
9) Astros - $108,059,086
10) White Sox - $105,287,384
11) Cardinals - $102,678,475
12) Mariners - $102,343,617
13) Braves - $100,078,591
14) Giants - $95,202,185
15) Brewers - $90,006,172
16) Rockies - $84,450,797
17) Blue Jays - $84,130,513
18) Royals - $81,917,563
19) Orioles - $79,308,066
20) Rangers - $77,208,810
21) Indians - $77,192,253
22) Diamondbacks - $73,800,852
23) Twins - $73,068,407
24) Reds - $72,693,206
25) Rays - $71,222,532
26) Nationals - $69,321,137
27) Athletics - $61,688,124
28) Pirates - $47,991,132
29) Padres - $43,210,258
30) Marlins - $37,532,482

The median salary in 2009 was $87,228,485 with 15 of the 30 teams (all below the White Socks and above the Nationals) spending a number that was either less than 20% above that figure or 20% below that figure. The highest payroll represented a 252% higher payroll than the median and the lowest payroll was 57% lower than the median.

Is Selig correct in saying that there has been economic reform in the past 17 years?
Absolutely, but the most noticeable change has not come in bringing the payrolls of teams much closer together as the disparity is widening. Rather, the big change has come in an absolutely stunning increase in revenue, made obvious by the fact that that median salary has nearly TRIPLED in 17 years. The issue that Selig fails to point out is that the revenue sharing and the luxury tax have not been able to prevent a still-evolving system that sways favor to large markets because of the exponential increase of revenue. In 1992, the Athletics and Reds counted themselves among the top 7 payrolls in MLB and 17 years later, they both find themselves among the bottom 7 payrolls in MLB.

What Selig assisted in creating is an unquestionable money-making machine (and let’s not be naïve enough to think that all of these teams aren’t making money hand over fist in some fashion), but also one that tilts the scales in favor of the large market teams where a larger population base has more or less equated into a larger payroll.

Prompted by Tim Marchman of SI.com’s suggestion that a 3rd team should be added to the NY-NJ area in an attempt to loosen the stranglehold that the Yankees and, to a lesser degree, the Mets have on simply buying the best players (or, more recently, trading for hefty contracts that teams were looking to unload, giving up only fungible parts, easily replaceable by simply paying over slot in future drafts), perhaps it’s relevant to examine the size of the markets in MLB and how they relate to 2009 payroll in the system currently in place. Using the Combined Statistical Areas and the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (with a little foray into the Great White North), here’s a more comprehensive look at population distribution among MLB cities and how many people are tied to each team, using the data from 2008 that takes into account neighboring cities for a truer sense of an extended metropolitan area’s population.

Listed parenthetically is where the teams that find those particular areas their home rank among the 30 MLB teams in 2009 payroll:
NY – 22,154,752 (Yankees #1 payroll, Mets #2 payroll)
LA – 17,786,419 (Dodgers #7 payroll, Angels #8 payroll)
Chicago – 9,793,036 (Cubs #3 payroll, White Sox #10 payroll)
Baltimore/Washington – 8,295,397 (Orioles #19 payroll, Nationals #26 payroll)
Boston – 7,514,759 (Red Sox #4 payroll)
San Francisco/Oakland – 7,354,555 (Giants #14 payroll, Athletics #27 payroll)
Dallas – 6,655,261 (Rangers #20 payroll)
Philadelphia – 6,398,896 (Phillies #6 payroll)
Houston – 5,829,620 (Astros #9 payroll)
Atlanta – 5,729,304 (Braves #13 payroll)
Miami – 5,463,857 (Marlins #30 payroll)
Detroit – 5,354,225 (Tigers #5 payroll)
Toronto – 5,113,149 (Blue Jays #17 payroll)
Phoenix – 4,281,899 (Diamondbacks #22 payroll)
Seattle – 4,087,033 (Mariners #12 payroll)
Minneapolis/St. Paul – 3,562,284 (Twins #23 payroll)
Denver – 3,049,562 (Rockies #16 payroll)
San Diego – 3,208,466 (Padres #29 payroll)
Cleveland – 2,887,492 (Indians #21 payroll)
St. Louis – 2,879,924 (Cardinals #11 payroll)
Tampa/St. Petersburg – 2,733,761 (Rays #25 payroll)
Pittsburgh – 2,441,464 (Pirates #28 payroll)
Cincinnati – 2,198,337 (Reds #24 payroll)
Kansas City – 2,070,544 (Royals #18 payroll)
Milwaukee – 1,748,818 (Brewers #15 payroll)
That would be 7 of the top 10 payrolls coming from 4 of the 5 biggest cities with an MLB team or teams, with the rest of the teams more or less falling in line with their payrolls being tied to the size of the metropolitan area which they cover. Sure, there are the exceptions (Baltimore/Washington with low payrolls at the top end of the population ladder, Milwaukee and St. Louis spending more than their population rank would dictate), but for the most part, the teams existing in larger cities have a built-in competitive advantage over team in mid-sized or smaller cities based in large part because of the size of their prospective customer base.

The problem with this set-up, in that the rich are able to get richer and the poor are left to attempt to build a better mousetrap to level the playing field, is that it shows no sign of changing. Very few teams have a chance to legitimately contend for the World Series from year to year because of the current system and the current make-up of MLB economics rewards the market of a team instead of the merit of that team.

What’s the solution?
Is it really to add another team to the Metro NY area or to Boston in an attempt to defray the base that the Yankees, Mets, and Red Sox draw from? Not even getting into the fact that the Steinbrenners, the Wilpons, and John Henry would cry bloody murder (louder and with more to back it up than Peter Angelos did when the Expos moved to DC), doesn’t that really just add another big market team to the mix?

So is the idea just to load up LA, NY, Boston, Dallas, Philly with another team to average these things out? If that’s the formula, where does it stop…4 teams in NY and LA, 3 in Chicago and Baltimore/Washington/Northern Virginia or just lumping a whole bunch of teams either into the megalopolis that extends from Southern New Hampshire down to Northern Virginia and to Chicago, Northern/Southern California, and Texas, since that’s where a vast amount of people live?

Rather, wouldn’t it be prudent to examine what makes the other pro sports in America able to avoid this disparity and, in turn, make them compelling…to find out how NFL maintains its stranglehold on the sporting interests of American and to find out how the NBA is able to offer a competitive balance based on the wisdom of a teams’ personnel decisions and not on the size of an individual team’s market?

It’s been beaten to death, I know, but the NFL playoffs this year boast Indianapolis, Cincinnati, San Diego, New England, Minnesota, Green Bay, New Orleans, Baltimore, New York, Philadelphia, Dallas, and Arizona and the common thread among all of those teams has nothing to do with the size of Cincinnati, Indianapolis, Green Bay, or Minneapolis as metropolitan areas just as it has nothing to do with the size of New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and Dallas and their outlying communities. The common thread among all of those teams is that they’ve succeeded at drafting and developing players, fit them into a successful system, and allowed that system to foster winning to the point that market size or payroll has very little bearing on wins and losses. In the NFL, teams are rewarded for intelligent drafting and development and have the tools in place to keep their home-grown players to allow continuity to reveal the wisdom of their best-laid plans. If a team succeeds, it is because the Front Office made prudent decisions and because the players performed at a level that resulted in consistent winning. On the flip side, if a team fails year in and year out, it is largely because of shortcomings within their organization and not reliant on factors outside of football decisions.

In the NBA, the system is also in place to reward wisdom in player acquisition and development and the procedures are in place to foster that continuity that puts the onus of winning on the Front Office, the coaching staff, and the players as the league makes it easier for teams to retain their stars. The NBA features winning teams that build through smart drafting and player development (witness what the Hawks and Trail Blazers are currently doing) and watches teams intent on finding a way to “beat the system” by buying players on the open market (see Knicks, New York) flounder in the mess that they’ve created, unable to simply buy their way out of the mud. To put it in very tangible terms, I’m not sure if you’ve heard this yet or not, but the Cavs can offer LBJ more money in NBA salary than any other team, just as Toronto can offer Chris Bosh more than any other team, just as Miami can offer Dwayne Wade more money than anyone else this upcoming off-season.
Compared to the system in place in MLB, how alien is that concept?

In MLB, most teams now are left to rely on the idea that they have to develop players that arrive and thrive at the same time to open their window of contention, see if they can use their increased revenue brought on by winning to keep that window open a little longer (see the Brewers’ off-season signings as an example of how a team is trying keep that window propped until Prince Fielder heads to the East Coast after the 2011 season), and attempt to have everything go right for them in one magical year to vault themselves past teams without their constraints before they have to tear everything down all over again to wait for that next window to open.

How is it that every other league has figured out a way to reward prudent SPORTS decisions (not business decisions) by individual franchises, while Cleveland fans are left to watch two Cy Young winners under the age of 30 face off against each other in Game 1 of the World Series while another rebuild/reload/whatever is underway on the North Coast?

Don’t take this to be sour grapes (OK…maybe it is a little bit after seeing the events of 2008 and 2009 unfold in Cleveland), but how is it that Karl Malone and John Stockton are able to spend essentially their entire NBA careers in Salt Lake City (smaller than every MLB market) and little question exists that Peyton Manning will spend his NFL career in Indianapolis (larger than only Milwaukee among MLB cities) while the Twins struggle to convince Joe Mauer (a St. Paul native, no less) to ignore the extra years and zeroes on the check that awaits him in Boston or New York after this season to stay in Minnesota?

A solution to the burgeoning issue is needed and, while the owners may not have an interest in doing this as they all line their pockets, flush with the economic boon to the sport that has transpired since Selig took over, perhaps they should if they’re looking at the long-term viability as their sport to be viewed as much more than a imbalanced joke. Reason being, the public has taken notice of the current structure and if a Seton Hall poll from November 5th of this year is any indication, public perception about their sport is essentially a David vs. Goliath tale, with their popularity dropping since 1985, when it ran neck and neck with NFL as America’s most popular sport:

Sixty percent of Americans who follow sports feel that teams located in bigger markets have an advantage in producing winning seasons, according to a poll conducted this week by the Seton Hall Sports Poll. Twenty-six percent felt the bigger market teams did not have an advantage.

The polling took place this week as the New York Yankees, representing the nation’s biggest market, played the Philadelphia Phillies, representing the nation’s fourth largest market.

Seventy percent of fans feel that Major League Baseball should make a bigger effort to equalize revenue for all teams, as the NFL has done.
--snip--
“While occasionally a small market team like Minnesota or Tampa Bay will break through and win a division or a playoff round, the big markets continue to prevail in the later rounds, and the fans clearly link that success to the ability to generate bigger revenue,” noted Rick Gentile, director of the Seton Hall Sports Poll, conducted by The Sharkey Institute.

To be clear on this, what the public is looking for is not for every team to finish at or around 81-81 every season – what they’re looking for is a legitimate competitive balance. Competitive balance doesn’t mean parity, nor does it mean that each team necessarily has an equal shot at winning every year. Rather it means that the competitiveness of a team should be based upon the baseball decisions that a team makes and not decisions made where putting the best baseball team on the field falls somewhere down the list of factors.

If the Royals or Pirates draft poorly and are unable to develop their own talent, there’s no question that they should find themselves in the cellar; but if the Twins or Rays draft and develop talent on a consistent basis, that talent should coalesce as the team sees fit, not within the parameters of their market and their payroll. If teams make a roster decision via trade, the prevailing reason should be baseball-related, above all other factors related to revenue or payroll or attendance, in an effort to foster the continuity that the other sports have already figured out.

What has happened instead of seeing these prudent teams focused on development grow into perennial powers is that the larger market teams have made great strides in recent years that have improved their baseball decisions (the Raul Mondesi-to-the-Bronx days aren’t coming back) and that fact has put most other teams further behind the 8-ball as the large market teams have started to understand that they can’t just dole out every big contract while they build a team (well, maybe the Mets haven’t) and have started to develop their own young players. The issue arises however, when a team like the Yankees doesn’t see their young players develop like they’re supposed to or as quickly as they’re supposed to (using Chamberlain and Hughes as examples) and they simply plug those holes via FA (Sabathia and Burnett) or, more recently, by trade (Granderson replaces Melky) as trading their prospects does not affect the Yankees as it does other teams. In this New World Order, where young, under-club-control, cheap talent is the most desired commodity, the Yankees and Red Sox (just to name two) can use their prospects to trade for other teams’ desired commodities with the idea that once they enter the Bronx or Yawkey Way, the Yankees or Red Sox have them under their collective thumb in terms of negotiation.

On the flip side, the smaller market teams are forced to take calculated risks in an attempt to narrow the margin between the larger market teams and themselves. In these attempts, they expose themselves to monetary risks that have the capability to sink the team if the risky venture turns out poorly. Forget the idea that small market teams don’t want to “pay the going rate” or “pony up” for their homegrown stars, the simpler fact is that the likes of Boston and New York have the margin of error that allow them to buy their way out of mistakes. While Travis Hafner’s 4-year, $57M contract (signed in 2007) sits around the Indians’ neck like an albatross, paying “cash considerations” to the Cardinals to take Julio Lugo (signed a 4-year, $36M deal in 2006) certainly didn’t seem to have affected the ability of the Red Sox to give John Lackey $82.5M this off-season. As the Brewers are paying $7.15M of Bill Hall’s $8.4M salary in 2010 after designating him for assignment last season, and because a team like the Brewers is not able to simply absorb that cost without it affecting the rest of their operation, they work under a different set of guidelines than the large-market teams like the Yankees who are still in the midst of paying Kei Igawa $20M from 2006 through the end of 2011, yet happily committed to paying $423,500,000 to Sabathia, Teixeira, and Burnett last off-season, which ultimately resulted in their 27th World Series Championship.

On the surface, it seems that large market teams are rewarded for their market, not for their merit while the teams that call smaller cities home are left to attempt to find new ways to win. Apparently though, it depends on who you ask as Red Sox owner John Henry complained that smaller market teams aren’t necessarily interested in winning and using their revenue sharing money to win and are instead simply pocketing it. His idea is to remove the notion of revenue sharing and to instead institute a “Competitive Balanced Payroll Tax” system:

“If the Yankees and the Mets spend a billion dollars plus of their investment dollars to build new ballparks, they should be allowed to keep their revenues from that,” Henry wrote. “But if they want to spend $200,000,000 annually on payroll, they should be heavily taxed directly on that – and if they want to spend more than that, they should be even more heavily taxed. So should all clubs who spend heavily on payroll – to the extent necessary – to bring the system into balance.”

While Henry’s idea certainly has some merit, it still doesn’t correct the fundamental problem in the current system as the teams in MLB are playing on different fields when it comes to being rewarded (or punished) for their baseball decisions in the won-loss column. That is, the Phillies developed the likes of Jimmy Rollins, Chase Utley, Cole Hamels, and Ryan Howard and should unquestionably in the mix for the MLB title. The problem is that the Phillies ran into a team in the World Series with an ace who cut his teeth in Cleveland, a 1B who came up with the Rangers, a 3B who was drafted by the Mariners, a LF who was originally a Royal, and a #2 starter who began his career as a Marlin. You could argue all day long about what circumstances put those players in the pinstripes last Fall (just as you could point to the Phillies’ roster for a former Indian in Lee and a former Royal in Ibanez), but the public has grown weary of the idea that it’s only a matter of time before every exceptional player in MLB becomes a member of the Yankees, the Red Sox, the Mets, or some other large market team.

So is there a solution?
Perhaps there is, and while I’m not calling for a return to the reserve clause or some sort of other form of indentured service, the 2 other major sports have figured it out to some degree, so there must be some way to do this to align consistency and competitiveness. Is it possible to satisfy the concerns of small market teams, quick to employ the “we can’t afford to take those risks to keep our homegrown players” card as well as the large market teams, who feel that they are lining the pockets of small market team owners who have no interest in competing, much less winning, so long as they are making money?

Going back to John Henry’s idea for a “Competitive Balanced Payroll Tax”, wouldn’t it make sense to use the funds created by this “tax” (and the revenue sharing number in 2009 was allegedly $400M that was “distributed from high revenue making clubs such as the Yankees and Red Sox to those at the low end of the spectrum, such as the Marlins, Pirates, Rays, and Royals”) to enable the smaller market teams to compete with the large market teams, in respect to keeping their homegrown players as members of their organization?

That is to say, if funds existed specifically to assist teams to keep their own players, it becomes less of an unbalanced field as to who can go out and “buy” the best players and more of an idea of developing the best players and keeping them to build around them and to allow them to congeal as a team as MLB teams once did. This idea shouldn’t take money out of players’ pockets however as the players should be fairly compensated for “what the market will bear” for their services, but perhaps a solution to that problem could be found.

A possible solution could go something like this – once a player hits Free Agency, allow said player to go out on the open market to see what deals exist for him out there. When the bidding has concluded and an offer sheet is signed by the player and his agent, his current team has 10 days to match the offer, much like Restricted Free Agency in the NBA. Now here’s where that pool of money created by the “Competitive Balanced Payroll Tax” come in – the player’s current team can decide to match the offer sheet while only footing the bill for half of the contract with the other half of the money coming from the pool of money created by the Competitive Tax Pool that John Henry argues for. To put that in tangible terms, if the Brewers wanted to match the Yankees’ 7-year, $161M contract offer from the Yankees last off-season, they would be responsible for $80.5M of the deal with the other $80.5M coming from the Tax Pool.

Thus, the large market teams can still bid for the services of the players they desire and, if their offers are matched, they have effectively ensured that the money that they pay into the “Competitive Balanced Payroll Tax” is going strictly for MLB players (not for other small market “expenses”) and the smaller market teams don’t have to assume as much risk in signing their own players to their contracts to keep them. The large market teams may not like the idea of bidding against their own money or subsidizing the contracts of players not playing for them, but their concerns about throwing money into other owners’ pockets would be allayed and they would be left to strive for the same excellence in player development that every other team would be chasing.

If teams don’t elect to utilize this Tax Pool to keep their own players, the onus is strictly on them for either not developing players internally compelling enough that they want to keep them or they are exposed for being more concerned with the bottom line than they are the product on the field. If a team develops players prudently, the machinations would be in place to keep those players as long as they wish to, with the players being compensated dollars equivalent to “what the market will bear”.

Certainly some teams would attempt to find ways around this structure by simply overpaying for young players or outspending other teams at a lower level in an attempt to develop their own players to take advantage of the Tax Pool. While that is a legitimate concern, it would bring a brighter focus on the need to create a worldwide draft or, at the very least, finalize some form of payment tied to draft position so teams with deeper pockets can’t pay over slot to select better players later in the rounds because they’re willing to throw more money at a riskier venture.

While some would argue that this would drive down salaries, I would argue the opposite and that, in the process, it could even indirectly even out the amount of risk large market teams would assume by signing Free Agents because of the escalating salaries that large market teams would be willing to dole out in an attempt to make even half of an offer sheet too daunting for another organization to assume.

For that, let’s take a look at the very real Joe Mauer situation in Minnesota and assume that the Twins don’t sign Mauer to a long-term deal this off-season. In the scenario, Mauer hits the open market with the Yankees and Red Sox both in need of catchers and salivating at the prospect of adding Mauer to their roster. Let’s say that after all of the negotiating, the Red Sox trump the Yankees’ best efforts by offering Mauer an 8-year deal worth $25M per year to come to Boston. In the newly proposed situation, the Twins would have the right to match the Red Sox offer, but pay only half of the salary with the other $12.5M annually being paid from the Tax Pool. If the number of $400M in revenue sharing being paid out last year is anywhere close to being true, subsidizing half of Mauer’s salary would represent only a drop (actually a little over 3%) in the Tax Pool bucket. In the end, Mauer gets paid what the market will bear, the Twins keep Mauer without assuming all of the salary risk, and the large market teams know that the money put into the Competitive Balanced Tax Pool is actually being used to foster competitive balance and not simply being added onto the bottom line of the small market teams.

Certainly, one would have to assume that the likes of the Yankees and Red Sox would counter this new set-up by increasing the size of their contract offers, in an attempt to make even half of their offer give smaller market teams pause in accepting the risk, even with the Tax Pool money subsidizing half of the contract. To put it in the Mauer situation again, let’s say that the Red Sox final offer came to 8 years and $40M annually in an attempt to scare the Twins away from accepting the risk associated with the Minnesota organization carrying the burden of a 8-year, $20M annual commitment. If the Twins decide to accept the risk, Mauer gets paid an even higher amount in the same manner as the previous scenario. If the Twins pass on the opportunity, Mauer still gets the money as he joins the Red Sox, who now have accepted a comparable amount of risk that small-market teams do in committing a large percentage of their payroll to one player and have essentially ensured themselves that they will continue to pay into the Competitive Balanced Tax Pool because of the annual salary necessary to net the player that they were willing to pay for.

Another argument that could be made is that it would severely limit the trade market because teams would not be willing to trade their own players with the machinations in place for them to have half of their own players’ contracts subsidized by the Tax Pool. I would argue that the opposite again may be true as trade values for pending Free Agents would actually skyrocket as not only would the soon-to-be-Free-Agent be traded, but also his status as a team’s own player and, as a result, the ability of a team to have half of that player’s next contract subsidized by the Tax Pool. That is, when the Indians traded Victor Martinez in July of 2009, they would be trading not only Martinez under his current contract, but also the right to have half of Martinez’s contract after the 2010 season subsidized by the Tax Pool, whether he would be a member of the Red Sox or whatever other team would have acquired him and those rights. Trades would be made for baseball reasons only and organizations would not be able to cite payroll constraints as reasons for making a deal, left to justify the idea that their team is better off with the trade completed.

A common misconception would be that the system would benefit only small market teams, but the use of the Tax Pool money wouldn’t be restricted from helping ANY team keep their own players. The large market teams wouldn’t be excluded from sharing in this Tax Pool, so if the Angels wanted to keep John Lackey and Chone Figgins this off-season, they wouldn’t be exempted from sharing in the Tax Pool (even if they contribute to it) as each player was a member of the Angels when they entered Free Agency. It would place a greater emphasis on player development and continuity with the idea that teams that made intelligent baseball decisions would field the best teams, regardless of how many people called their metro area home.

If the sport is so flush in revenue (and it is, as MLB has generated nearly $13B in revenue in the past two years), spread the money around to the players and to reward the teams that are prudent baseball minds, not business minds. Utilize the “Tax Pool” (or “Central Fund” or whatever you want to call it) and the shared profits in a manner that they’re supposed to be used, to even the playing field by not punishing teams for being in markets that are large or markets that are small, but rather for not making the best baseball decisions to put the best team on the field.

If all of the Tax Pool money isn’t used to effectively subsidize contracts, allow the remainder to be distributed evenly back to the 30 teams for “performance-related” expenditures, meaning that if a team like the Royals or Pirates don’t develop talent compelling enough to generate interest on the open market that they don’t get any more shared money than the larger market teams do. In doing so, it would place an even greater emphasis on teams developing their own players and creating the continuity necessary for ANY team to sustain contention, not just those with fatter wallets.

How this would affect salaries prior to the Free Agent process or arbitration hearings as well as how it would affect the movement of lower levels of Free Agents would play itself out over the course of time, but the familiar complaints from both the large and small market teams would be wiped away. No longer could John Henry say that small market teams aren’t using the shared profits of the league to create more competitive teams, just as small market teams would no longer to be able to cry foul that they were outbid by the “haves” while the “have-nots” were left lacking for funds to keep their homegrown players in an effort to consistently contend as the system is currently constructed to only allow a few teams to accomplish.

In the new system, the Rays could keep Longoria, Upton, Crawford, Pena, Shields, Garza, and Price as long as they’d like to without diminishing the amount of money that those players would receive just as the Phillies should not have to decide whether they have the wherewithal to keep Jayson Werth, who they prudently signed to a one-year, $850,000 deal back in December of 2006, when he becomes a Free Agent after this season.

Whether the math works or how the ultimate distribution of funds shakes out, it would certainly seem that the money is there to institute this modification on the use of funds for all of MLB to potentially benefit all 30 MLB teams. The caveat would be that the teams that it would benefit would be the teams that developed players and created an environment for players to develop as a cohesive unit into a perennial contender.

The modification would reward teams for the merit of their baseball-related decisions, not simply the market in which they made those decisions. It could potentially bring back the days when a player spent his career with one team (without compromising his earning power) and, more importantly, even the playing field to legitimately renew the idea that MLB wasn’t going forward with a flawed system weighted towards particular organizations.
While that may not represent the panacea, it would certainly represent a start.

A Lazy Sunday In Absentia

With the New Year upon us, I’ll be taking a break from a Lazy One this Sunday as the traditional image of the New Year as a baby in diapers has taken on a new meaning as The DiaBride and I continue to wait for the arrival of the new baby. Since the due date was New Year’s Day, the one concern that festers is that I’m dealing with some sort of Buster Bluth 11-month pregnancy with the claw marks on the walls of the uterus yet to come…I kid, I kid.

Nevertheless, I’m holding off of compiling the normal Lazy One this week as one never knows when nature will take its course and, though the next few days and weeks are sure to be full of adjustments and less sleep than I already get, I should be able to get up a less time-sensitive post that I’ve been working on as we’ve had some time to stay close to home this Holiday weekend waiting for a little bundle of joy. In the coming piece (and since nothing is happening on the corner of Carnegie and Ontario), I thought it was a good time to touch on some of the lessons that 2009 (and specifically Game 1 of the 2009 Fall Classic) brought into focus the idea that while baseball itself remains a beautiful game, it’s the sport that has become the issue.

Finishing touches still need to be made on the 5,000 word opus that should be coming sometime this week, so until then…Happy New Year and send diapers.

Looking for Hope on a Lazy Sunday

With my hands cramping from two days of putting together PlayMobil police cars and pirate ships (which apparently requires an advanced degree in engineering) let’s roll right into a Lazy Sunday as Baby Watch 2009 continues and as my pleas to induce before the end of the calendar year (for the tax deduction obviously) continue to fall on deaf ears.
And with that…we’re off:

With so very little happening on the North Coast recently (well, actually all off-season…but you feel me), I thought I would pass along an interesting piece that never mentions the Indians but is relevant in terms of evaluating the off-season moves (or really the lack of an off-season moves) on the North Coast. It comes from Jeff Pearlman of SI.com and it focuses on the bad signings that bad franchises make on the FA market, ostensibly to give the impression that the organization is attempting to improve, when the net result of the moves is actually that it sets said organization back by perpetuating mediocrity:

Throughout the majors, lowly franchises everywhere are doing their thing -- which means lavishing funds upon men who should be either playing for the Newark Bears, coaching the Newark Bears or watching the Newark Bears from the stands. Two weeks ago, the Kansas City Royals signed Jason Kendall, a 35-year-old catcher and perhaps the game's worst player, to a two-year, $6 million deal.
--snip--
This is what bad franchises do when they're officially, unambiguously, unanimously pegged as bad franchises: They act stupidly. Some of it stems from sheer desperation, and some from poor decision-making skills. Mostly, however, it's a flimsy effort to fool the fan base; to hope that the illusion of an effort to compete cons enough bored city residents into coming out to the 'ol park and buying a hot dog and a collectable seat cushion. The Royals, whose Kendall signing is a near-replica of the past acquisitions of Doug Mientkiewicz and Reggie Sanders, excel at the trick.

In comparison to what’s happening elsewhere on the FA market, a relatively quiet off-season (despite the puzzling addition of Mitch-A-Palooza Talbot to the 25-man roster to take innings away from starting pitchers that are much more likely to factor into the teams’ plans past…say, June of 2010), I’ll take the Indians’ roster as it’s currently constructed and use 2010 as the time to answer questions regarding internal options, not the time to see innings or plate appearances taken away from the young players that do figure into the team’s future past this year.

While not trying to simply pile on the Royals’ organization that Pearlman used to prove his point, let’s go off from that thought tangentially to introduce a post put up by Joe Posnanski (who also has his own Cleveland-centric “Christmas Story” that you must read if you haven’t) on the Royals and, in particular, their off-season that continues to puzzle. Posnanski posted a story titled “Depressing Royals Story of the Day” in response to the Royals signing former White Sox CF Brian Anderson to a one-year deal (presumably to be their CF) and examines it in the context of the other moves that the Royals have made in the past six months:

This Brian Anderson can be called Brian N. Anderson — the N is for “Nikola” — and he has a career 69 OPS+ in 883 plate appearances. Much of that 69, to be fair, comes from his dreadful 2004 season when he hit .225/.290/.359. Since then, his OPS+ has been a more robust 75. And while he has no power, and has been caught stealing more times than he has been successful, and has a walk-to-strikeout ratio of 65-208, he does have a reputation as a good outfielder even though those rascally defensive numbers don’t show it.
Here’s the thing: Last year, there were seven players in baseball who qualified for the batting title with OPS+ of 80 or less. You got that number in mind? Seven.
– Two of those players — Yuniesky Betancourt and Jason Kendall — have been locked up by the Royals.
– Jose Guillen had an OPS+ of 80, but did not get enough at-bats to qualify for the batting title — he and his $13 million contract will be in the everyday lineup as either a DH or (gasp) a right fielder.
– Chris Getz, who had an OPS+ of 74 in 415 plate appearances (not enough to qualify) was acquired by the Royals and figures to be in the everyday lineup at second base.
– And now, Brian N. Anderson, with his career 69 OPS+ is the leading candidate to be the Opening Day centerfielder.
So — there were seven every day players in all of baseball last year with OPS+ of 80 or less. The Royals project to have FIVE IN THEIR OPENING DAY LINEUP. And that is assuming that Josh Fields, with his 68 OPS+ in 268 plate appearances last year, does not win a place in the lineup. And he could. The Royals like his bat.

While those 300 words certainly make me feel a little better about the Indians’ off-season, in that they have stood pat instead of foolishly spinning their wheels and prolonging the “rebuild/reload/whatever” from actually producing a contender, it got me to thinking about what the rest of the Central offenses figure to look like as the winter has been relatively quiet in the division.

With that in mind and jumping off from the JoePos piece, what does each AL Central teams’ Opening Day lineup (using MLB.com’s accumulated “Depth Chart” to project lineups) look like in terms of OPS+ for last year, if the season were to start tomorrow?

Realizing that past performance does not guarantee future results (and please note that the names in bold are those that compiled 350 or more MLB plate appearances last year for any team), it’s a pretty fascinating look…and remember an OPS+ 100 simply means that a player’s performance was exactly league average, meaning that any sub-100 number represents production below the league average.

Royals
Billy Butler – 124
David DeJesus - 106
Alex Gordon – 86
Jose Guillen – 80
Chris Getz – 74
Josh Fields – 68
Brian Anderson – 67
Yuniesky Betancourt – 65
Jason Kendall – 66

Twins
Joe Mauer – 170
Justin Morneau – 129
Jason Kubel – 136
Michael Cuddyer – 124
Denard Span – 114
Delmon Young – 91
Brendan Harris – 77
JJ Hardy – 76
Alexei Casilla – 44

Tigers
Miguel Cabrera – 142
Ryan Rayburn – 128
Magglio Ordonez – 109
Carlos Guillen – 96
Brandon Inge – 86
Gerald Laird – 64
Adam Everett – 59
Scott Sizemore – 0 MLB PA in 2009
Austin Jackson – 0 MLB PA in 2009

Indians
SS Choo – 137
Travis Hafner – 121
Asdrubal Cabrera – 115
Grady Sizemore – 111
Matt LaPorta – 100
Blue Lou Marson – 98
Mike Brantley – 93
Luis Valbuena – 90
Jhonny Peralta – 86

White Sox
Paul Konerko – 115
Gordon Beckham – 107
Juan Pierre – 105
Carlos Quentin – 99
Mark Teahan – 94
AJ Pierzynski – 94
Alexei Ramirez – 87
Mark Kotsay – 85
Alex Rios – 81

Not exactly a collections of Murderers’ Rows, eh?
How many players who figure into everyday lineups in 2010 for each team had more than 350 plate appearances AND posted and OPS+ above 100 last year?
Twins – 5 (Mauer, Morneau, Kubel, Cuddyer, Span)
Indians – 4 (Choo, Hafner, Sizemore, Cabrera)
White Sox – 3 (Konerko, Beckham, Pierre)
Tigers – 2 (Cabrera, Ordonez)
Royals – 2 (Butler, DeJesus)

To put that into perspective for someone who follows mainly the Indians, as awful as 2009 was for Jhonny Peralta, there figure to be 17 everyday players between the other 4 teams in the division who had a year that was just as bad or worse than Peralta’s nightmarish 2009…including 7 of the 9 likely Royals’ starters!

To put those numbers into actual run production, the Indians scored the 8th most runs in the AL last year and the 2nd most in the Central as the Twins finished 4th in the AL in runs, the Tigers 10th, the White Sox 12th, and the Royals 13th among the 14 AL teams. Looking at the names for each team then, outside of the Twins who are obviously the cream of the Central offensively (and any team with Joe Mauer better be), doesn’t the Indians’ 2010 lineup look pretty solid, particularly in the context of the teams that they will play 72 times this year? Considering that the players who came in at-or-below league average for the Tribe are either talented youngsters still adjusting to MLB (LaPorta, Brantley, Valbuena, and Marson) who should have a long leash to learn and with more options available to the team in the coming year (Donald and Santana, most notably) or are on the final year of their current deal (Peralta) with a youngster (The Chiz) a step away from waiting in the wings, the Indians offense shouldn’t be an issue in 2010, assuming health.

Further than that, maybe I’m missing something but since the middle of 2009, the Central has seen Victor Martinez, Curtis Granderson, Placido Polanco, Jermaine Dye, and Jim Thome leave, with an “influx” of known quantities like JJ Hardy, Andruw Jones, Alex Rios, Juan Pierre, Jason Kendall, Yuniesky Betancourt, Brian Anderson, Mark Kotsay, and Omar Vizquel (as well as many young players) taking their places in the lineups. Add that all up and the offenses in the Central are going to be downright offensive.

I know…I know, it all comes down to pitching (not to mention defense and “Waves of Arms” has an interesting analysis of the defenses in the AL Central) and Grienke and Verlander and Porcello and Buehrle and Peavy and Danks and Floyd and Baker and Blackburn (not to mention Nathan and Soria) all reside in the Central. Throw in the that “Unleash the Fury Mitch” Talbot could go from a likely turn on the waiver wire next Spring (when he would not have broken camp with the Rays) to the Indians’ starting rotation and the combination of the whole equation doesn’t exactly bode well for the idea that the Indians are going to contend for the AL Central in 2010.

But with the Indians facing the AL Central lineups a WHOPPING 72 amount of times in a 162 game season (that’s 45% of their 2010 games against AL Central opponents), perhaps the Indians can ride a steady offense and an settled bullpen (yes, I just went there but only because I’m such a HUGE Saul Rivera fan…I’m kidding) to win some games and create those building blocks for 2011 with the idea that holes will reveal themselves more fully in 2010 so 2011 can be a legitimate year for contention. That is, of course, assuming that the Indians don’t follow the blueprint currently being employed in KC and Washington and that the Talbot “acquisition” (and I use that term loosely) isn’t an indication that the Indians are going to continue to add MLB fodder at the 25-man roster to the benefit of…well, no one.

Is that logic reaching for a silver lining among the gray clouds on a day when the snow is falling on the North Coast?

No question, but isn’t that what this Holiday Season is all about, when uplifting stories like the news that Luke Holko (the little boy that was hit in the head by a foul ball at a Mahoning Valley Scrappers game this past summer) spoke his first words since the accident warm the heart and have us all looking for the silver linings in life, however inconsequential they may be?

Unleash the Fury Mitch

While attempting to go on hiatus leading up to Christmas, I thought that the announcement of Mitch-A-Palooza Talbot as the PTBNL for the Shoppach deal merited a quick comment. The announcement comes as a disappointment not because Joseph Cruz (the other name on the list) is that fantastic of a prospect or even because the Indians let the Rays pick the PTBNL for Shoppach, showing just how far Shoppach’s value had apparently fallen, particularly in light of the 2-year deals being given out on the FA market to back-up Catchers.

Past those two reasons, the announcement comes as a disappointment because Mitch Talbot is out of options, meaning that he’s likely going to get a long leash to adjust to MLB in the Indians’ rotation. As a 26-year-old with 9 2/3 IP in MLB, my guess is that the “adjustment” may take a while and since they can’t shuffle him back and forth to Columbus, he essentially takes up a spot on the pitching staff in a year where the Indians should be judiciously dividing up innings for their best options PAST 2010. Rather, between Talbot, Sowers, and Ambriz (if he sticks), the Indians have 3 guys who HAVE to break camp with the parent club (plus Wood, Westbrook, and Carmona who aren’t going anywhere) and have to stay on the Indians all season, laying waste to the idea that the Indians could use their roster flexibility to expose as many arms as possible to MLB hitting in 2010 so 2011 isn’t still a year of adjustment.

Alas, it looks like 2011 may still be a time when questions will remain unanswered and I fear that the addition of Talbot and Ambriz (and to a lesser degree, Grilli and Rivera) show that the Indians have not learned the Roberto Hernandez/Danny Graves lesson, in that the Indians seem to have found more arms (just not even as accomplished as the likes of Hernandez and Graves) to see if they can find lightning in a bottle again to start the season while the young arms that seemed to be set up so neatly (and actually bulging in AAA) get pushed back. Thus, it feels like the hope that 2010 will offer a new strategy than the “throw it all up against the wall to see what sticks” philosophy that has proven to be ineffective for too many years may be in vain.

Maybe Mitch Talbot comes out and shows that “the best change-up” in the Rays’ organization a couple of years ago means something, but the rationale that “he’s logged close to 400 Triple-A innings” with the idea of “adding him to our mix to come in and compete for a spot” (which is what Chris Antonetti said) sounds like we’re adding a 4-A journeyman who they’re looking to eat some innings. If they are, and they really intend to give Talbot that long leash to see if he can prove that he can adjust to become a mediocre MLB pitcher (something the out-of-options Jeremy Sowers is still trying to do after 400 MAJOR LEAGUE innings), then perhaps it’s more of an indictment as to how ready they really think their close-to-being-ready-for-MLB starting pitching really is. That is, if they’re willing to give Talbot a shot over younger internal options, most with more upside, with the idea that innings in 2010 should set the team up to know what they have going into 2011 (particularly in the rotation), then they’re not as high on the readiness of Huff, Rondon, Carrasco, and even Laffey and Masterson as we might think.

With Talbot, it’s not even really that he’s that bad of an option…if he were simply challenging to take a couple of starts here and there in the system to see if the Indians could find a use for him. Rather, the idea that he’s out of options (plus the fact that Sowers is as well and Ambriz needs to be carried on the 25-man because of the Rule 5 guidelines) just muddies the 25-man waters and unnecessarily takes up a roster spot at the expense of a pitcher who may figure into plans past 2010 and who retains options. It’s entirely possible that the Indians are content to give Talbot a shot in Spring Training and are more than happy to expose him to waivers if he doesn’t impress in Goodyear (which would further the idea that the team was just going to non-tender Shoppach and are taking a shot in the dark with Talbot), but very little exists on Talbot’s resume that suggests that he’s much more than a 5th starter/long man entering an organization that may already be flush with them.

If Mitch Talbot (he of the nearly 400 AAA innings and 9 2/3 MLB innings who is out of options) is that “innings-eater” that the Indians supposedly wanted (but couldn’t afford) when the off-season started and now represents one of the best five options to start games for the Indians coming out of Spring Training, 2010 may be an even longer season than previously thought. To me, I’d rather see the Indians use the 162 starts in 2010 to answer questions that exist for the likes of Laffey, Masterson, Huff, Rondon, and Carrasco than to see if Talbot’s worth a roster spot (and waiting until ¼ of the season is gone to make that determination) in 2010, much less beyond.

Trading Arms on a Lazy Sunday

With only four shopping days left before the arrival of one Baby and with things that need to be done before the arrival of another baby, let’s roll right into a Lazy Sunday where The Reservation remains quiet, but that certainly doesn’t mean that we’re hurting for topics to dissect.
And…we’re off…

The only notable articles from the week related specifically to the Tribe dealt with the health of Jake Westbrook and Travis Hafner and how Westbrook finished the winter “pain-free” and how Manny Acta describes Hafner’s likely usage pattern as one “that he’s going to get days off here and there, but nothing as he was in the past, where he couldn’t play a certain amount of games in a row.”

I’m not from Missouri (though I have been there and it is lovely…if otherworldly humid in the summer), but you’ll excuse me when I say that I’m going to wait to actually see proof that Westbrook is finally healthy and Hafner is able to play more than three consecutive games before optimism creeps in. Perhaps I’ve been tainted by hearing these “reports” before (“Hafner looks great…he’s REALLY making progress”, “When Jake gets back in June, this team could really make up some ground in the Central”), but “show me” that this isn’t just all hopeful thinking and something to talk about in a quiet off-season before you expect any excitement or optimism concerning those two. Maybe these updates on the health of players who will “earn” a little less than half of the Indians’ 2010 salary are valid (and maybe this news that Matt LaPorta will “be ready for Spring Training” is just as accurate), but after the cloak-and-dagger approach to reporting (or is it misreporting or under-reporting) injuries and rehabilitations to key players, I’ll reserve my excitement for the day when Westbrook has started his 10th straight game for the Tribe sometime in May with Hafner playing every day, taking up a spot in the middle of the lineup. Until then…color me skeptical.

As for the other semi-Tribe-related news, the Cliff Lee-Roy Halladay deal has continued to hash itself out, as most analysis centers either on why the why the Lee trade to Seattle was even necessary when weighed against the idea that Philly could have boasted Halladay AND Lee at the top of their 2010 rotation in an effort to return to the World Series as well as some analysis as to why the Phillies weren’t able to extract more on the trade market for one year of CP Lee at $9M.

The reason being broadcast as to why the Phils couldn’t just have kept Lee is allegedly “payroll limitations” (despite the team committing about $8.675M for 2010 on Placido Polanco, Ross Gload, and Brian Schneider in FA signings this off-season while Lee would have cost them $9M), but maybe the strip-mining of their Farm System to acquire Lee and Halladay had more to do with their decision to move Lee than they’re letting on, which actually leads into the next topic, which is what the Phillies received from the M’s for Lee.

As for why the Mariners gave up what seems to be so little for Lee, Dave Cameron at Fangraphs (the one who said that Shapiro got “taken to the cleaners”, or something to that effect, when Lee headed to Philly) tackles the subject:
In the last four months, I’ve written two posts with a similar point – a team traded Cliff Lee and got a mediocre return at best in terms of prospects. First, Cleveland’s Mark Shapiro made the decision to trade Lee to Philadelphia at the deadline for an uninspiring package of players, a decision that looked even more questionable given how well Lee pitched for the Phillies. But now, Ruben Amaro has followed in his footsteps, trading Lee away for a trio of okay-but-not-great prospects.
So, I have to wonder what is going on here? It’s impossible to believe that both Shapiro and Amaro failed to do their homework, trading Lee away without surveying the market and weighing available offers. They obviously are both interested in making the best deals they can, and with a player of Lee’s stature, I have to believe they did significant due diligence before pulling the trigger.
So, our options here are believe that two General Managers are lazy/incompetent and failed to extract the best return possible for their team when trading him, or that the market for Cliff Lee is just not very good. Let’s just agree to reject option A out of hand, as neither Shapiro or Amaro are lazy or stupid. That leaves the second option – that this really was the best both teams could do.
What, then, is wrong with Cliff Lee in the eyes of major league GMs?

Cameron concludes that GM’s are still unsold on Lee because of his rapid rise to greatness (and please remember that Lee allegedly wanted to talk contract extension with the Tribe BEFORE his 2009 season) and while that’s eminently possible, I think the fact that Lee’s made no bones about the fact that he’s chasing every last dollar (limiting his appeal to some teams, looking for more than just a rental) after 2010 excludes a number of teams from entering the conversation. Don’t take that to mean that the exclusion of a number of teams not looking for a one-year-rental at the top of their rotation sheds any more light on the situation, as it would seem that the Phillies (after the Halladay deal) were primed to use Lee as just that, to make another push for October with Halladay, Lee, and Hamels fronting their rotation; but Cameron does not mention that the Phillies strip-mined their farm system to net Lee, then Halladay, in the past two years and could be casting an eye towards their future beyond 2010.

So did the Phillies make this deal to replenish their farm system that has been stripped pretty clean in the past two years, considering that they traded their #2, #3, #4, and #10 prospects going into 2009 (according to Baseball America) for Lee as well as their #5, #6, and #7 prospects going into the 2009 season (again, as per BA) for Halladay? Perhaps, but don’t take that as a cue for the violins for Philadelphia, who have a World Series appearance and four years of Roy Halladay to show for all of their sacrifices (which amounts to 7 of their top 10 prospects going into 2009 as well as giving up their #2 and #4 prospects going into 2008 for Joe Blanton), but their good fortune as to where they sit today has as much to do with Roy Halladay putting his money where his mouth is in terms of contract negotiations (something Lee did not in Philly) as anything else.

It comes back to the question as to whether the Phillies really needed to make the Lee-to-Seattle deal to replenish their farm system as Joe Sheehan states in a fantastic piece (pay content, with the monthly price for access to B-Pro coming below what it costs for four Sunday issues of the PD on your doorstep) that, “the Mariners traded long-term upside, players who would not be in the majors until 2012 at the earliest”, which raises the biggest question in the whole Lee trade.

If the prospects the Phillies received from the M’s aren’t going to be in the Majors until 2012 at the earliest, what’s the rationale in using those high-upside players a LONG way away from MLB as the way to re-stock the farm system, particularly in the context that Philadelphia could have let Lee walk away at the end of 2010 with two draft picks in return, which could really net them the same type of young, high-upside (if untested) players they extracted from Seattle for Lee? The Phillies could have used those 1st Round Picks they would have received had Lee left to acquire players that wouldn’t be much different than Aumont and the others, players with high-ceilings who have the potential to look fantastic in High-A ball.

Regardless, it’s impossible not to bring this back to the Indians’ deal with the Phillies over the summer and to compare some of the players dealt in the three deals (Lee to Philly, Lee to Seattle, and Halladay to Philly), and it remains fascinating to me how most of the analysis regarding the trades focuses on the “promise” and “potential” of players (particularly arms) and are content to rely on names being thrown out there and “ceilings” instead of looking at track records and, even more importantly, ages that go along with those track records.

For instance, the two big arms in the recent Halladay and Lee deals were Kyle Drabek and Phillipe Aumont, two former first round picks, aged 21 (Aumont in January) and 23 (Drabek) a few weeks ago and while everyone drools over the potential of those two, let’s realize that Aumont has thrown a total of 106 2/3 innings in the minors and Drabek has thrown a total of 267 2/3 innings as a professional. What basis is used to label these guys potential impact arms…promise that may just be a result of the lack of exposure to better hitters?

I’m not questioning that Aumont and Drabek look to be talented pitchers, with Adam Miller and Chuck Lofgren in the news this past month (the Indians’ #1 and #2 prospects heading into 2007), let’s remember how much can go wrong between AA or High-A and MLB, particularly with pitchers. What puzzles me is that there seems to be an overemphasis on potential and “what could be” instead of what is actually there and projecting particular players effectively while acknowledging them for what they are.

For instance, to keep this in the Cliff Lee discussion, let’s take a look at the progression of how Carlos Carrasco (who seems to be the most MLB-ready pitcher that the Indians have acquired since…well, Lee) has been perceived as a prospect as he’s racked up 738 2/3 innings in the Minors.

After his first couple of seasons in Rookie ball and on short-season teams, Carrasco spent his first year in the Sally League (the same league as Lake County), posting this line for the Lakewood Blue Claws:
Carlos Carrasco 2006 – Age 19 – Low-A
2.26 ERA, 1.05 WHIP, 159 K, 65 BB in 159 1/3 IP

Pretty impressive stuff for a 19-year-old pitching against players much older than him and entering 2007, he was rated as the #41 ranked prospect in all of MLB and put forth this line as a 20-year-old:
Carlos Carrasco 2007 – Age 20 – High-A/AA
3.86 ERA, 1.30 WHIP, 102 K, 68 BB in 140 IP

A slight regression for him in terms of a higher WHIP and a lower K-rate from his time in the Sally League; but after posting that line in 2007, he was still ranked as the 54th ranked prospect in all of MLB going into 2008, when he put forth this effort:
Carlos Carrasco 2008 – Age 21 – AA/AAA
3.69 ERA, 1.35 WHIP, 155 K, 58 BB in 151 1/3 IP

The K-rate went back up and the ERA and WHIP stayed consistent with Carrasco pitching as a 21-year-old in AA and AAA. As a result, after thriving in 2008 with that cumulative line, he was ranked as the 52nd best prospect in MLB and posted this line last year:
Carlos Carrasco 2009 – Age 22 – AAA
4.64 ERA, 1.24 WHIP, 148 K, 45 BB in 157 IP

Carrasco thrived at each level that he’s been placed at and, while his ERA may have seen a bump in 2009 in AAA, his WHIP was actually the lowest it’s been since he was a 19-year-old in the Sally League…the season after which he was rated the 41st best prospect in MLB. Carrasco posted his best K/BB rate in 2009 (3.29) as a minor-leaguer besting the numbers in 2006 (2.45) after which he was the 41st best prospect, in 2007 (1.50) after which he was the 54th best prospect, and 2008 (2.67) after which he was the 52nd best prospect.

So…where did the luster come off and when did Kyle Drabek (he of the 96 1/3 innings pitched above A-ball…and only 5 ½ months younger than Carrasco) become the “ace-in-waiting” and the “untouchable” in the Phillies’ organization, while Carrasco became the disappointment? In Carrasco’s overall body of work, what justifies the opinion that he wasn’t the close-to-MLB-ready starting pitcher that was desired in any Cliff Lee deal? Are we really going to label Carrasco as a “project” and a “potential bust” because of 22 1/3 disastrous innings he threw in MLB as a 22-year-old?

Wouldn’t a little bit of patience be a better avenue to travel?
It may be a difficult road to hoe in this world of instant analysis with every off-season and every trade having “winners” and “losers” immediately, but who’s to say that Carrasco isn’t the exact same top prospect that he’s been since the end of 2006, climbing the minor-league ladder appropriately and putting up the same numbers that he did as a 19-year-old for the Lakewood Blue Claws?

Trust me when I say that by no means is that meant to suggest that Carrasco is the next aCCe (see what I did there) of this team or that Drabek isn’t going to front the Blue Jays’ rotation for the next 6 years while Carrasco attempts to find some level of consistency in the back of the Indians’ rotation. The exercise is meant more to cast a suspicious eye on reading too much into reports or on how one particular publication ranks prospects, when the consensus among MLB Front Offices could run completely counter to those opinions. More than that though, it’s meant to preach some level of patience to the idea that a trade can be properly evaluated so soon after being consummated.

To that end, realize that after the 2004 season, a solid 2 ½ years after Bartolo Colon deal, here is the cumulative production at the MLB level from the prospects (Lee Stevens need not apply), with their ages at the end of 2004 shown, obtained from Montreal:
Cliff Lee – Age 25
17-12, 4.88 ERA, 1.42 WHIP, 211 K, 109 BB in 241 2/3 IP over 44 MLB starts

Brandon Phillips – Age 23
.210 BA / .251 OBP / .317 SLG / .567 OPS with 6 HR in 423 AB over 129 MLB games

Grady Sizemore – Age 21
.246 BA / .333 OBP / .406 SLG / .739 OPS with 4 HR in 138 AB over 43 MLB games

Thirty months after the deal, the Indians had a talented LHP who was still adjusting to MLB, a young middle infielder who was not making much of a transition to MLB, and a very young OF who had just made his appearance with the parent club. To put that in terms of evaluation, thirty months after the Lee deal will be AFTER the 2011 season. If that seems like a long way away, it is…and that period of time should reveal what type of pitcher Carrasco is, whether a 23-YEAR-OLD Lou Marson is just a suitable back-up catcher or more (or even trade bait), whether Jason Donald is a legitimate starting 2B or just a Utility IF, and whether Jason Knapp’s arm troubles cause him to go the way of Adam Miller.

But the majority of those questions figure to be answered by the time that 2012 starts and, if you remember what Joe Sheehan wrote about the prospects that the Phillies received from the Mariners, that they “would not be in the majors until 2012 at the earliest”, it becomes a question of timing.

Is the better strategy to receive players whose warts may be a little more on display but are closer to legitimately contributing at some level in MLB, or load up on high-ceiling prospects who have yet to be exposed or challenged in AA, with the keywords of “promise” and “potential” carrying the day?

Time will ultimately tell if the better strategy in trading Lee was to take the apparent bird in the hand of close-to-MLB ready players (not that Carrasco, Marson, or Donald are any locks to become everyday MLB players) or two in the bush with younger, high-ceiling players (as, most notably, Aumont does seem to have the talent to help the Philadelphia bullpen) was the more judicious path to take. Regardless, both paths were taken and the names are now out there so they can always be compared in terms of return for Cliff Lee.

Finally, in a programming note, I will appear on Monday’s episode of “More Sports and Les Levine” with Scott Sargent and Rick Grayshock of Waiting for Next Year as we discuss the past year in Cleveland sports with Les, as well as what 2010 may hold. So, if you want to see what a frazzled, soon-to-be-father-of-2 (badly in need of a haircut) looks like in the holiday season, espousing thoughts on the Indians (while faking it on the Browns and Cavs questions), the show airs at 6 PM on NEON (that’s 23 on Time Warner Cable…at least my Time Warner Cable) and re-airs at 11:00 PM.
Set those DVR’s…now.

With the week ahead likely precluding any posts until next Sunday, let me take the opportunity to wish everyone a Merry Christmas and a Happy Holidays to you and all of your families.

Tommy Lee

While North Coast is busy trying to make sense of Mike Holmgren and why a Miami Dolphins jet was seen at Burke Lakefront Airport on Tuesday morning, a little trade went down in MLB with a particular Arkansan that you may remember…middle name of Phifer. With the BIG trade (step aside, Granderson) finally consummated, let’s shoot off some quick tomahawks on what it took to get Lee to the Pacific Northwest, among other topics:
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Obviously, most of the focus nationally on the Halladay-Lee trade is on…well, Halladay and Lee, but the most fascinating aspect of the deal for me is what Seattle gave up for one season of Lee…or rather what they didn’t give up. The M’s parted with Phillipe Aumont, Tyson Gillies, and JC Ramirez to net Lee from the Phillies and going over to Dave Cameron from USS Mariner, here’s how he first reacted to the news of including those three players from the Seattle organization:
Aumont is a good relief prospect. He could be in the majors this year, and he’s got all-star closer upside. Gillies is a potential high OBP center fielder with speed. Ramirez has the best arm in the system. They’re all prospects. And the whole lot of them aren’t worth three months of Cliff Lee, much less an entire season.
--snip--
The Mariners are getting a Cy Young caliber pitcher for some decent-but-not-great prospects. They aren’t giving up Morrow. They aren’t giving up Saunders. They aren’t even giving up Triunfel. And yet, they walk away with one of the five or six best pitchers in baseball.

Before exploring that further, let’s just say that the logic for all three teams in the deal makes a lot of sense as this all played out because the Phillies approached CP Lee about an extension and, seeing that he had no interest in doing one, moved back onto Halladay with the idea that they could reach a contract extension with Halladay, which they now have. However, since the aspect of this whole deal of interest to Tribe fans is that Lee has now been dealt a second time in the last five months, let’s examine that portion of the trade in terms of what it took to get him to the Emerald City. In essence, the Mariners got Lee and, using the idea that they’re that “lucky team” that Rosenthal referenced in his piece on Sunday (when he absolutely nailed this exact scenario, if not the particulars/prospects), what did they give up?

Using Dave Cameron’s words here, that would be “a good relief prospect with all-star closer upside” in Aumont, a “potential high OBP center fielder with speed” in Gillies and a RHP who entered the season as the M’s #5 prospect who is a 21-year-old who just completed a season in High-A ball and was added to the 40-man roster this off-season in Ramirez. To provide some perspective as to how far off these prospects are from legitimately contributing, that would be a 20-year-old “potential closer” who has yet to throw a pitch above A-ball, a 21-year-old toolsy outfielder who has yet to see a pitch above A-ball, and a 21-year-old with a MiLB career K/9 rate of 7.9 (Dave Huff’s MiLB career K rate is 8.1) who has yet to throw a pitch above A-ball for one season of CP Lee at the top of their rotation.

Maybe Aumont gets fast-tracked to help out a Philadelphia bullpen in need of it (despite the fact that he’s never even been exposed to AA hitters), but that’s 3 players who have never played above A-ball (or the Kinston equivalent in the Indians’ farm system) for one year of Lee. You could say that the prospects that all traded hands included the likes of Kyle Drabek and Mike Taylor, but those three players are what the M’s gave up to get one year of Cliff Lee.

Remember how Shapiro was panned for not getting enough for 1 ½ seasons of Lee at an affordable salary and even questioned for not approaching Lee about an extension past the 2010 season? It would seem that the worm has turned (to some extent) as the Phillies couldn’t convince Lee to talk extension (those tightwads!) and now have those three youngsters to show for Lee in terms of prospects.

Compare that Seattle threesome to just the pitchers that the Indians netted for Lee – a 21-year-old Carlos Carrasco (Carrasco doesn’t turn 22 until next March) who has already thrown 193 1/3 innings at AAA (with a cumulative 1.26 WHIP and a 8.0 K/9 rate at AAA) and a 19-year-old Jayson Knapp who figures in at the A-level this year with a K/9 rate of 11.3 (albeit in a limited amount of innings). Carrasco figures into the 2011 season at the very latest and the other two players (Donald and Marson) acquired in the deal from the Phillies are guys who figure onto the Indians’ 25-man roster (and probably their starting lineup this year). Suddenly, the Lee deal to Philly doesn’t feel as deflating as it previously did, particularly when you consider how young and advanced Carrasco is compared to those two arms departing Seattle.

Will the Lee deal eventually be looked upon as a success or a failure from a Cleveland standpoint?
Regardless of how quickly everyone wants to make a snap judgment on it, the deal is still only 5 months old (and 2 of those months did not involve baseball being played) and still needs some time for these players to reveal themselves more fully for a sufficient analysis to be done. That being said, the comparable package of what a team had to give up for one season of Lee is now out there and it’s entirely possible that the comparable package of what a team would have to give up for ½ of a season with Lee could be coming in July if things go completely off the rails for the Mariners to start out 2010.

As for the other factor in the whole equation, Lee presumably now goes to Seattle to chase another Cy Young (in a giant ballpark) and waits for his chance to join his big buddy in the Bronx after the year, when Andy Pettitte’s contract comes off of the books (again) to get his 4 to 5 year deal worth $18M to $20M annually and sit behind CC and Burnett in the Yankees’ rotation.
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The other news to come out this week happens to center on CP Lee’s old battery-mate as Anthony Castrovince has reported that the PTBNL in the Kelly Shoppach deal has been narrowed down to two options, Mitch Talbot and Joseph Cruz. The Indians, who have until December 20th to choose between the two, should have no trouble deciding between the two and the fact that they’re waiting to make the selection is about the only confusing aspect of the deal.

The reason that the decision should be easy becomes clear once you realize that Mitch Talbot is 26 year-old RH changeup artist who has struggled to make the transition to MLB after spending TWO FULL years in AAA in 2007 and 2008 with a career AAA resume that includes a 4.23 ERA, a 1.36 WHIP, and a 2.82 K/BB over 67 starts in AAA. Sound like anything already in the Tribe organization that needs to get filtered through this year?
Not to be overly dismissive here, but to use a line from “The Bizarro Jerry” episode, “we already have a ‘George’”.

Adding Talbot to the mix of arms, with only Jeremy Sowers older than him (by a whopping 5 months), after he’s now spent a good amount of time at AAA without doing anything special simply doesn’t make sense. Throw in the fact that Talbot is out of options, meaning we’d have to carry him out of Spring Training and for the whole season in a season where the arms figure to be moving back and forth from Cleveland to Columbus pretty frequently, and his inclusion on this list mystifies even further.

What would make sense would be to add the other name purported to be on the list, which is Joseph Cruz, a 21 year old prospect who averages more than a K an inning and sports a career K/BB rate of 4.05. If you’ve been following the Indians’ acquisitions over the last 6 months, you realize that the Indians are stacking up these high-ceiling, high K-rate arms with the idea that the sheer quantity of talent will offset the attrition rate that proved to be the undoing of the first idea that arms would simply emerge from the Minors to fill holes on the parent club seamlessly and effectively.

Would Cruz project as a starter or as a reliever?
At this point, it wouldn’t really matter as he’d simply join this growing army of hard-throwing pitchers with the idea that if about ¼ of them ever make a resounding impact that the net result is better than the mediocrity that seems to be the alternative.

For what it’s worth, RaysProspects.com lists Cruz as the Rays’ 24th best prospect and Talbot as the Rays’ 25th best prospect, which is certainly not all that compelling despite the knowledge that the Rays’ farm system is obviously stacked. While that ranking system may or may not be relevant, the fact that the Indians seem to be looking at a lower-tier prospect is disappointing only because activity on the open market has dictated that there were a number of teams looking for a catcher. On the FA market alone we’ve seen dreadful signings like Jason Kendall to KC and Pudge to Washington, as well as fair-to-middling signings of Gregg Zaun to Milwaukee, Brian Schneider to Philadelphia and John Buck and Miguel Castro to Toronto. That’s 4 teams that looked to be in the market for a catcher (with other teams like the Mets still looking) and, while Kelly Shoppach’s value may never truly be known, the fact that the likes of KC, WAS, and PHI were willing to commit 2-year deals for what would seem to be lesser talents certainly lends credence to the idea that the Indians should have been able to extract more than Talbot or Cruz from Tampa…and it should be Cruz.
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Finally, just as a little parting shot for the argument that the Indians should the Indians be spending money to fill holes and to make themselves more competitive for the 2010 season in which they figure to be rebuilding/reloading/whatever, here’s a brilliant sentence from Joe Sheehan at Baseball Prospectus:
The key mistake that continues to be made—and we’ve seen it with Kendall and the Royals, Ivan Rodriguez and the Nationals, Brandon Lyon and the Astros—is money wasted in dribs and drabs on players who are fungible by teams that have no reason to chase wins.

The Indians made their mistakes spending “dribs and drabs on players who are fungible” (Dellichaels, anyone?) and the fact that they’re NOT making the same mistake represents some sort of lesson learned and some sort of shift in organizational thinking, doesn’t it?

It may not be much, but in a system in which 6 to 7 teams make the majority of the off-season moves and the rest of the teams sit on the sidelines and use “hope” as a strategy, I’d prefer the idea that the Indians are positioning themselves for making a run when they’re ready to make a run and not just “chasing wins”.

A Lazy Sunday After Indy

In light of hosting a 3-year-old’s birthday party yesterday here at the house with the in-laws staying AT said house, we’ll keep this (relatively) short and sweet because, while today may be a Lazy Sunday for some, I have to figure out how to get to a tree farm in Valley View, cut down a tree on a rainy morning and get it decorated…all before getting the assembled Milwaukeeans to a bar to watch the Packers play the Bears at 1 PM.

And with that (and me shuddering after merely typing that itinerary)…we’re off:
The Rule 5 Draft (not to be confused with the lesser-known and actually non-existent “Rule V” Draft) was conducted this past Thursday with the Indians losing LHP Chuck Lofgren to the Brewers (as Milwaukee hopes to develop him as a LOOGY, based mainly on his stellar numbers against LHP this year in Columbus and Akron) while they picked up RHP Hector Ambriz from the Diamondbacks organization to compete for a big league spot in the 2010 bullpen. As this is not generally my area of expertise, I’ll defer to the write-ups from Tony Lastoria and Andrew Humphries of the LGT to break these transactions (particularly the Ambriz addition) down with the proper depth.

What did the Indians get in Ambriz?
To my untrained eyes, his MiLB cumulative numbers (4.41 ERA, 1.31 WHIP, 7.9 K/9, 2.8 BB/9, 2.84 K/BB) don’t show too much, other than that he’s not a strikeout pitcher and that he’s not flown through the Diamondbacks’ system without his hiccups (he wouldn’t have been available in the Rule 5 if he had), as he is now 25 and just got his first taste of AAA this year. It will be interesting to see how the assembled coaching staff in Goodyear (Scott Radinsky and Ruben Niebla in particular) approaches Ambriz as the Indians did transition a good number of pitchers that were previously starters only into bullpen options by asking those arms to focus on a two-to-three pitch mix instead of attempting to master a four-to-five pitch repertoire. Since Ambriz has started 79 of his 83 games over the last three years, how his stuff translates to shorter stints will essentially determine whether he sticks or not (and B-Pro’s Kevin Goldstein puts the likelihood of that at about 5% that he sticks) is the $50,000 question.

If nothing else, Ambriz represents a middle relief option and probably nothing more. Don’t take that to mean that having a young, cost-controlled RHP that could supply some middle relief is not valuable, as we’ve been subjected to the likes of Danny Graves, Oldberto Hernandez, and Guillermo Mota out of the gate in the past few years with the idea that they’d pitch middle relief…with horrifying results. Ambriz now enters the bullpen mix and could be given a long leash to see if he can succeed in the early going of 2010 as so many of the other arms that figure into that middle of the bullpen mix (Jensen Lewis and Jess Todd in particular and Tony Sipp and Joe Smith to a lesser degree) still retain options. If Ambriz is able to translate his groundball ability (44% in the minors) to the Majors and remains a strike-thrower, he could turn into a useful piece that doesn’t cost the Indians much more than a roster spot.

Whether he does well enough in Spring Training or gets a long look once the 2010 season starts in the Tribe bullpen could mean that some of those aforementioned arms with options remaining (Jenny Lew and Jesse Ray Todd, I’m looking squarely at you) will start the season in AAA Columbus with…cue the trumpets…Charles Nagy as their pitching coach!

That’s right, all you friends of the feather who pine for the “Era of Champions” (while ignoring the fact that the Indians were never World Series Champions during that “Era” of the 1990’s), another former Tribesman has re-entered the fold as a coach for the young Indians as Charles Nagy joins Sandy Alomar, Jr. to mold the minds of these youngsters. While this news made some people’s days, I feel no different about it than I do the Alomar hiring, in that the nostalgia factor makes me warm and fuzzy for about 5 minutes, giving way to the thought that I hope that Charles Nagy knows what he’s doing as a pitching coach.

He was the Angels’ AAA pitching coach in 2006 and 2007 when he tutored the likes of Joe Saunders (both years), Jered Weaver (in 2006) …both of whom have made a nice transition to their big league club and represent two young talented arms that have translated MiLB success to MLB. Thus, the body of work is there to justify the return of Nagy to the organization in this post with the hopes that he can put the finishing touches on Rondon, Carrasco, and Jeanmar Gomez (most notably) as he did with the Angel hurlers. Not to suggest that talents akin to a Saunders and (more obviously) a Weaver are just sitting in the Indians’ organization, but if Nagy can turn some of these young arms into top-to-middle-of-the-rotation candidates instead of being back-end fodder, he’s doing his job splendidly. If he’s able to assist in that transition, I don’t care if his name is Gnarls Nagy…so long as some of these arms emerge from AAA ready to contribute and become mainstays in the big league pitching staff going forward.

One arm who will seemingly never emerge from the Minors to become a mainstay on the Tribe’s pitching staff is Adam Miller, who suffered yet another setback. While everyone is aware of the cautionary tale that Miller has come to represent and now know what TINSTAAPP means, it does essentially bring to a conclusion the chance that Miller will ever see the mound in Cleveland as his body simply would not allow his prodigious talent to mature into what everyone thought he would become when 2007 dawned.

In terms of the other major news of the last week that affects the Indians (albeit indirectly), Curtis Granderson and Edwin Jackson have left Motown, the innocent by-standers who turned into victims of other bad decisions made by the Tigers’ organization as Jon-Paul Morosi keenly points out:
Some may suggest that the Tigers agreed to trade Curtis Granderson and Edwin Jackson on Tuesday because the Michigan economy is not doing well.
That is false.
This deal happened for 92.1 million reasons — the number of dollars owed to Miguel Cabrera, Magglio Ordonez, Carlos Guillen, Brandon Inge, Nate Robertson, Dontrelle Willis and Jeremy Bonderman in 2010.
It's sad, really. The Tigers were doomed by their own generosity. They won a pennant in 2006, traded for Cabrera and Willis in 2007, and made a habit of rewarding players based on past accomplishments or the expectation of same.
Baseball teams do not win championships because of benevolence. They must make cold, calculating decisions about when to hold onto veteran players and when to let them go.
Time after time, the Tigers made the wrong choice. And now they have determined that the best way to atone for those errors is to trade away a pair of All-Stars before they make big money.

The topic du jour after the trade was Granderson’s issues with LHP, as his .484 OPS vs. LHP was 2nd last (and not even really all that close to 3rd last) among all MLB players with 125 or more plate appearances against LHP. For some perspective on that, Louie the Fifth had a .661 OPS vs. LHP in 2009…you know, the guy the Indians want to find a RH complement for at 2B because of his struggles against LHP. While Joe Pos makes a strong argument that he doesn’t think that Curtis’ struggles against LHP will be as much of an issue in the Bronx because the rest of the Yankees absolutely crush LHP, it’s hard to ignore that Granderson’s numbers against LHP were subterranean.

Granderson is no longer the Indians’ AL Central problem (as well as Jackson exiting the division, which shouldn’t be overlooked), as the Tigers’ big get in the deal is young K machine Max Scherzer from the desert. While most analysis of the deal centers on how Scherzer may represent an upgrade over Edwin Jackson right now in the Detroit rotation (not to mention being under club control for 3 more years than Jackson) the interesting contrarian point of view focuses on the long-term injury concerns for Scherzer from Arizona GM Josh Byrnes, coming via a Rob Neyer Sweet Spot post:
Diamondbacks had concerns about Scherzer's ability to remain healthy and develop into a perennial 200-inning workhorse, questions that stem from a violent, jerky pitching motion that many believe could lead to injury.

Scherzer’s development will be the interesting aspect of the Detroit team going forward as, if Scherzer is what some baseball people say he is, the top of the Tigers’ rotation just got pretty wicked with Verlander (though Morosi states in the piece linked earlier that Verlander is under contract for only two more years and will be in line for a big payday…one that might not come from Mike Ilitch, depending upon how the next two years go), Porcello, and Scherzer. Whether Scherzer finds immediate success (or even eventual success) in the rotation will determine whether this deal is a success for the Tigers and affects the long-term future of their team unlike the performance of any other Detroit player.

While the Granderson deal certainly represents the biggest news of the off-season to date, Ken Rosenthal floats a balloon out there for what he sees would be a possible solution to the Halladay situation in Toronto, one that would certainly be a bigger deal than Granderson going to the Bronx:
We know the Phillies preferred Halladay to Lee last July. We know they are one of his top choices, an East Coast team that trains close to his home in Dunedin, Fla. And we know from published reports that Phillies GM Ruben Amaro Jr. met last week with Lee's agent, Darek Braunecker, about a possible contract extension.
I'm guessing that discussion did not go well.
Both Lee, 31, and Halladay, 32, are free agents after next season. Halladay likely will require a contract extension to waive his no-trade clause. Perfect! By exchanging Lee for Halladay, the Phillies would ensure that they gain long-term control of an ace — Halladay, the one they wanted all along.
So, here's the deal: Lee goes somewhere for prospects. The Phillies include the prospects in their package for Halladay, maybe keep one or two for themselves. Halladay gets his extension, the Jays get a bounty of young players and some lucky team gets Lee for one year at his bargain salary of $9 million.

The bolded portion was admittedly bolded by me (as it brings us back to the idea that the INDIANS should have extended Lee), but if that scenario were to take place (as unlikely as it may sound the first time you hear it), could you imagine the Monday Morning Quarterbacking that would take place to see what that “lucky team who gets Lee for one year at his bargain salary of $9 million” in terms of comparing it to the Carrasco/Knapp/Marson/Donald haul?

The other “news” (and that term is used loosely and not offering contracts to Reyes, Miller, and Veras does not even constitute a loose use of the term “news”) is that the Indians may have an interest in Marcus Thames to be the RH bat to play LF and 1B, which makes sense as long as Thames plays about once every week or so and doesn’t take at-bats away from LaPorta or Brantley. As a RH bat, he offers something that Crowe and Brown cannot (well…actually a lot of things), but Thames has hit LHP at a .867 OPS clip over the last three years, so he would have some value on a LH-heavy roster and could simply complement Hafner (who may or may not be able to play consecutive games and could face LHP). That all being said, it would ostensibly end the Andy Marte Era in Cleveland (as difficult as it will be for some people to let that Era go) as Marte looks to the RH option off of the bench right now that can play 1B, a move that may be a little short-sighted when the Indians lack an obvious answer at 3B for 2011 when Peralta’s option won’t be picked up and The Chiz figures to start the 2011 season in Columbus. So long as any deal with Thames wouldn’t be a guaranteed MLB deal and wouldn’t automatically exclude Marte from future plans, I could find some merit to it; but giving Thames anything more than a minor-league deal isn’t entirely necessary.

Moving away from the Indians, it has been announced Sweet Pete Gammons is leaving ESPN for the MLB Network and MLB.com (as well as becoming a studio analyst and reporter for NESN, the Red Sox flagship station in an obvious and brilliant counter move against ESPNBoston.com), essentially removing any reason for me to watch ESPN or keep the WWL in my life in the least bit…outside of Bill Simmons, who’s just waiting for his escape hatch. Since I don’t think I’m alone in feeling nauseous at the sight of former players and columnist blowhards yelling at each other and contributing nothing substantial to “analysis”, I would also have to think that I’m not alone in thinking that this news is the death knell for that 4-letter word (which used to mean so much more) for many sports fans, who are now able to get their news from the sources they want instead of simply where it was most readily available, which WAS what was transmitting from Bristol. One of those sought-out sources has consistently been Gammons and we’ll continue to get him, presumably for free, and without the histrionics associated with the increasingly difficult to watch ESPN.

As for what the move means to the MLB Network, it means even better insight from people in the know and a nice complement to their growing stable of articulate former players who provide more than belly laughs or empty opinions for the sake of hearing themselves talk. MLB Network has come a long way in a short amount of time and this news cements the removal of ESPN from my cable “Favorites” button as I’ll now go straight to the MLB Network, with their slick production, intelligent banter, and all-encompassing baseball coverage. With Gammons in the fold at the MLB Network, the intelligent baseball fan (looking for more substance than style) wins out as better avenues to satiate their baseball appetite continue to be upgraded.

Winding it down here, while watching the most recent episode of “How I Met Your Mother” (one of the only 3 consistently funny comedies on Network TV…along with the 9:00 to 10:00 PM block on Thursday night on the Peacock), there was a flashback to a 15-year-old Marshall making a list of everything that he wanted to accomplish by the time he was 30. As the rat-tail sporting, overall-wearing Marshall laid his list down back in 1993, he referred to himself as…wait for it…Vanilla Thunder with the idea that his basketball exploits will have earned him that moniker. While this nickname is somewhat funny in a vacuum (and funnier if you’re aware of the urban definition for the term), it struck me that the co-creator and writer of HIMYM, Carter Bays, is a Cleveland native who regularly references the Indians in HIMYM episodes.

Why is this all relevant on a Sunday in which I have more pressing things to do than to recount a HIMYM episode? Because Vanilla Thunder is the nickname being championed by yours truly (and LGT’s Jay Levin) for one Matt LaPorta and, while I’ll stop short of saying that the HIMYM reference came from the Indians’ blogosphere, it would seem that the nickname could have gained some traction for Mr. Gator4God.

Finally, Vince Grzegorek over at ’64 and Counting has a fun piece (as usual) jumping off from Joe Posnanski’s obsession with Duane Kuiper by asking a couple of folks who their “Kuiper” is, with some sawed-off hack going on and on (again) about this mildy-upsetting Pat Tabler obsession.

That’s it for me, you can find me at some as-yet-undetermined location with a group of people watching the Packers-Bears game…I’ll be the one on with his head on the table taking a nap.