Untime-Lee

Realizing that the events of this post-season continue to be agonizingly painful for Tribe fans, in light of what has transpired from this time in 2007 to now, what happened on Tuesday night forces us all to re-visit what is, what has happened, and what could have been, particularly in terms of Cliff Lee's playoff performance the last three times his teams made the playoffs...
Cliff Lee
2010 Postseason - 1.13 ERA, 0.69 WHIP, 21 K, 0 BB in 16 IP (2 victories)


Cliff Lee
2009 Postseason - 1.56 ERA, 0.82 WHIP, 33 K, 6 BB in 40 1/3 IP (4 victories)


Cliff Lee
2007 Postseason - Did not participate, left off of post-season roster


Do not take this as a cry that Lee deserved on the 2007 post-season roster, but rather that the timing of "Cliff Lee: middle-of-the-rotation-starter" turning into "Clifton Phifer Lee - absolute stud and playoff hero" didn't exactly jibe with when the Indians could have used said "absolute stud and playoff hero".

Such is baseball...particularly in Cleveland as of late.

A Lazy Sunday with Lacoste Nostra

As another gorgeous Fall weekend is upon us on the North Coast, and with the requisite trip to the apple orchard completed yesterday with the boys (and a day at the Zoo in front of us), let’s wade back into the Indians’ season, now done for nearly a full week. While you can’t help but see former Indians on the TV these days in the playoffs (and at whose feet does the blame of having guys like CC, Lee, Pavano, and Wood…just to name a few, fall in that the Indians were unable to compete WITH those guys on the roster in the past two years), the MLB playoffs for me are fun to watch, if depressing.

The fun comes, obviously from watching baseball being played well, with tremendous starting pitching and with the pressure of postseason baseball being palpable, almost on every pitch. Unfortunately, the competitive balance of the league has devolved to the point that, as Cleveland Frowns puts it in his (albeit late) playoff preview, “the playoffs are for the big boys…the ones with $100,000,000 more to spend on world class baseball players than you have.”

Interestingly, the Phillies seem to have realized that they play in the 3rd largest Metropolis area with just one team and the Rangers (and their new owners) have awoken to the fact that they play in the 2nd largest Metropolis area with just one team (that team in New England is 1st, in case you were wondering); so it would seem as if MLB has some new “big boys” at the table as the disparity between the teams with the financial wherewithal (or a healthy and steady revenue stream that a large market can bring in TV revenue, like this deal) grows as the big-market teams continue to figure out how to use their built-in financial advantages…you know, to their advantage in the final standings.

All of which brings us to the topic of the day as the Indians, find themselves with a “new” structure in their Front Office with Mark Shapiro moving into the role of President (where he is suddenly the MORE compelling character in all of this because of his new role as keeper of the purse strings and because his job is to figure out a way to compete with – or at least live in the same zip code – as the aforementioned “big boys) and Chris Antonetti moving up to the position of General Manager.

This “announcement” of the GM baton passing from Mark Shapiro to Chris Antonetti has been one of the worst-kept “secrets” in Cleveland (worse that LeBron’s tipping), dating back to when the Cardinals courted Antonetti, who “re-worked” his contract, never officially saying that the “re-work” included this ascension to the GM spot. Thus, since very little else is happening on The Reservation (unless you want to delve into the “season in reviews” from the beat writers…and I don’t), we’ll keep the focus today on the new “Don” in the “Polo Shirt Mafia” at the corner of Carnegie and Ontario.

If you’re confused by the language of that last sentence, the term of the Polo Shirt Mafia gained traction when Antonetti (and others) started giving interviews and as his picture (along with others) started to appear in the paper and online. As Antonetti (and others) matched Shapiro in dialect, diction, body language, and linguistic filler, even succeeding in evasiveness while answering and specializing in an ability to use many words while actually SAYING very little, it became obvious that this group of executives were all cut from the same cloth.

To that end, in terms of their wardrobe choices, it seemed that they were actually “cut from the same cloth” as all were nearly always pictured donning Polo Shirts and Khakis. While I’ll be the first to admit that I have, from time to time, worn the same garb, the “business casual”-ness of it all was hard to ignore. They ran in groups, spoke the same language (even if it was decipherable to only a few), and always wore something with a collar and usually a crest.

Along the shores of Lake Erie, the Polo Shirt Mafia, or as it later became known in a brilliant off-shoot Lacoste Nostra (coined by Anthony from Willoughby…currently watching baseball in Cincinnati), ruled with Shapiro leading the Family and Antonetti learning the trade at Shapiro’s right hand. Now, Shapiro has stepped aside (or up, depending upon how you want to see it) and the Indians are left with the hand-picked “co-GM” of Shapiro and, as I said before, this was hardly a surprise.

In fact, the title transfer was made official back in February and was hit on in this very space at length. Going back and looking at that piece again, I’ll stand by what I wrote back then (as little has changed) with the high points (relatively speaking) coming in the timing of the change, in terms of Shapiro stepping aside with the tear-down pretty much complete:
Shapiro could have insisting on sticking around until after the 2011 or the 2012 season, when the prospects of the team competing look to be brighter or when he could hand the reins off to Antonetti, with the team contending or at least closer to contention. Instead, the transition will come about half of a season after the second rebuild/reload/whatever began in earnest, with Antonetti coming in more or less after Shapiro will have been the point man on most unpopular decisions.
--snip--
Now, realize that Shapiro will still be the GM (again, at least in terms of public perception) when…not if, when the Indians trade (or at least attempt to trade) Westbrook, Wood, Peralta, and maybe even Branyan this coming season. By the time that Antonetti will assume the GM reins, all of the dirty work will have been done in the rebuild, with the roster purged and the contract situations of Lee, Victor, Wood, Westbrook, and Peralta in the rearview mirror…all completed in the “Shapiro regime”.

Remember, that was written back in February…but that was pretty much the script for the season, was it not?

Going further from the old piece (and I don’t mean to just re-use this stuff, but it is wildly relevant again), the question of whether Antonetti was merely a Shapiro clone was examined:
If you’ll remember, Shapiro was (a long time ago) the protégé of John Hart and Hart’s hand-picked successor, and while there is a difference here as Shapiro will stay in the organization (which Hart did not), time will tell what kind of GM Antonetti will be.

That is to say, as much as these guys sound like they could finish the trains of thought for one another, much less sentences, anyone who has ever worked in a business realizes that even the closest of allies do not see eye-to-eye on EVERY single issue. When a decision has been made, as much back-room complaining can be done about it, a good business (or organization) has the soldiers fall in line, toe that company line and articulate it clearly, as if they believe every bit of it.

While Shapiro and Antonetti always seem to be reading from the same script, the truth (with any situation involving human beings) is that if you’re not in charge, you generally have your own ideas about doing things. That doesn’t mean that Antonetti is going to stray wildly from what is already in place with the Indians’ organization (as he had a hand in building the structure), but does anyone truly believe that this is simply an extension of Shapiro’s reign, with Antonetti playing the role of marionette and Shapiro pulling the strings from a higher office?

Perhaps the most cynical and pessimistic among us believe that, but I’m more inclined to see how Antonetti acts as a GM and HOW he arrives to those actions as well as WHY he ends up there. Perhaps it will reveal itself to be a continuation of Shapiro’s beliefs and maneuverings, but seeing as how Antonetti is, in fact, a different person (though it is difficult to discern between the two at times), I’ll see what he brings to the table and decide from those actions and not simply from what everyone “thinks” will happen.

By the way, just to jump back to the February piece, please note that I did nail the Mike Chernoff promotion (exciting for everyone…I know) to his new position:
As for a best guess as to who plays the role of Assistant GM (formerly occupied, to some critical acclaim, by Antonetti) in the new arrangement, a name to remember would be Mike Chernoff, the current Director of Baseball Operations.

Additionally, I will point out (as I did in February) that Chernoff was listed #6 on a list of potential future GM’s that Will Carroll put together back in June of 2008.

But back to Antonetti and wondering what, exactly, the Indians are getting as a GM, what I wonder about (not that I’ll ever get this answer) is what moves of the past 5 years were the ones that Antonetti was the dissenting voice in the room…again, assuming that the Front Office isn’t so completely on the same page that they agree about everything. For whatever reason, I remember the story told about Mark Shapiro (then Farm Director) banging his fist against the table, protesting the Brian Giles-for-Ricky Rincon deal and (again, while this would NEVER become public knowledge, given the CIA-level of secrecy of the Indians) I wonder at which points Antonetti reluctantly went along with a decision, or saw a move happen that he wasn’t all too fond of.

While one would hope that this kind of insight could have been gleaned by the current beat writers (and I don’t count Castrovince as one of these anymore, given his promotion at MLB.com…so, read him here now), nearly every interview is so narrow-minded in terms of asking specifically about the team as it exists right now, instead of where the team has been and where it SHOULD be going. If you haven’t been reading the sit-downs with Antonetti recently, you haven’t missed much:
Beat Writer - “So…um, what are you going to do at 3B?”
Antonetti - “We’re going to look for a 3B, probably one who is a good defender.”

Beat Writer - “What are you going to do with Choo?”
Antonetti - “We’re going to approach him about a multi-year deal and, if that doesn’t happen, we’ll sign him to a one-year deal.”

Seriously, at a certain point, I could create a faux Q & A anticipating the mind-numbing questions from the local media and the evasive, non-committal answers from the Front Office that has taken place for far too long, with the enlightened opinions of Castrovince no longer at our disposal to wade through the muck. After reading everything about Antonetti in the last week, I actually think that I know less about him or what he’s going to do and, while some of that is by design, all of this brings us to the entrée of today’s brunch.

In case nobody remembers (and this feels like much longer ago than it really is), before the 2009 season, I contributed on an Indians’ Preview book with some of the guys at LGT, as well as some other terrific writers…including Joe Posnanski. Regardless, one of the meatiest pieces in the Indians Annual 2009 (or IA2K9, as it was lovingly called) was an extended interview that Jay Levin of Let’s Go Tribe conducted with then-Assistant GM Chris Antonetti.

Given the recent events regarding Antonetti’s promotion, Jay convinced the publisher, Maple Street Press, to make the story available online for reading. In the article, you will find the most insight that you likely ever will read into the inner workings of the Indians’ Front Office and their decision-making process. Despite the fact that, as Jay says in the opener, “the Indians are notoriously tightlipped about the proprietary statistics they’ve developed to evaluate hitting, defense, and pitching” but continues that the team “emphasizes strong, candid communication, and Antonetti seemed to be fighting his own natural cordiality in order to protect the team’s trade secrets”, the interview is insightful and probing.

Although it does, at times, devolve into vagaries because Antonetti is coy about tipping his hand on much more than generalities, Levin was able to glean information from him on topics that are fascinating to examine, particularly with the benefit of hindsight…remember, these interviews too place in December of 2008 and January of 2009. Among the many topics hit on in the now-published piece were Kerry Wood and medical issues, the value of a player on the trade market versus the value to the team (in this case, with Kelly Shoppach as the example), how they approach Free Agency, and their due diligence before making a deal.

If you’re waiting for the snippets from the piece, they’re not coming as the complete interview is worth a read so again, here’s the link…I’ll wait until you finish it…

Not to simply let sleeping dogs lie, Jay posted the unpublished portions of the interview over the course of the 2009 season and just recently posted the final part of the interview that had not yet been published in any space. The topics hit in the portions of the interview that did not make IA2K9 are a fascinating look at the value of closers (made more interesting by the fact that Chris F. Perez would not become an Indian for another 6 months or so), an unbelievably insightful piece on the contract given to Travis Hafner and whether there was any buyers’ remorse that existed in the Winter of 2008 (there didn’t seem to be and sheds some light as to how the Indians approached the extension from all angles), the ongoing issue at 3B (one that remains unresolved), and finally a bit on Antonetti on a personal level (a topic he was obviously not interested in discussing or pulling back the curtain on) and on the perception that he is among the “new age” baseball executives, separate from the “old school” scouts and traditionalists.

Again, there are links embedded in each of those that will give you about 15,000 of Chris Antonetti’s words, perhaps more insightful in hindsight (when everyone’s glass was still half-full) than anything that will pass through his lips these days, which will be even more measured and evasive than that…if that is possible.

In terms of the “transition of power” to Antonetti, much has been made about the Indians essentially having everyone move up one step with Shapiro “graduating” to role of Team President. In fact, when you see it all broken down in one place (as Stephanie Storm does), it is jarring to see how the structure essentially remains the same, with new titles being the main change.

To that end, as for the rest of the Front Office promotion looking like a continuation of the status quo (when the status quo has looked woefully underprepared and unprepared in the 2008 and 2009 seasons), perhaps the rumors that former Diamondbacks GM Josh Byrnes could be joining the Indians in a Front Office role (first reported by Ken Rosenthal) can find some favor on the corner of Carnegie and Ontario, if only to bring in that “fresh set of eyes” who has been in other organizations and is not simply resigned to accept the process because “that’s how it’s done around here” and could instead bring a discerning (and perhaps dissenting) voice to an organization that could be stuck in a rut because of tunnel-vision.

If you don’t remember, back when Byrnes was fired from Arizona, I advocated a return to his “roots” back in July, in the hopes that he would return (yes, return…and you should read this) to the Tribe Front Office. If you want a prudent use of money this off-season, use it to acquire a talented executive who will question why the Indians do what they do and provide some fresh perspective (or at least an outside perspective) on the road they’ve already laid out in front of them for the past 2 ½ years.

If Josh Byrnes does make his way to Cleveland, would his relationship with Brandon Webb put the Indians in the running for a rehabbing Webb, who is probably going to receive a contract that would be “very heavy on incentives and very light on guaranteed money”?

Nobody knows, but it gets back to the question of what can really be expected from Antonetti this off-season. That’s hard to say as their “shopping list” (SP, 3B, RH bat, 4th OF, RH reliever) is pretty well known…assuming that is their “shopping list”. Again, most of the “dirty work” (clearing off contracts, unpopular trades) has already occurred and if, as it has been stated, Antonetti’s fingerprints can be found on specific deals, starting with the Cliff Lee deal, it bears mentioning again what they have targeted since July of 2009 – big, strong pitchers who have the potential to miss bats.
Take a look at the list of acquired arms, just from the CP Lee and Victor deals:
Masterson – 6’6”, 250 lbs.
Carrasco – 6’3”, 220 lbs.
Knapp – 6’5’, 235 lbs.
Hagadone – 6’5”, 230 lbs.
Price – 6’4”, 210 lbs.

You can mention the likes of Corey Kluber, Zach McCallister, Scott Barnes, Connor Graham and others, but those names listed above (with heights and weights…ding) get to the point as to what the Indians are attempting to do with these arms. Given the astonishing attrition rate and injury rate for pitchers, the Indians have been targeting high-upside arms, capable of being dominant starters (assuming health and projection) or, at worst, relievers at the Big League level. Throw guys like White, Gardner, and Pomeranz on this list if you’d like, but the Indians (after years of going for the “polished” product or the player “close to contributing”) have gone after the potential difference makers in terms of pitchers.

Whether or not those arms pan out remains to be seen, but as we’re seeing this off-season, the importance of pitching, and more importantly DOMINANT starting pitching, rules the day in the post-season. From Halladay to Hamels to Lincecum to Cain to Hughes to…yes, even Sabathia and Lee, the team with the better starting pitchers (and the bigger studs at the front end of their rotation) are generally going to have an advantage in the playoffs.

Don’t think that the reason for the success of the 2007 team (CC and Fausto at the top end) was lost on the Front Office and, while it could be said that every team is attempting to find those front-of-the-rotation studs, the moves that the Indians have made since the Lee deal show that they have some concrete plans to resort back to that reliance on superb starting pitching.

If you don’t think that the Indians had that stable in place (albeit with poor timing) in the mid-to-late-90s, consider what SI.com’s Jon Heymann wrote about CP Lee’s off-season value rising because of his postseason performance, with that value reaching some dizzying heights:
Before Halladay took a $60-million, three-year extension with Philly, Lee turned down a similar offer, believed to be for three years and somewhere in the mid-$50-millions from Philadelphia, who eventually traded him to Seattle. Word was, he was thinking about more than double that, maybe something close to Johan Santana’s $138-million, six-year Mets contract.

Now, word going around the game is that Lee might seek three times what Philly offered. In other words, Lee might try to match his old Indians teammate CC Sabathia’s deal, which is for seven years and $161 million. “Why not?” one club executive said. “He’s as good as Sabathia.”

Look at that second quoted paragraph again and realize that, when we enter the 2011 season, the two biggest contracts ever handed out to starting pitchers in baseball history may come in the course of two off-seasons for players that made their MLB debuts with the Tribe and who were teammates for four full seasons (2004 to 2007) and who resided in the 2008 rotation together for a team that was 37-51 when CC was dealt.

There’s plenty of blame to go around in those circular arguments (and I’ve laid more that my share of blame here), but the Indians (as they were constructed from 2003 to 2009) were designed to be reliant on strong starting pitching (CC, Lee, Carmona, Westbrook, etc.) and the blueprint doesn’t seem to be all that different now.

Granted, there’s no way to know now how all of these arms shake out, but the Indians have started to stockpile young, big, swing-and-miss pitchers (some from Brad Grant’s drafts, that have looked to potentially bear some immediate fruit) and how those arms project to MLB is going to determine where the Indians go, just as the maturation of those young, undeveloped arms in the early-to-mid-2000s dictated the franchise’s trajectory.

If the Indians get production from Carrasco (or even Masterson) and the likes of White, Pomeranz, and Knapp develop in a manner in which the Indians hope, the Indians will find themselves in a position rivaling (and probably exceeding, because of the positional talent) where they were only five years ago, when their potential seemed limitless.

However, if that situation were to play out, which GM takes the “credit/blame” for that as most of the names listed above were technically acquired under Shapiro’s watch. Regardless of whether Antonetti played a major role in that decision, those players will be identified as “Shapiro’s guys”, just as the drafting of CC coming under John Hart’s watch remains another blemish on the draft record of Shapiro’s tenure.

To that end, it gets to what Chris Antonetti should be doing this off-season, in that he should be looking to not simply continue the status quo for the sake of status quo. He should be attempting to separate himself from Shapiro, if at all possible, to debunk the notion that he is simply “Shapiro, Jr.” or is in his new office to continue to do Shapiro’s bidding. While I’m not suggesting that Antonetti should suddenly start exploring how to get Jeff Francouer on the roster or see if Oliver Perez can be had (as I’m not suggesting stupidity for stupidity’s sake), he’s coming into a situation that he can put his stamp on over the course of the next couple of years. His ability (or inability) to do so will go a long way towards coloring public perception of him (fair or not) and whether he is simply an extension of the status quo in the name of stability or if he brings a different opinion and approach to the position…his own.

Lessons Learned

The 2010 season is officially in the books and while the MLB playoffs will roll on for the next month or so, the eulogies, obituaries, and post-mortems have been rolling in front of our eyes for the better part of a couple of days. While The DiaBride will be happy to catch her “Glee” and “Private Practice” on the nights that they actually air (instead of sitting through a Tribe game, then catching up on the DVR when possible), the end of the season means that most Tribe fans move on to a period in which we miss the pattern of baseball, the regularity of it, and the promise that each game provides. Nevertheless, an off-season awaits (along with my plan to re-watch “The Civil War”...obviously unbeknownst to The DiaBride), and before we tackle all of the issues facing the Tribe, perhaps it would be better to tie up the season in a nice tidy package. Since the highs and the lows, the hits and the misses have been discussed (with an absurd number of words) in this space, I’m going to hold off on doing any full-blown season recaps because…well, if you’ve been paying attention, you know what happened.

That being said, much transpired over the course of the last six months (as it often does) and while it does provide some levity to go back to see what was written in anticipation of the season (and here’s mine, which I am oddly proud of), the more important things to take from the season come in the learned lessons, the questions that remain, and what answers lie out there in the darkness of the off-season.

Thus, without going too deeply (relatively speaking) into stats or “what’s coming next” (as there is plenty of time for that), let’s realize that 2010 has shed some light on particular corners of the organization. While others remain shadowy (at best) going forward, questions were answered and while other answers remain out there in space, let’s take a moment to recap what we learned, what we didn’t, and (for another day and another couple thousand words) what may be coming…

What We Learned
First and foremost, we learned that SS Choo is a tremendous player who has provided stability in the ocean of uncertainty that has surrounded this team for the last two years. Looking back at The BLC and where he came from (and I don’t just mean from Seattle for Broussard), does anyone remember when Choo returned from TJ surgery back in 2008 and was out of options and there was some thought that he would a platoon option for Frank the Tank, who was struggling mightily?

In that 2008 season, he did bounce around the OF with Gutierrez and Francisco, for the remainder of the year, the trio flanked around Sizemore in the hopes that the Indians could finally find a suitable corner OF for the future incarnation of the Tribe. Well...Since he’s returned from injury in 2008, Choo has posted an OPS of .897 since his return in 2008 and his OPS+ of 144 in that timeframe ranks as the 9th highest mark in MLB over that 3-year stretch, ahead of Holliday, Morneau, and Teixeira, among others whom he’s outpaced…no, seriously.
Click on the link...do it.

Interestingly, his terrific season has given an opening for this groundswell that Choo “needs to be signed right away” sports-talk radio mantra, which is wildly misleading for those who hear or read only headlines and see Choo as the next Indian who will make his way out of Cleveland. While that perception may be ultimately true, what it fails to take into consideration is that, you know... he’s under club control THROUGH THE 2013 SEASON!

So yes, he needs to be signed in his first year of arbitration eligibility to avoid the arbitration process (which can turn ugly) and the Indians can approach he and his agent about giving up some of his Free Agency years, but the first of those FA years comes four full seasons from now. If there were any indication that Indians’ fans have grown a little paranoid on this whole “players leaving” thing, here it is as most of the city acts as if Choo’s time in Cleveland is about to expire when he is, in fact, under club control longer than Travis Hafner...seriously. So as much as everyone moans that the team is “stuck with Hafner for two more years”, realize that they control Choo for one more year past that.

For now, let’s appreciate Choo and know that he’s going to get paid handsomely (and rightfully so) for the next three years, whether the contracts come as three one-year deals or as a three-year deal or even as the first three years of a multi-year deal that buys out some FA year. While that last scenario is unlikely, the first and second still keep him here until he’s 31 years old, which does not present such a bad scenario going forward.

As for the player that looks most obviously to be Choo’s running mate in the middle of the lineup, Carlos Santana showed why he is one of the top prospects in the game as he put an OPS+ higher than the Rockies’ Carlos Gonzalez did and, while it was admittedly in 1/3 of the plate appearances, he did it from behind the plate and not a traditional power position, like the OF. Santana’s all-too-brief time in Cleveland this year proved that he was worthy of the hype as he arrived with his bat barrel blazing and looking like he was prepared to stabilize the middle of the lineup from Day 1. While he may move him to 1B from time to time going forward (or even to DH), Santana looks like the best pure hitting rookie (in terms of readiness and immediate impact) the Indians have had since the Baby Bull burst on the scene in the early 90s.

While Santana provided some stability to the middle of the order, Chris F. Perez did what no Indians’ reliever has been able to do for the better part of the last decade as he took complete control of the 9th inning, dominating at a clip that hasn’t been seen since the halcyon days of the mid-1990s. Perez was given the opportunity to be the full-time closer after Wood was dealt and ran with it, posting the lowest ERA (0.63) in the second half of the season among all MLB pitchers with more than 20 IP after the All-Star Break. In that timeframe, Perez whiffed 32 and walked just 10 in his last 28 1/3 IP and limited opposing batters to a .445 OPS, proof to the dominance that Perez brought to the mound in the 9th. Even more compelling than that dominance was the air of invincibility that accompanied Perez as he strode out to record the final three outs as the Indians seem to have finally found that bad-ass at the back-end of the bullpen, capable of shortening the game to 8 innings for opposing teams, something that has been sorely missed for far too long.

After the three obvious bright spots (The BLC, The Axe Man, and Chris F. Perez) that provided clarity, the other rays of light come with some remaining questions as Carmona (3.77 ERA) has returned from the abyss…but to what degree not being known, and while Carrasco utilized his September opportunity (unlike last season), his ability to pitch like he did in 2010 for an extended period of time remains to be seen. The pitching staff posted a 3.89 ERA after the All-Star Break (5th best in the AL), but many members of that staff still face serious obstacles before they become definitively “known” assets.
But I’m getting ahead of myself as those questions fall into the next section…

Back to what we definitively learned, the idea was always out there that injuries can crush a season for any team, but for a team like the Indians, losing their four best position players (Sizemore, Cabrera, Choo, and Santana) for extended periods of time were simply too much for the lineup to bear. If the injuries revealed anything about the team, it shone the light on the thinness of the roster as the team was forced to rely on players who were thought to either be nothing more than organizational fodder or not even on the organizations’ radar when the season started.

Through all of these injuries, we learned that this team is willing to exercise a good deal of patience with their young players. While a good deal of that “patience” came as a result of the aforementioned injures, some of it was rewarded as players (R. Perez, Masterson, and Brantley...somewhat) showed steady (or even drastic) improvement as the season progressed, while some of it looks foolish in hindsight (most notably Crowe and Valbuena...who had 310 PA, by the way) and likely represents the last bit of “patience” that some of these players are going to see at the MLB-level.

To that end, a number of players who were thought to be part of that organizational cavalry, who should have arrived back between 2006 and 2008, are ostensibly at the end of their (limited) usefulness – Marte, Crowe, Jenny Lewis, Laffey...just to name a few, and that’s not even including Aubrey, Sowers, Garko, Snyder, etc., who have already been relegated to a perpetuity of minor-league detritus.

Those “waves of arms”, much less talent?
Yeah, most never hit the shore and the ones that did make landfall will never be mistaken for whitecaps. Perhaps there are more out on the distance or closer to the shore, but that particular group of players (aged 26 to 28 or so) who have struggled to adjust to MLB seems to have hit its expiration date.

Past the injuries and the “patience”, we saw that the internal bullpen arms are starting to arrive, and while the relievers (past Perez y Perez) are still question marks, some optimism abounds that the days of Jose Jimenez, Scott Stewart, Oldberto Hernandez, and Danny Graves have given way to Vinnie Pestano, Tony Sipp, Frank Herrmann, and (eventually) guys like Bryce Stowell, Zach Putnam, Josh Judy, Rob Bryson, and Bryan Price. Hard-throwing, bat-missing relievers that can be plugged into the bullpen in a manner that has been the status quo in the Twin Cities but has remained elusive for the Tribe may be on its way to being remedied from within, which provides optimism on two fronts – that they’ll have an effective bullpen AND that they’ll do it with homegrown players.

Finally (and with the names of Oldberto and Graves invoked), we learned that the Indians’ use of the FA scrap heap is not as abhorrent as some make it out to be, as the team gave Minor League deals to Kearns and Duncan and saw them contributing positive attributes (Kearns OPS+ of 117, Duncan OPS+ of 106) to a team in need of some stop-gaps as injuries hit around the same time that some of the youngsters revealed themselves to be “not ready for prime-time players”. Even the much-maligned Rusty Branyan would end the 2010 campaign with 25 HR on the season, one of only 19 players to do so in the AL and while he may not have been much by way of a “scintillating” player (or even all that necessary) while in Cleveland, the Indians paid him $1.5M for 10 HR in 52 games played. Realizing that this “scrap heap” stuff is nails on a chalkboard for some, as long as the usage for those ancillary players does not take away from young players that obviously are part of the future of the team, I’m OK with these forays into the land of Kearns, Branyan, Pavano, and others as the Indians have actually shown to be surprisingly effective in finding some players on the cheap in the last two years.

What Remains a Mystery
While some questions found answers (some good, some not so good), too many remain unresolved after a full season to count 2010 as too much of a success in terms of overall development. That is to say, while Choo, Santana, and Perez look to be pillars to build upon, questions surround nearly every other position and player on this roster and deeper into the organization. While some of those questions are to be expected given the youth and inexperience on the Indians, enough intriguing mysteries remain to fill a bookshelf.

First and foremost is the multitude of questions in the rotation, as the starting pitching was a surprise, but whether it is sustainable is another story as (nearly) every pitcher in the rotation has presented reason for optimism, but a reason that comes with a caveat. Each question leads to another question with these players and this is worthy of probably a whole series of pieces, but the crux of issues for each pitcher that figures into the 2011 rotation can be quickly summarized by wondering…

Can Carmona continue to improve, armed with a new weapon in his change-up, or is his “recovery” complete and is what you see now what you get...

Was Carrasco’s September a harbinger of things to come or is it simply a mirage against post-September-call-up competition…

Did Masterson really “figure it out” as the season wore on or is the bullpen still his landing spot because of his disparate splits…

Which Mitch Talbot (still out of options) will appear in 2011, as his first 15 starts (3.88 ERA, 1.35 WHIP) run in sharp contrast to his last 13 starts (5.23 ERA, 1.71 WHIP)…

Are Tomlin and/or Gomez viable options for the 2011 rotation or simply organizational depth/fodder for next year and beyond…

Will Dave Huff, now 26 years old with a 5.84 ERA (70 ERA+) with 208 MLB IP in 38 career starts and on the outs after an ill-timed Tweet, even be a member of the organization when 2011 starts...

How close/far away are the likes of Alex White and the rest of the recent draftees (Joe Gardner, Matt Packer, Drew Pomeranz) from legitimately being considered as even depth options…

As much as you’d like to say that a season and 162 starts (well…161 if you don’t count Germano’s start) would give a clearer idea of what the Indians have in their stable of starting pitchers and while some optimism exists for many (and not all) of these pitchers going forward, 2011 figures to be a continued look at all of these arms to glean what the team truly has in each and where each pitcher ultimately figures into the short-term and long-term future of the organization.

If the rotation looks to be wrought with questions but some possible answers, the biggest obvious “hole” on the team remains 3B, which is still a “work in progress”, to be kind. With Andy Marte likely on his way out of the organization and the underwhelming/unproven internal options of Jayson Nix and Cord Phelps (sorry, I’m not buying Jared Goedert as a legit option after his offense fell apart in the 2nd half and because of his defensive…um, “issues”) looking underwhelming and unproven, the Indians have to determine how to approach their 3B issue and weigh the importance of improving their infield defense (important) with solidifying 3B with a multi-year deal for a veteran (not important) and act accordingly this off-season.

Outside of 3B, the Indians appear to have logical options at every other position and, while uncertainty still surrounds how 2B plays out next year for some (Donald will start the season with Kipnis pushing him mid-season), 8 of the 9 positions seem to have players that are likely starters for 2011. That being said, most of those players disappointed in 2010 for various reasons and while the Indians have to wade through how to separate “development/maturation” curve from a “this is who this player is” flatline, and few of the young players are immune from having to separate themselves by excelling in 2011.

The topic has been dissected from all angles (in multiple overviews and specifically) to no end, particularly in this second half of the season. However, it is obvious that major steps need to be taken in 2010 by young offensive players – LaPorta chief among them – and while all figure to be on a long leash in 2011, this year showed that they are either young players struggling to adjust to MLB or are simply players ill-equipped to adjust to MLB. The answer may come in 2011 for some of those young players, because 2010 just cast more doubt on too many of them.

If a long leash exists for many of the young position players that struggled, the (relative) success of bullpen in the second half didn’t answer too many questions as bullpen consisted of players with varying degrees of an obvious future with the team. Though the past has taught us not to look too closely at periods of the season for relievers (and I’m excluding C. Perez here), the second half of the season represented a bullpen that showed signs of life, if from some unlikely sources:
C. Perez – 0.63 ERA, 0.87 WHIP, .445 OPS against
Jenny Lewis – 1.76 ERA, 0.85 WHIP, .497 OPS against
R. Perez – 2.40 ERA, 1.40 WHIP, .701 OPS against
Tony Sipp – 2.81 ERA, 1.06 WHIP, .654 OPS against
Joe Smith – 2.96 ERA, 1.23 WHIP, .534 OPS against
Justin Germano – 3.31 ERA, 0.99 WHIP, .664 OPS against
Vinnie Pestano – 3.60 ERA, 1.80 WHIP, .614 OPS against
Frank Herrmann – 4.71 ERA, 1.40 WHIP, .795 OPS against

How does everyone feel about the 2011 bullpen looking like this?
That may be overly dismissive of players that DID perform down the stretch in 2010, but Jensen Lewis and Justin Germano represent those kind of “stop-gap” players that the Indians are hopefully getting away from in the bullpen. That being said, each thrived in the second half of the season and while Perez y Perez and (the still-inconsistent) Tony Sipp look like they should be part of the bullpen in 2011, do you see any of these names and immediately recognize who should be pitching the 7th or 8th inning as a RH reliever?

Maybe that name is there and will simply emerge over time (as relievers are wont to do, as Rocky Betancourt did), but going into 2011 with that group of RH relievers (outside of C. Perez) does not evoke confidence. While it is true that more compelling options exist down the road, the trajectory of Frank Herrman’s season should serve as a warning against getting overly excited about AAA numbers (Herrmann in Columbus – 0.31 ERA, 0.81 WHIP in 28 2/3 IP) or a small-sample (Herrmann’s first 19 appearances in Cleveland – 2.37 ERA, 1.15 WHIP) with these young relievers.

While all of the questions about the rotation, the infield, and the bullpen have to do with players still trying to establish their value in MLB, the bigger questions exist with players who have established themselves in previous years (or in a brief stint this year), but who now find themselves returning from injury – be it a recent injury or a lingering one.

All of the team’s five best offensive players (Choo, Hafner, Sizemore, Cabrera, and Santana) missed significant time due to injury in 2010 and perhaps the biggest question facing the Indians (after which members of the rotation are legitimate MLB starters, and to what degree) is how those players return from those injuries. While the answer already exists for Choo (who did miss time this year, though not as much as initially thought) and the hope that Cabrera will rebound in 2011 from his struggles in 2010 (whether those struggles were caused by injury or not), how Sizemore and Santana (most notably) return from their injuries will go a long way in determining the direction of the 2011 season.

This season for both players could be marked as “incomplete” and while Sizemore’s performance prior to the injury call into question what can be expected of him (as well as wondering when the injury occurred) and Santana’s performance gave a glimpse as to what is possible, you want a crazy stat?

Austin Kearns, the player signed to a Minor-League deal with no 40-man guarantee, traded on July 30th, had more Plate Appearances than Santana and Sizemore combined this year...

While the idea that Hafner is getting healthier and healthier will be floated out there all off-season, the realization that Hafner’s is what it is at this point (incapable to playing prolonged effective stretches without rest), which will likely lead to the Indians adding a RH bat to complement him, Sizemore and Santana remain wild cards. If Sizemore can return to the form that saw him posting a cumulative OPS+ of 128 from 2005 to 2008, the offense could find some traction, particularly in terms of lengthening out. Additionally, if Santana can pick up where he left off last year (before Ryan Kalish unceremoniously ended his season), the offense comes into clearer focus and becomes more than just The BLC.

Health has, unfortunately, become a topic that Indians’ fans have grown all too aware of in the past three years and how important players on the team (both young, “youngish”, and old) recover from those injuries could stabilize the lineup in a way that an emerging group of young position players may simply not be ready for.

All told, 2010 was a painful year to live through and, while the hope that the pain was a result of the team building up in the way that a muscle aches as it grows, the fear that it is simply a gaping wound cannot be escaped. Much was learned, but more needs to be surmised in terms of particular players and groups of players as the season wore on.

So, if this is what we learned in 2010, what can be done leading up to 2011 to put the Indians closer to contention or at least to seeing that “window of contention” crack open, even a few more inches?
Stay tuned...

Attending to a Lazy Sunday

As the rhetoric has changed from “will the Indians avoid 100 losses” to “can the Indians really win 70 games” (not that 70 wins is any great shakes) on the strength of their sprint to the finish line over the last week or so, the 2010 will thankfully draw to a close today and the Indians will head into the off-season with a list of hits, misses, and hopes for the future incarnations of this team. While the entire off-season awaits to examine the moves that should and should not be made and the moves that will and will not (and I’m thinking that “will not” will rule the day) be made, perhaps today represents a day as good as any to the 2010 number that has been getting the most attention recently - 1,391,644.

That’s right, as the season winds down and the Indians come off of a 7-game winning streak, a good deal of focus has been placed onto the Indians’ “setting” the attendance record since they arrived in Jacobs Field as they drew the fewest fans since 1992, the year prior to the final season in Municipal Stadium…and remember, that 1993 number was inflated by people who wanted ticket priority for Jacobs Field.

If you don’t think that much attention has been paid to it, realize that the Editorial section of Sunday’s Plain Dealer had a piece about attendance and the economic impact that it has on the city, while taking the requisite swipes at the Dolans and the organization. This is an important topic apparently, despite the fact that elections are about a month away, local corruption has made the area a laughingstock once more, Cuyahoga County is ushering in a brand new regional governmental system with a new county executive and county council, none of whom have been elected, there is a state-wide race for Governor and Senator…and THIS is what graces the paper for me this morning for a medium that can’t figure out why they’re struggling to remain relevant.

Regardless of how a dying elephant chooses to draw attention to itself, there’s little question tha the attendance issue is an issue nonetheless and much of it has to do with a state of apathy that has settled on the North Coast. That apathy has come mainly from the perception that the Indians are ill-equipped to compete with the “haves” in MLB on a regular basis (which is true) and that the latest “Reloading/Rebuilding/Whatever” is full of empty promises and a place where “hope” is a plan.

How the Indians address, or don’t address, this perception this off-season will be fascinating to watch as Joe Posnanski has a great piece (unsurprisingly) questioning whether a team like the Royals (to use his example) should take the same avenue of marketing that Domino’s Pizza is currently taking, where they’re owning up to their inadequacies, apologizing for it, and promising to get better. The crux of it is that fans are tired of hearing that a team is “three years away” from contending, particularly when that refrain lasts for 15 years.

This is brought up because the most common reasoning that I hear from people who are disgusted with the current state of the Indians (well, second most common…after MLB disparity) is that the Indians constantly try to sell their future to the general public, just as the Royals have done, as Posnanski points out. As a sidebar, while the 2009 and 2010 seasons have been wildly disappointing in terms of end records, I’d put 2008 as inordinately more soul-crushing, given what was at stake.

But that idea of “what was at stake” is where I think the Indians in recent years separate themselves from those aforementioned Royals, or even the Pirates and Orioles, whom the Indians have suddenly been lumped in with as teams built merely on “hope” and “luck”. To get to the idea of why the Indians, even in recent years, don’t fit into that group of the MLB dregs, peep this:
The last time the Royals won 80 games or more was in 2003, when they won 83
The last time the Pirates won 80 games or more was in 1992, when they won 96
The last time the Orioles won 80 games or more was in 1997, when they won 98

In the last 15 years, here is the number of 80 win seasons for each franchise:
Kansas City 1 (3 in the last 20 years)
Pittsburgh – 0
Baltimore – 2 (1996 & 1997)

For some context, the Indians have 4 seasons in which they’ve won 80 or more games SINCE BARTOLO COLON WAS TRADED in 2002 (and those 4 have occurred in the last 7 seasons), with two 90 win seasons in that 7-year stretch and while the dissenting voices will say, “great, so we’re better off than those three dreadful franchises and we can win 80 games every other year…let’s throw a parade”, they’re missing the point.

The point is that every team who finishes a year well out of the playoff mix (like the Royals, Pirates, and Orioles...just to further the use those as examples) has bright spots and players they can point to as building blocks for the future, with the idea that the whole plan will fall into place and the team will become the latest in the list of “surprise” teams (like the Reds and Padres this year) and bear the fruit of their developmental efforts. Year after year ends with those bright spots, and players to build on, and a litany of “could be” statements.

Unlike many other teams, the Indians DID pull themselves out of the “could be” side of the ledger already in the last decade as they built, in short order, a contender from the ground up. Sure, the contender didn’t last long enough, but 2002 and 2003 certainly felt like the Indians were about to enter the realm of the bottom of the barrel in MLB and, while that feeling is pervasive to some now, the Indians should have made the playoffs in 2005 and were one win away from the World Series in 2007…this after the trade of Colon that made it feel like the Indians would never sniff the playoffs again.

The talk can go to why the Indians were unable to sustain that success, and that’s a legitimate conversation, but the Indians did climb that mountain of MLB competitiveness (something not easy to do) and they did it in the last 5 years, something that few teams can lay claim to that lie in similar financial standing to the Indians.

Would it have been great if the Indians simply transitioned from one group of contending groups to another in terms of players, with a sustained level of contention?

Absolutely, but while the baseball world cries over the fact that the Rays are about to break up (and they are about to break up and their window could be closing), the realities of sustaining success in MLB for small-market teams (solid drafting and development) are evident to anyone who takes even a moment to pay attention to this team and to MLB as a whole. On that side of the ledger, this organization has failed in recent years, but that “draft and develop” our own players thing has been beaten to a pulp in this space.

Regardless, the team is attempting to climb out of the crater again and while the crater may be of their own doing, it brings us back to the attendance issue as fans have stayed away and the question sits like the 800 pound elephant in the room - how does this team attract the fans?

Well, winning is an important component here, something that is not lost on the Indians as here’s Acta in a piece from AC that we’ll get back to in detail a little more later:
“People pick and choose what they want to support,” he said. “I can’t tell people what to choose. I am excited about this franchise. It’s a fact that we have to do things a certain way. It’s tough to tell people that’s what we have to do. But this is the way we have to operate. Our best chance is to draft and develop our players and make as few mistakes as we can. That’s the reality. All I can do is try to accelerate the process as much as I can to make this an exciting, blue-collar unit that people will want to come watch play.”

There is that optimism among the organization and among some fans that the talent to succeed, and perhaps sustain success, lies in wait already within the levels of the team. But will winning truly bring people back on a regular basis to the ballpark?

This is brought up (and I’m sure I’ve brought this up before) because here are the records and attendance for the team, starting with the 2005 team. For the sake of context, included is the rank in attendance as well as stadium capacity (which measures more accurately apples to apples because of disparate stadium sizes) for the last five years:
2005: 93-69
2,013,763 - 24th of 30 MLB teams
57.3% Capacity - 23rd of 30 MLB teams

2006: 78-84
1,997,936 - 25th of 30 MLB teams
56.8% Capcity - 22nd of 30 MLB teams

2007: 96-66
2,275,916 - 22nd of 30 MLB teams
65.6% Capacity - 17th of 30 MLB teams

2008: 81-81
2,169,722 - 22nd of 30 MLB teams
62.5% Capacity - 18th of 30 MLB teams

2009: 65-97
1,776,904 - 26th of 30 MLB teams
51.8% Capacity - 24th of 30 MLB teams

2010: 69-92
1,391,644 - 30th of 30 MLB teams
40.1% Capacity - 28th of 30 MLB teams

We all know about the slow starts and the inability of the team to put together two consecutive years of contention, which allowed some to be able to fall back on the “last year was a mirage, when they put a consistent winner on the field, I’ll go back” argument. But look at that number in 2007, where they ranked 22nd in attendance and 17th in stadium capacity filled, for a team that was one win away from the World Series. Even after that year, 2008 saw an attendance DROP, where fans still stayed away despite the Indians being the darling for many media members, who picked them to win the World Series before the season started.

So, if winning (albeit inconsistently) isn’t necessarily the panacea that most people think that it is, it goes back to the question of what this organization needs to do to engage a disenfranchised fanbase. While the cleveland.com crowd will howl about spending money on the FA market, remember that the Indians did spend money (imprudently, it turns out) on Kerry Wood prior to the 2009 season and the result at the box office was no different than a continuation of the downward trend. Some of that had to do with the performance on the field and with the trades of CP Lee and El Capitan mid-season, but the precipitous drop continued, despite wading into the FA waters.

Though it flies in the face of everything that sports-talk radio holds dear, spending money on FA for this organization is simply not the manner in which they should be building this team, particularly at this time in their developmental cycle. Remember when Billy Beane told Pete Gammons this on payroll:
“The way the system is right now, there really is no difference between a $75 million and $40 million payroll,” said Oakland GM Billy Beane. “I think a lot of small-market clubs look at that and ask, ‘Why pay $75 million when $40 million will buy me as many wins?’”

In case you don’t remember, here’s a quick reminder on recent payrolls on the North Coast, along with an absolutely fascinating graphic that compares the payrolls of all 30 teams over the last decade to the amount of wins they’ve averaged in that timeframe.
2003: $ 48,584,834
2004: $ 34,319,300
2005: $ 41,502,500
2006: $ 56,031,500
2007: $ 61,673,267
2008: $ 78,970,066
2009: $ 81,579,166
2010: $ 61,453,967

But I digress and will try to bring this back into the present tense in terms of what the Indians should be looking to do THIS off-season, in terms of improving their team but also to put out some sort of measure of good faith to the public that they are not content to slip into the dregs of MLB.

With that in mind, here are the payroll commitments for 2011 that have numbers already set – Hafner ($13M), Sizemore ($7.667M) and Carmona ($6.288M), which adds up to $27.455M

There will be bumps in arbitration for Rafael Perez (2nd year of arbitration), but more notably for Choo and Cabrera and perhaps CF Perez. That list finally leads us back to the idea of how this team should be approaching this off-season as most assume the first priority to be locking up The BLC on a long-term deal. While most fans don’t realize that Choo is under the Indians’ control for three more seasons and are wildly unfamiliar with arbitration and only see Scott Boras looming while the idea that Choo is not long for Cleveland takes off, let’s take a step back and analyze this Choo situation.

To get us to where we’re going, let’s first address this garbage story from Detroit about Choo wanting to join the Tigers, which comes from this particular columnist who has been (inexplicably) banging the drum for the Tigers to pick up Peralta’s option because Peralta has experienced a “turnaround” in Detroit when he’s really just been hot recently...and when has Peralta ever been hot to close out a season…no, not Jhonny. Additionally, this “turnaround” is largely false as Peralta’s OPS+ in Cleveland was 95. His OPS+ in Detroit is 97…so maybe these glowing remarks that Peralta had to say about Motown had to do more with him being “happy” (partly because he’s back to playing SS) because it is “so different” playing for the Tigers. And why wouldn’t Jhonny feel more comfortable in a place where he’s not seen as a profound disappointment, who peaked at age 23 and regressed at the plate and in the field ever since.

Regardless, back to Choo and this intimation that SS Choo told Peralta, “When I'm a free agent, I want to go to Detroit.”…um, everyone knows that Scott Boras is The BLC’s new agent right?

Perhaps this has nothing to do with Peralta at all when you consider this story last year on MLB.com that listed the Tigers as front-runners for the services of Johnny Damon, who was essentially out of other options, before Detroit swooped in and gave him $8M, likely due to the “relationship” between Boras and the Tigers, which is explained in some detail in the piece:
In 2004, clubs were reluctant to negotiate a multiyear agreement with catcher Ivan Rodriguez, a Boras client, because of concerns that his aging body wouldn't hold up to the grind of catching. The Tigers came through with a four-year, $40 million contract (though only two years and $19 million were guaranteed to Pudge). He played four strong years for the Tigers, batting .298 with 67 home runs and 268 RBIs while playing in at least 129 games each season.
In 2005, Boras client Magglio Ordonez was the last prominent free agent available on the market, due to concerns about his surgically repaired right knee. The Tigers didn’t just take a chance on him; they gave him a five-year, $75 million contract. He played just 82 games in 2005 but bounced back to play in an average of 147 games a season over the next four years. Ordonez topped 20 HRs and 100 RBIs each season from 2006-08 before dropping off last year, although he still hit well enough (.310 average) to vest his option for 2010.
Both the Rodriguez and Ordonez contracts came shortly before the opening of Spring Training camp, so the Damon deal, if consummated, would not be without precedent.
In fact, Boras’ ties to the Tigers run deep, as he has also represented the likes of Kenny Rogers, Bobby Seay and Rick Porcello. And in Ilitch, Boras seems to have found a successful negotiating partner.
“The thing I like to say,” Boras said last week, “is that Mike knows his investments. His businesses are successful.”

Starting to see where this comes from now, even if it is just a conversation between two players who may not have had that much to talk about on the field before a game?

This Boras/Tigers thing is actually pretty pervasive and you can throw Jacob Turner on to that list and, if you don’t know who that is, he’s the Tigers’ 2009 1st Round Pick who received the largest signing bonus ever given to a high school player ($4.7M in a MLB deal that could pay him $4M more) and you start to see why the Tigers have been whispered in Choo’s ear by Boras, who has been the beneficiary of Mike Ilitch’s largesse for quite some time. I wouldn’t go so far as to say that Scott Boras has an unusual amount of pull in the Tigers’ contract decisions, but don’t be surprised if Jayson Werth is suiting up for Detroit next year…and that Werth’s new agent (one Scott Boras) is smiling broadly at the press conference.

Back to Choo and this looming contract issue, MLB Trade Rumors had an interesting piece a while back, bringing in some comparable players and what they earned in their first year of arbitration, settling somewhere around a $3M to $4M salary for The BLC next year, then making the case for Choo in terms of an extension:
If Choo is making $3-4MM next year and is set to receive raises in 2012 and 2013, the Indians would likely have to be prepared to spend considerably to sign Choo for the next three seasons. Antonetti could go year to year, especially if it looks like Choo will have to serve in the South Korean military, but if the Indians do sign their right fielder for the next three years, it probably won’t be for less than $20MM.
Nick Markakis, who signed a long-term extension with the Orioles after the 2008 season, then had remarkably similar numbers to the ones Choo has now. Markakis, who also has a strong throwing arm and plays right field, edges Choo in average, runs and homers, but Choo has more RBI and steals and better on base and slugging averages. Markakis’ extension could be a model for Cleveland and he will earn $20MM for his three arbitration seasons.

Markakis contract is actually a 6-year deal worth $66M, so the $20M that he earned in the first 3 years (and the breakdown was $3M in the first year, $6.75M in the second year, and $10.25M in the third year) is technically true, but it’s also lost in the fact that Markakis has 3 years on that deal worth an additional $46M.

That being said, I could see the Indians using that 3-year, $20M number as a starting point, but I don’t see it going much past that, based on Scott Boras’ likely plan for Choo past those three years (which could or could not involve Detroit) and Jon Steiner from WFNY summed this up quite well in a piece from some time ago, but that certainly rings true:
While I agree that Boras won’t let Choo sign a contract longer than three years, I do think it’s likely that Choo will sign rather than going to arbitration. For one thing, I would think that a 29 year old outfielder might want some job security. All it would take is one injury to end Choo’s earning potential were he to go to arbitration (arbitration settlements last for one year only). If, on the other hand, he signs a three-year deal with the Indians, he would be protected financially in case he were to get injured, even if he did believe he was leaving some money on the table to do so.

Let me say this...I love Choo, I love the fact that he is The BLC and that he came out of nowhere to become the player that he has become. I have a deep appreciation for the fact that he truly is a 5-tool player whose worth is likely understated by the fact that he’s currently playing with a group of prospects. However, the question is whether the Indians should be looking to give a long-term deal to Choo as he’s still under club control for three years and he’s going to get his money, whether it’s in a series of three one-year deals (arbitration or not) or some other amalgamation that combines to give him three years under contract with the Indians.

Should the Indians be looking to lock up Choo past those three years, given his recent performance and given what we’ve seen at the box office at the corner of Carnegie and Ontario?

The fact is that Choo’s going to be 30 when his contract expires and 31 in his first year of FA and if you don’t remember, there was another slugger who signed an extension when he was 30 and whose performance has dipped considerably since he signed that deal. For teams like the Indians, long term deals for 30+ year old players generally aren’t a good idea and, as unpopular as this may be to say on the heels of Choo’s 2010 season, the Indians always have to be paying for future production, not past results.

Perhaps Choo is an exception and his recent play certainly looks as if he’s among the best players in the AL (or at least in the conversation), but the Indians need to balance what’s right for the organization today against what’s best for the organization tomorrow. That may not be a popular opinion, but signing Westbrook and Hafner certainly looked like great deals for the Indians of 2007, but turned out to be poor decisions in hindsight.

Ultimately, the Indians should let other teams fight over a six or seven year deal for Choo and if they want to take a logical approach to Choo this off-season, I like the idea of going after that 4th year as an option year, even if it means front-loading some of this deal which is to say that if they use, say a 3-year deal worth $24M to buy out his arbitration years, they work the numbers so he’s getting paid $8M annually and not on some sort of escalating scale, where he would get paid $3M, then $7M, then $10M in the next three years.

Would that be enough to entice Boras into agreeing to a $12M (which is what Markakis’ contract includes for the first year that he gave up FA) or thereabouts club option?
Not bloody likely, but it gets back to the idea of what this organization is going to do to “prove” to the fanbase that they’re above the likes of Pittsburgh and Kansas City this off-season to entice the folks back to the ballpark.

Regardless of the fact that they may not even care and may simply keep their heads down as they attempt to carry through with an existing plan, I’m hoping that the Indians don’t make a foolish foray into the world of FA to pacify the fanbase by throwing bad money at a mediocre player. Reason being that the way that teams like the Indians are built isn’t through Free Agency. Generally, that avenue should only be taken when drafts and trades have left a crater at a particular position, with no immediate or coming help being apparent.

For this current Indians’ team, the question becomes whether adding a FA turn this team into an immediate contender?

Sure, there were bright spots in the second half, as the team was 34-38 after the All-Star Break and the pitching, specifically the turnaround for Carmona and the September starting pitching, along with the performance of the bullpen, specifically CF Perez (who is currently 3rd in ERA+ for pitchers with more than 60 IP in all of MLB with an ERA+ of 229, which ranks behind only Billy Wagner and Joakim Soria, in front of Rafael Soriano and Brian Wilson) are undoubtedly signs of life.

But if you’ve been following the recent history of the team, the Indians are probably better served staying the course that they’ve already laid out and while most think that the Indians are going to get that starter for the rotation, Acta’s comment that they go after “not a veteran, but a good pitcher…you can’t just bring in a 40-year-old guy to say you brought in a veteran” brought this from Castrovince, who waded waded through the post-mortem press conference as only Castrovince can:
Because good pitchers cost good money, I would say it’s somewhat safe to assume the Indians will stick with the arms they have in place. But I’ve been wrong before.

Since most assume that the “good pitcher” essentially boils down to a return from Jake Westbrook, with him accepting less money to come back to Cleveland, this is fairly interesting from St. Louis:
Cardinals’ starter Jake Westbrook, nearing the eve of his first shot at free agency, said he shares the club's interest in his return and wouldn't be resistant to discussing a deal before hitting the open market.
“I’m definitely going to be open-minded about pretty much everything,” Westbrook said. “If they had interest, I’ve definitely enjoyed my time here. I’ve gotten to know the guys well. The organization is definitely one that everybody knows about, that I’ve certainly heard a lot about, and now, firsthand, I’ve gotten to see that everybody was right.”

Pieces like this come out at the end of every season for every veteran, but if “the Cardinals coveted Westbrook for several years, and pitching coach Dave Duncan is among those advocating Westbrook’s return” as the piece asserts, Jake may be squarely in the crosshairs of the Cardinals and may not be making a return to the North Coast

If Jake does stay in St. Louis, is the idea of getting a “good pitcher” even feasible or prudent?
When you look at other players that are out there, you start to wonder. Just to use an example, always-alert reader John Mast points out that Joel Sherman of The New York Post sees Javy Vazquez getting a “one-year, $4 million gamble with incentives” (and, truth be told, the guess is at the end of a piece that questions whether Vazquez is the WORST YANKEES PITCHER EVER...oh, the humanity), so is that the way that you’d like to see the Indians go in “adding” to their rotation?

Interestingly, since 2003 Vazquez has inexplicably operated on this bad year followed by a good year cycle and if you look at the pattern (to which there's probably nothing), he’s “in line” for a good year:
2003 – 139 ERA+
2004 – 92 ERA+
2005 – 101 ERA+
2006 – 98 ERA+
2007 – 126 ERA+
2008 – 98 ERA+
2009 – 143 ERA+
2010 – 81 ERA+
It is worth noting that, except for 2007 with the White Sox, all of the years with ERA+ above 100 occurred in the NL, while all of the years with ERA+ under 100 occurred in the AL...so, perhaps there’s something to that. Additionally, I’m scared off a little by the fact that he can’t seem to stick anywhere and I think I remember Ozzie Guillen calling him a “loser” or thereabouts questioning his heart and I’m not sure we need that (if there’s even a kernel of truth to it) rubbing off on young, impressionable pitchers.

To that end, serial poster Cy Slapnicka sent me an interesting proposition as he doesn’t see Westbrook taking the Indians’ discounted offer and wonders whether a better tact to take in terms of adding a veteran presence to the pitching staff to serve as “an assistant pitching coach, basically a recently retired veteran, with a good idea how to approach the game from the pitchers perspective – not a pitching coach fixing mechanics – but a Millwood-type player, to help the young staff mature, as Millwood did in 2005 or even as Byrd did later”.

The idea is not without merit if you remember what CC and Westbrook said they learned from Millwood that one year in terms of pitching and maybe the Indians already have a person like that in Charles Nagy, who did an effective job with Carlos Carrasco in Columbus.

Regardless of what they do, it comes down to the question of what the best use of money is and whether the Indians are better served taking a chance on a reclamation project, like the aforementioned Javy Vazquez or someone of similar ilk, or if the Indians should simply keep going on this track that they’ve laid out. It should be noted that the off-season between 2003 and 2004 saw the Indians add Jeff D’Amico to their rotation and traded for Jeriome Robertson, so if the past provides any clues as to what they’re going to do…it’s not a lot.

But that brings it all back to this idea about how this off-season is important to the Indians in terms of public perception. If they generally stand pat on the FA front (which is probably the right move) or simply sign Choo to a one-year deal, how will that affect how they are seen by most fans?

Perhaps them staying out of the FA market and going year-to-year with Choo is the most prudent way to approach both situations. But neither of those actions (or non-actions) is going to bring the droves back to the corner of Carnegie and Ontario. Ultimately, winning will…or at least it should, and the Indians have to hope that the players that they’ve put into place for 2011 and beyond are able to return the team to its winning ways.

While those “winning ways” in recent years were all too brief and bittersweet in terms of where we sit now, they find themselves (again) at a place in which they need to separate themselves (again) from organizations that constantly sell the idea of “next year” or “three years from now” because the Indians are dealing with a fanbase that has been sold “next year” or “three years from now” from all of its teams for the last 40 years and the Indians’ ability or inability to come through on providing “next year” in short order (as they did in 2005 and 2007) will ultimately determine the future of the franchise in Cleveland.

Going Around the Developmental Curve

Despite the Indians experiencing a last bit of success as 2010 comes to a welcome finish, the overwhelming bad taste in the mouth from a season gone horribly wrong remains as there are nights when the light at the end of the tunnel seems to be getting smaller, instead of things coming into focus throughout the course of the season.

Back when the season started, lo those many days ago, the thought was that the young offensive players for the Tribe would make their way in Cleveland while the pitching would remain a work in progress. The youth of the team was unmistakable, as was the sense that 2010 represented a year that would be looked upon as providing some building blocks for the future.

Since the Indians had just undergone a massive tear-down and build-up earlier in the decade, the question emerged as to where this 2010 season would fit in that developmental curve that lasted from 2002 (the bottom) through 2005 and 2007 (the peak) and into 2009 (the bottom once more) and while some (ahem...me) floated the idea that the 2010 Tribe would line up favorably to the 2004 Indians, comparing the 2010 season prior to the season with the 2004 team was presumptive and more than a little optimistic, given that the 2004 Tribe finished with an 80-82 record and chased the division lead into August.

Knowing what we know now, and with the season nearly complete, little doubt remains that the 2003 Indians (68-94) remain a much more apt comparison to the 2010 Indians (68-91) and it brings up something that needs to be done in terms of putting the proper context around this trainwreck of a season.

That context is that it needs to be asked where the Indians (as they are currently constructed) truly are in this developmental life-cycle in terms of how it relates to the build-up of the previous incarnation. Since some schools of thought existed that the Indians' offense would be able to mature and develop into a productive unit (it didn't) and that the rotation would be completely devoid of bright spots (it wasn't, with Fausto, Carrasco, and to a lesser degree, Masterson), the 2010 season is pretty much finished and the question of where this team sits, in comparison to past incarnations, is worth a look.

The review, which could be seen as an exercise in futility by attempting to tie two separate teams together, becomes necessary because the 2002 to 2005 build-up is a body of work that exists from this Front Office and it undoubtedly is being used as a blueprint to get this team back into contention in short order. Additionally, outgoing GM Mark Shapiro had this to say to the Akron Beacon Journal in terms of where he thinks the team is in the life-cycle of a small-market team:
“I try to get back to '02 and '03 and what it felt like and look at us now and think we're in a better position now than we were in '03 and probably even '04. If you go around the diamond, we've got more talent and our system is in a better position than it was then.”

Rather than reading this and simply sitting around, exchanging “harrumphs” - hey, I didn't get a “harrumph” out of that guy – how about taking a look at this from a rational standpoint and try to determine whether the Tribe is really are better off than they were in 2003 and “probably even 2004”?

The 2004 team went 80-82 and probably represents a best-case scenario for 2011 so, again, let's dismiss this as wishful thinking (and I'll show you why in a minute here) and go back to that idea that the team is “in a better position now” than they were in 2003.

To that end, here are the numbers put up by the offense and the pitching staff, in terms of runs scored and runs allowed, for each incarnation of the Tribe, with 3 games left to play in 2010:
2003 Runs Scored – 699
2010 Runs Scored (to date) – 632

2003 Runs Allowed – 778
2010 Runs Scored (to date) – 737
“Year of the Pitcher” and all...I know, but the PITCHING in 2010 is the aspect of the team that surpassed where the 2003 team was at this stage of development and lest you think that we're comparing two unrelated groups of players in terms of age, check this out:
2003 Average Age of Hitters – 27.0
2010 Average Age of Hitters – 27.3

2003 Average Age of Pitchers – 26.3
2010 Average Age of Pitchers – 26.3

Going further on this, check out the number of players used each season:
2003 – 54 Hitters, 29 Pitchers
2010 – 38 Hitters, 22 Pitchers

Why is this so interesting?
One would think that when development is the main thrust of the organization, that the number of players that cycle through the lineup and the pitching staff is going to be long and varied. Despite the fact that the Indians did battle injuries and moved a number of veterans at the Trading Deadline, the turnover and number of players used in 2010 is significantly lower than what we saw in 2003. Just to bring in the 2004 team that the Indians will aspire to next year, here are the 2004 numbers:
2004 – 52 Hitters, 30 Pitchers

What's amazing as the 2010 season draws to a close is that they didn't just continue to throw guys out there (while it certainly seemed like they were) and stuck with the players (for the most part) that they figured on when the season began. Interestingly, the number of players used in 2010 is actually closer to what the 2005 team looked like, as they used 38 hitters and 17 pitchers. Though that's the last time that you see the 2010 team and the 2005 team used in the same sentence, or even in comparable terms, let's get back to the idea that we're attempting to compare the 2010 team with the 2003 team to see if the current team really is “in a better position” than they were in 2003, when they were still two years away from winning 93 games.

Since we've already looked at the overall numbers and ages, how about taking it by hitters and pitchers, grouped into smaller designations to see how the two teams stack up. Starting off, here are the hitters listed by plate appearances (more than 150 PA), age, and OPS+ for that year, taking it position-by-position grouping for the sake of simply not listing these guys:
Catchers – 2003 Indians
Josh Bard (Age 25) – 329 PA, 78 OPS+
Tim Laker (Age 33) – 176 PA, 72 OPS+
Victor Martinez (Age 24) – 174 PA, 84 OPS+

Catchers – 2010 Indians
Lou Marson (Age 23) – 287 PA, 59 OPS+
Carlos Santana (Age 24) – 192 PA, 143 OPS+
Santana and Victor certainly represent the duo worthy of comparison and I say this while wearing my tear-stained Victor jersey, I would certainly prefer Santana v.2010 over Vic v.2003 in terms of prospect pedigree, power, and overall upside. While the injury that The Axe Man sustained tempers the enthusiasm, it is not enough to say that I would say that the Indians aren't better off now at catcher than they were in 2003...and I say that with an El Capitan-sized hole in my heart.

Corner Infielders – 2003 Indians
Casey Blake (Age 29) – 621 PA, 93 OPS+
Ben Broussard (Age 26) – 429 PA, 100 OPS+

Corner Infielders – 2010 Indians
Matt LaPorta (Age 25) – 413 PA, 88 OPS+
Jhonny Peralta (Age 28) – 373 PA, 95 OPS+
Jayson Nix (Age 27) – 291 PA, 99 OPS+
Russell Branyan (Age 34) – 190 PA, 127 OPS+
Andy Marte (Age 26) – 180 PA, 95 OPS+
This grouping is absolutely fascinating as the Indians find themselves in the same place they were in 2003 in terms of 3B, in the middle of cycling through a litany of marginal retreads (one of whom turned out to be Casey Blake) in the hopes that those “stop-gaps” could provide some time before a more compelling prospect came along. While that “more compelling” prospect didn't exist for the 2003 Tribe until Andy Marte was acquired (and is anyone else shocked that Marte has an OPS+ of 95, which is admittedly still low for a corner infielder), the Indians do have an internal stop-gap in Cord Phelps and perhaps another one in Nix (if his glove improves SUBSTANTIALLY, though his numbers compared to Blake are intriguing), who would eventually give way to the “compelling prospect” in The Chiz.

As for 1B, the inclusion of Broussard on this list and the fact that he out-performed LaPorta in these respective years points again to the disappointment in the 2010 season for LaPorta. When you figure that that Broussard was generally seen as more of a placeholder (although the team did eventually turn him into Choo) or a platoon player as MaTola has been unquestionably painted as a potential member of the next “core” group of players. While giving up on LaPorta (or taking PA away from him in 2011) is irresponsible, next year represents the year that LaPorta needs to separate himself from the Broussard/Garko mold and into what was envisioned when he was acquired back in 2008.

Middle Infielders – 2003 Indians
Brandon Phillips (Age 22) – 393 PA, 48 OPS+
Omar Vizquel (Age 36) – 250 PA, 78 OPS+
Jhonny Peralta (Age 21) – 270 PA, 67 OPS+
John McDonald (Age 28) – 233 PA, 45 OPS+

Middle Infielders – 2010 Indians
Asdrubal Cabrera (Age 24) – 412 PA, 86 OPS+
Jason Donald (Age 25) – 325 PA, 93 OPS+
Luis Valbuena (Age 24) – 294 PA, 53 OPS+
Whereas the 2003 team gave both Phillips and Peralta their first taste of MLB, both players were extremely young and showed it at the plate as each was given a pretty long leash (in Peralta's case because of an injury to Vizquel), something that was afforded in 2010 to both Donald and Valbuena. While Valbuena hung himself with the length of the rope, Donald contributed to the team, even if it was not at a level that will guarantee him anything in terms of a position for the entirety of the 2011 season. Regardless, both Donald and Cabrera outperformed their 2003 counterparts, and while the disappointment is unquestioned in terms of Cabrera's offensive output, the Indians' middle infield seems to be further along the developmental stage in 2010 (with Kipnis waiting in the wings) than they were in 2003, when promise was certainly there in Phillips and Peralta, if not results.

Outfielders – 2003 Indians
Jody Gerut (Age 25) – 525 PA, 120 OPS+
Milton Bradley (Age 25) – 471 PA, 147 OPS+
Coco Crisp (Age 23) – 447 PA, 76 OPS+
Matt Lawton (Age 31) – 429 PA, 104 OPS+
Shane Spencer (Age 31) – 232 PA, 103 OPS+

Outfielders – 2010 Indians
The BLC (Age 27) – 630 PA, 145 OPS+
Trevor Crowe (Age 26) – 460 PA, 82 OPS+
Austin Kearns (Age 30) – 342 PA, 116 OPS+
Mike Brantley (Age 23) – 304 PA, 68 OPS+
Everyone remembers when Jody Gerut and Milton Bradley were two of the “building blocks” of this organization in 2003, right? This grouping, to me, shows how quickly perceptions and realities can change as the idea that Gerut, Bradley, and Crisp represented the future quickly gave way to Bradley taking a cab home from a Spring Training game, Gerut bottoming out, and Crisp being seen as an easily-replaceable piece, dealt after the 2005 season.

What that means for the 2010 Tribe, I can't really say as Choo operates on a different plane than anyone that was on the 2003 team, in terms of realized production AND potential and Crowe and Kearns won't (or at least shouldn't) be a part of this team past this year. As for the youngsters, Brantley and Crisp are an interesting little pair here as Brantley is often touted as a future “core” player while Crisp was often dismissed as a useful, if not necessary, piece and their performance as 23-year-olds with more than 300 PA make the comparison an intriguing one as Brantley will likely do what Crisp never did next year – move Sizemore (not on this list because he only had 140 PA this year and who was the one real addition to the mix in 2004) to LF.

Designated Hitters – 2003 Indians
Travis Hafner (Age 26) – 324 PA, 115 OPS+
Ellis Burks (Age 38) – 228 PA, 109 OPS+

Designated Hitters – 2010 Indians
Travis Hafner (Age 33) – 449 PA, 129 OPS+
Shelley Duncan (Age 30) – 248 PA, 105 OPS+
If you think of Hafner's career on a bell curve, 2003 represented his path up the curve and 2010 represented another year coming down from the top…it just so happens that we have no idea where the bottom of the curve lies for Hafner. While Acta's recent comments that, “we're going into Spring Training with the hope that he has no limitations” is a song that I can't seem to get out of my head, Hafner showed in 2010 that he is, at the least, a productive part-time player. Not the level of “productive” that you'd want from the salary number going his way, but it would seem that hope springs eternal from the Indians (even if that HAS to be their public face) when Acta had this to say on Hafner:
Last year he was unable to play more than three games in a row, and this year he started the season without restriction. We were just managing him to 5-6 games a week. He hurt his shoulder and went on the DL [in August], but after that he's been able to play 4-5 games a week, which is better than what he did last year.
He was obviously expecting more production this year, but he's hit 29 doubles and 12 home runs. We've talked to Travis, and the hope for next year is he'll have had one more offseason under his belt on that shoulder.

“One more offseason under his belt on that shoulder” eventually gives way to the fact that he's going on 34 years old and that the issue doesn't seem to be simply going away. That being said, there are other positions at which the Indians seem to be better off in 2010 going forward than they were in 2003...it's just that DH isn't one of them.

All told, if you had to judge the offense of the 2010 Tribe versus the 2003 Tribe in terms of future expectations (and it's here that I'll drop in that the player with the most PA from that 2003 Tribe was a 29-year-old 3B in Lacey Cake and the OPS+ leader among players with more than 150 PA was a 25-year-old player who would be traded PRIOR to the 2004 season in Milt Bradley), I'd break it down that the Indians are better off behind the plate, in the middle infield, and in RF right now with the positions of 1B, 3B, CF, and LF largely dependent upon the maturation of LaPorta, Brantley, and eventually Chisenhall as well as what type of player Sizemore (who, again, was the only real “prospect” not included in these 2003 groupings who arrived the next year and, even then, Grady had only 159 PA in 2004) returns as determining whether the Indians are truly “in a better position now than they were in 2003”

The question has been asked ad nauseum, but it comes down to whether the young players that cut their teeth in MLB this year (Santana, LaPorta, Brantley, and Donald most notably) can make the same leap that Martinez, Hafner, Peralta, and even Crisp did between the 2003 and 2004 season as the Indians went from scoring 699 runs in 2003 to scoring a whopping 858 runs in 2004, largely because of the steps taken by Hafner (OPS+ of 162 in 2004), Martinez (OPS+ of 125), and even Coco Crisp (OPS+ of 110) towards becoming known quantities. Back in 2004, even Ben Broussard (OPS+ of 127) and Casey Blake (OPS+ of 122) posted the best offensive years of their career while neither was seen at the time as much more than placeholders until something better came along.

In Choo, the Indians of 2010 have a player that didn't exist in their lineup in 2003 and when Shapiro says that the Indians “are in a better position now than” they were “in 2003 or even 2004”, the truth is that they're probably somewhere between those two and whether they continue to develop offensively relies on a number of factors, none of which would seem to be sure things.

Interestingly, the entire Shapiro quote that served as the impetus for this is that “we're in a better position now than we were in '03 and probably even '04”, which continues with “if you go around the diamond, we've got more talent and our system is in a better position than it was then” and that notion of “around the diamond” is interesting because while the 2010 offense may compare favorably to the 2003 team with the hope that some of the 2004 break-outs await particular players in 2004, the pitching remains another story.

With that little intro laid out there, here are the pitchers for both the 2003 Tribe and this season's club, listed by innings pitched (more than 35 IP), age, and ERA+ for that year
Rotation – 2003 Indians
CC Sabathia (Age 22) – 197 2/3 IP, 122 ERA+
Jason Davis (Age 23) – 165 1/3 IP, 94 ERA+
Brian Anderson (Age 31) – 148 IP, 119 ERA+
Jake Westbrook (Age 25) – 133 IP, 102 ERA+
Billy Traber (Age 23) – 111 2/3 IP, 84 ERA+
Ricardo Rodriguez (Age 25) – 81 2/3 IP, 77 ERA+
Cliff Lee (Age 24) – 52 1/3 IP, 122 ERA+
Jason Stanford (Age 26) – 50 IP, 123 ERA+

Rotation – 2010 Indians
Fausto Carmona (Age 26) – 204 1/3 IP, 103 ERA+
Justin Masterson (Age 25) – 178 IP, 82 ERA+
Mitch Talbot (Age 26) – 152 1/3 IP, 85 ERA+
Jake Westbrook (Age 32) – 127 2/3 IP, 84 ERA+
Dave Huff (Age 25) – 79 2/3 IP, 63 ERA+
Josh Tomlin (Age 25) – 68 IP, 87 ERA+
Jeanmar Gomez (Age 22) – 57 2/3 IP, 84 ERA+
Carlos Carrasco (Age 23) – 38 2/3 IP, 121 ERA+
What initially jumps out from that 2003 Rotation (other than the 2 future Cy Young Award winners) is the youth and how many innings those young pitchers threw that year as 526 2/3 innings were pitched by starters that were 24 or younger (Sabathia, Davis, Traber, and Lee) and even the pitchers that were over 24 years old weren't that much older as only Brian Anderson and Jason Stanford were starters over 25.

Additionally, 5 of the 8 starters from 2003 posted ERA+ over 100 with a 22-year-old CC posting an ERA+ of 122 in nearly 200 IP. Compare that to the 2010 version, where 2 of the 8 starters listed posted ERA+ of 100 or better and even those that were sub-100 performed at a level lower than what Jason Davis put forth in 2003. Some of this speaks to the volatile nature of pitching and trying to project success for any arm, but the fact that CC put together a nearly 200 inning season posting an ERA+ of 122 speaks to the potential that certainly seemed to exist in that young staff.

If 2010 showed the Indians anything, it was that they are currently full of back-end-of-the-rotation guys like Talbot, Tomlin, and Gomez and have a few arms that project as solid middle-of-the-rotation guys in Carmona and perhaps Masterson (assuming September shows that he realized the adjustments he needed to make), but short of Carrasco, who put up an ERA+ that was close to what CC did in 2003, albeit with nearly 160 IP and one year older, the Tribe lacks that pitching rotation that was the linchpin of those 2005 and 2007 teams. That is not meant to be overly dismissive of the current group (as I think that I have been overtly optimistic, particularly in the cases of Carmona, Carrasco, and even Masterson) as the potential has shown. Instead, it reflects on what was in place in terms of rotational arms in 2003.

This is all “old” news, I know, but if we're putting this 2010 team in the proper context in terms of development, that 2003 staff far outpaces what the 2010 staff did...and at a generally younger age. The argument could be made that the Indians currently have players in the Minors (White, Gardner, and even Pomeranz) who project to join this mix going forward, but Adam Miller and Jeremy Sowers were two names that were thought to represent re-enforcements for this 2003 group from within that either never arrived or never panned out. Whether a similar fate (knocking on any wood I can find) awaits any of the Indians' prospects (and Rondon has already undergone Tommy John) remains to be seen.

Essentially, the lack of a “CC”-type player is what separates these two groups. Certainly, it could be argued that Sabathia is the type of 22-year-old player who would separate just about group of pitchers from having an obvious “ace” from having a collection of arms who can be cobbled together to create an effective staff, but seeing as how the 2005 and 2007 teams were built on starting pitching around CC's left arm, the differences between 2003 and 2010 begin to emerge.

That being said, if the team is further ahead in terms of position players, although how far ahead will reveal itself in 2011, and behind in rotation options, where the 2010 team comes out in much better shape is in the bullpen:
Bullpen – 2003 Indians
Terry Mulholland (Age 40) – 99 IP, 90 ERA+
Danys Baez (Age 25) – 75 2/3 IP, 116 ERA+
David Riske (Age 26) – 74 2/3 IP, 193 ERA+
Jason Boyd (Age 30) – 52 1/3 IP, 103 ERA+
Jack Cressend (Age 28) – 43 IP, 176 ERA+

Bullpen – 2010 Indians
Tony Sipp (Age 26) – 62 IP, 93 ERA+
Chris Perez (Age 24) – 61 2/3 IP, 225 ERA+
Rafael Perez (Age 28) – 60 IP, 119 ERA+
Aaron Laffey (Age 25) – 54 2/3 IP, 85 ERA+
Hector Ambriz (Age 26) – 48 1/3 IP, 71 ERA+
Frank Herrmann (Age 26) – 43 2/3 IP, 96 ERA+
Joe Smith (Age 26) – 38 1/3 IP, 99 ERA+
If nothing else can be taken from 2010, at the very least, it represents the first time that the Indians can count on a young closer that became a bona-fide closer for the Indians since, well...I guess Jose Mesa, although even he was more of a failed starter (Joe Table started 33 games for the 1993 Tribe, but you knew that) than a lockdown reliever from the start. In Chris F. Perez, the Indians have the (young) player who brings the attitude AND the filth to the mound in the 9th inning that this team could have used...well, about three years ago.

Regardless of his arrival date, Perez brings some stability to the 9th inning and some pieces and parts are starting to emerge around him, albeit slowly. To simply compare the MLB 2003 relievers – of whom Riske and Baez, operating on an ill-concieved contract, are the only arms under 28 who logged more than 35 innings – to the 2010 mix with the likes Rafael Perez and Tony Sipp (interestingly both LH) establishing themselves (or re-establishing themselves) as viable relievers going forward doesn't quite do justice to the difference between the two situations. While the 2010 Indians had older relievers who may not figure into the team's future for too long, namely Jensen Lewis (ERA+ of 126) and Justin Germano (ERA+ of 178), who are not included on this list because of too few innings pitched, the bulk of innings went to young arms and while those results were...um, mixed, in terms of guys like Heck Ambriz and Joe Smith and Frank Herrmann struggling to find consistency, much less success, the difference between 2003 and 2010 lies beneath for the bullpens.

The 2003 team had Fernando Cabrera a year away, but little else on the horizon in terms of bullpen prospects as most of the relievers that waded through the bullpen from 2003 to 2009 represented either non-prospects, lottery tickets (although Rafael Betancourt would eventually emerge as a winning lottery ticket), retreads, and lost causes as the bullpen would eventually deep-six the 2006 and 2008 seasons, or at least play a major role in the team's struggles.

If anything, the 2010 team looks to be better positioned with the likes of Perez, Sipp, and Perez already topside with the mix of Smith, Herrmann, Pestano, and even Lewis and Germano among the ranks to sift through that are already in Cleveland. Below them, arms like Bryce Stowell, Josh Judy, Zach Putnam, Jess Todd, Rob Bryson, and Bryan Price all looking like the swing-and-miss relievers that the organization failed at producing for far too many years. Attrition and injury will remove a number of those names from consideration as the years pass, but the Indians have built up a small stable of high-powered arms and designated them specifically for the bullpen, which puts the club unquestionably in a much better place going forward than where they were in 2003.

All told, if you really want to surmise where this 2010 team is on this developmental curve, they probably are somewhere between 2003 and 2004, although much of that is based on the promise and pedigree of the young hitters. The starting rotation has much larger question marks that means that it takes an awful lot of squinting through that half-full glass to see 2011 shaping up like 2004, given that so many of the young players (Carrasco, LaPorta, Brantley, and Masterson) need to take a major step towards consistency while other older players are fighting their way back from injury or ineffectiveness (Sizemore, Hafner, and Cabrera).

Beyond that, the Indians need to hope to avoid the regressions and injuries that are unforeseen in Spring Training and that have become a part of the seasons' narratives since 2008. Whether they can mature and develop while avoiding pitfalls elsewhere and plugging in more talent remains to be seen, but it has been done before as that 2003 team evolved into a contender in 2005 and again in 2007. The transformation wasn't done overnight and didn't have its surprise contributors (like Blake) and casualties (like Bradley and Gerut), but the Indians are attempting to pour the concrete again on the road that is sure to crest and dip and take many turns.

Whether that road leads anywhere better than where we've been...well, that's a question that will reveal itself as we go along for another ride.